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The Caspian Revenue Watch (CRW) is a program of the Open Society Institute’s Central Eura-
sia Project, which sees the transparent use of revenues generated by the sale and transport of
Caspian natural resources as an issue of great importance for regional development and the pro-
motion of civil society. The Caspian Revenue Watch aims to generate and publicize research, infor-
mation, and advocacy on how revenues are being invested and disbursed and how governments
and extraction companies respond to civic demands for accountability in the region. CRW also
supports projects that build the capacity of local advocates to monitor government revenues. It
seeks to help ensure that existing and future revenue funds in the region be invested and
expended for the benefit of the public—for example, to reduce poverty, reform education, and
improve public health—through the promotion of transparency, civic involvement, and govern-
ment accountability.
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The Central Eurasia Project (CEP) of the Open Society Institute acts as a policy center, grant-
making program, and OSI liaison for Soros foundations and programs in the South Caucasus,
Central Asia, Mongolia, Turkey, Afghanistan, and the Middle East. It promotes public aware-
ness about policies and developments in the region through its website, EurasiaNet, the Open
Forum meeting series, and the Eurasia Policy Forum, which helps develop policy and advocacy
initiatives. CEP awards grants to local nongovernmental organizations and international groups
that promote human rights and civil society. CEP provides support to Soros foundations in Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan.
It also awards grants relating to Iran, and is exploring initiatives in Turkmenistan, the Middle
East, and North Africa.
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The Open Society Institute (OSI), a private operating and grantmaking foundation based in New
York City, implements a range of initiatives to promote open society by shaping government pol-
icy and supporting education, media, public health, and human and women’s rights, as well as
social, legal, and economic reform. To foster open society on a global level, OSI aims to bring
together a larger Open Society Network of other nongovernmental organizations, international
institutions, and government agencies. OSI was created in 1993 by investor and philanthropist
George Soros to support his foundations in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. Those foundations were established, starting in 1984, to help former communist coun-
tries in their transition to democracy. OSI has expanded the activities of the Soros foundations
network to other areas of the world where the transition to democracy is of particular concern.
The network encompasses more than 50 countries with initiatives in Africa, Central Asia and the
Caucasus, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, as well as in Haiti, Mongolia, and Turkey. OSI also
supports programs in the United States and selected projects elsewhere in the world. 
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Foreword
It is sad but true that most natural resource–rich countries do not grow faster or perform in
other ways better than those with fewer natural resources do. This observation would seem
to contradict the basic laws of economics since more natural resources should provide more
economic advantages and opportunities. Economists and other social scientists have worked
hard to explain this anomaly and to figure out how these countries can maximize the bene-
fits of their abundant natural resources. 
Yet, the failures are legion and continuous. Oil-rich Nigeria has squandered a quarter
trillion dollars of oil revenues and is deeply in debt. Two-thirds of the population of Venezuela
still lives in poverty. Civil wars, fostered in varying degrees by struggles over control of oil, gas,
and minerals, have devastated a host of resource-rich countries. 
Part of this instability is explained with simple economics. Natural resource wealth can
destabilize exchange rates. It can cause currency appreciation that weakens sectors of the econ-
omy not based on natural resources by making it difficult for manufacturers to export or to
compete with imports. Meanwhile, the natural resource sector of the economy provides sub-
stantial revenues, but does not create employment throughout the economy. The resulting
unemployment can give rise to political and social instability. 
But the most fundamental problems that many resource-rich nations face are politi-
cal. Control over natural resource wealth provides leaders with little incentive to share power,
and gives leaders the means with which to buy legitimacy rather than earn it through elec-
tions. Leaders undertake costly investments to buy political support through job creation with
contracts often awarded to well-connected insiders. Because rent seeking and state subsidies
direct investment to unviable projects incapable of attracting private financing, many of these
extravagant projects fail to lessen the country’s dependence on natural resource development.
The desire by government leaders to control wealth generated by natural resources often dis-
courages the development of democracy and prompts violent conflict and resistance by those
who have not benefited from the resource wealth and who feel shut out of centralized, unde-
mocratic political systems. 
To avoid these outcomes, political leaders and citizens need to regard their country’s
natural resources as the nation’s endowment. These resources do not belong exclusively to the
current government or generation, but to all citizens and generations. The current govern-
ment and generation are simply trustees. To use these resources for one’s own benefit, leav-
ing future generations impoverished, is to steal their patrimony. Leaders inside and outside
of government share a responsibility to promote this sense of stewardship in resource-rich
countries. 
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Transparency of information about revenues received and fiscal accounting standards
are key to increasing natural resource management and wealth. National accounting frame-
works that do not appropriately take account of the depletion of resources are misleading; they
prompt governments to think that the economy is becoming wealthier, when it may be becom-
ing poorer. This false sense of wealth leads to bad decisions. 
Even more important is information about what the government receives for oil or other
natural resources, how this compares with what other countries are receiving, and how the
government uses the funds it receives from the sale of natural resources. Governments should
recognize that even in more developed countries major oil companies have tried to minimize
their royalty payments by under-reporting the effective price of oil and over-reporting their
costs. It was only through hard research that such evasion was detected, for instance, in the
State of Alaska, and it was only through even harder prosecution that the oil companies finally
agreed to pay the more than a billion dollars that they had avoided paying the state. 
Companies have strong incentives to maximize profits and the opacity that surrounds
oil contracts and payments can lead to abuse. A few oil companies, most notably BP, however,
are setting the opposite example, by willingly publishing what they pay. Such disclosure allows
citizens in resource-rich countries to become informed about how much the government
receives for the nation’s natural resources. It is regrettable that this commitment to good cor-
porate citizenship has not been matched by most other oil companies. 
Institutional arrangements like stabilization funds are essential to managing wealth
derived from natural resources and ensuring that the money is used to replace the natural
resource endowment that is being depleted. Stabilization funds in several countries have
helped ensure that public funds are available for the rainy day when they are needed. This is
especially important because international arrangements like the IMF, set up at the end of
World War II to help finance counter-cyclical fiscal policy, have failed to perform the func-
tion for which they were created. The result has been that most developing countries are forced
to engage in pro-cyclical fiscal policy, at great cost to the economy and society. Countries today
recognize that borrowing is highly risky, and that they must rely on their own resources, espe-
cially for stabilization purposes. 
There is no issue of greater importance than ensuring the long-run prosperity and sta-
bility of resource-rich countries by developing ways to use these resources and the wealth they
generate well. The approaches explored in this important study provide a framework that will
enhance the likelihood of success in what remains a very difficult task. 
Joseph E. Stiglitz
x i i i
Acknowledgments
This book is the product of more than a year’s work to bring together the experiences of var-
ious countries that possess natural resource funds, to analyze the oil funds created in Azer-
baijan and Kazakhstan, to assess the impact of petroleum development on the two economies,
to identify opportunities for public oversight of revenues gained from resource extraction, and
to provide policy recommendations stemming from these analyses.
Because of its broad scope, this report benefited from the contributions of many peo-
ple. First are staff members of the Open Society Institute. I particularly want to thank Anthony
Richter, director of the Central Eurasia Project, for the creation of the Caspian Revenue Watch
and for his vision in developing the concept for this work. I also wish to thank Scott Horton
for his able guidance as the chairman of the Caspian Revenue Watch advisory board. I am
grateful to CEP staff, especially Erika Dailey for her guidance and Erin Finnerty and Dan Ser-
shen for their valuable assistance. I am also deeply indebted to Ari Korpivaara, Will Kramer,
and Laura Silber in the OSI Communications Office for their excellent work in making a com-
plex subject so readable. A special thank you goes to the director of the Open Society Insti-
tute Assistance Foundation–Azerbaijan, Farda Asadov, and the president of the Soros
Foundation–Kazakhstan, Murat Auezov, for identifying able and enthusiastic local partners. 
I am grateful to Robert Ebel for his capable editing of the book, and to Chuck Sudetic
for helping prepare a summary version.
I wish to thank the contributors for the chapters they have written and for their will-
ingness to revise. I am particularly grateful to Tulegen Askarov, Sergey Solyanik, Sergey Kura-
tov, Sergey Zlotnikov, and Sofia Issenova for their research and help in answering questions
for the chapter on Kazakhstan. I am also grateful to Sabit Bagirov and Ingilab Akhmedov for
their help in revisions to the chapter on Azerbaijan.
The book benefited from the comments of advisory board members. Special thanks go
to Karin Lissakers, Richard Fineberg, Jon Elkind, Terry Karl, Miguel Schloss, and Laurent
Ruseckas for their helpful and thorough suggestions on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Out-
side readers also offered valuable commentary, and I particularly thank Warren Krafchik, John
Holsen, and Paul Mathieu.
I gratefully acknowledge research assistance provided by Zeke Vermillion, Damon
Osborne, Silvia Mercogliano, Sayaka Chatani, and Mohammad Ali.
Romania
Bulgaria
Moldova Ukraine
Turkey
SyriaCyprus
Greece
Mediterranean Sea
Aegean
Sea
Black
Sea
Sea of
Azov
Sea of
Marmara
tanker
route
●
●
★
●
ANKARA
Istanbul
Novorossiysk
Ceyhan●
Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan Pipeline
Blue Stream
 Pipeline
Caspian
 Pipeline
Caspian Energy Export Pipelines
Exisiting oil pipeline
Existing gas pipeline
Planned, proposed, or under construction oil pipeline
Planned, proposed, or under construction gas pipeline
Producing block
Exploration block
Selected refinery
Iraq
Iran
Russia
Kazakhstan
Georgia
Turkmenistan
Azerbaijan
Tengiz
oilfield
OKIOC
Caspian
Sea
barge
route
Shah
Deniz
AIOC
BAKU
barge
route
★
★
●
●
★
●
●
●
●
Makhachkala
Atyrau
Aqtau
Tabriz
TEHRAN
Neka
port
Sup’sa
TBILISI
●
Neka-Tehran
Pipeline
Turkmenistan-
Iran Pipeline
Shah-Deniz
 Pipeline
Iran-Turkey
 Pipeline
Western Early
Oil Pipeline
Northern Early
Oil Pipeline
Caspian Pipeline
Consortium—CPC
Turkmenistan-
Russia Pipeline
Atyrau-Samara
 Pipeline

11. The Hazards of 
Petroleum Wealth
Introduction
The problem of managing petroleum wealth is so universal that a rich vocabulary has devel-
oped to describe it. The “resource curse,” the “paradox of plenty,” “Dutch Disease,” “flawed
prosperity,” “economic indigestion,” “the devil’s excrement,” and even the “banyan tree prob-
lem” have all been used to describe this essential paradox: in recent decades countries blessed
with resource wealth have consistently underperformed resource-poor countries on almost
every indicator of progress ranging from human development, economic growth, democracy
and good governance, and preserving the peace.
Two years into the 21st century, oil- and gas-rich countries in the Caspian Basin such
as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are on the threshold of entering this unfortunate club. Like
many of the countries that have struggled with the resource curse, these Caspian states are
becoming petroleum exporters at the same time as they are trying to become modern states.
As massive oil rents begin to hit state coffers, these countries are still in the process of for-
mulating systems of public administration and expenditure, tax collection, legal adjudica-
“Increasing oil revenues do not imply increasing wealth.”
—SVEIN GJEDREM, 
GOVERNOR, NORWEGIAN CENTRAL BANK
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tion, a civil service, and other components of a modern state. In countries as diverse as Iran,
Nigeria, and Venezuela, this combination of state infancy and revenue windfalls has proved
overwhelming, undermining even the best efforts to develop these countries’ non-oil
economies and improve living standards for their populations. 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are two Caspian petroleum producers that have shown a keen
interest in gleaning lessons from other petroleum-based economies and a willingness to do
better. As one manifestation of their commitment to sound revenue management, these states
have created natural resource funds (NRFs) to help stabilize fiscal policy and save a portion of
revenues.
NRFs are not just fiscal instruments. The evidence of their effectiveness as tools to
smooth out fiscal management under commodity price volatility is mixed.1 Moreover, many
economists argue that countries with high dependence on oil or other nonrenewable resources
can implement sound fiscal policy just as effectively without an NRF as with one. The real
value of an NRF is not in its effectiveness as a fiscal tool but as a political instrument. This
report views NRFs as a compact between a government and its citizens that, under ideal con-
ditions, forces governments to plan ahead and to be transparent about what they are earning
and spending. NRFs can commit governments to treat revenues as public monies, not as pri-
vate income veiled from public scrutiny. By providing information to legislatures and citi-
zens about how oil revenues are being managed, NRFs can encourage another key component
of good revenue management: an educated and active citizenry capable of organizing to
demand government expenditure accountability. 
An institution such as an NRF can only be described as a compact if it has some kind
of binding power. Otherwise, it is no more than a promise that can be broken with impunity
at any time. The way to build binding power into an institution is to distribute influence among
those overseeing it. Thus, power over an NRF should be broken up among the different par-
ties that have an interest in it: the president, the legislature, the judiciary, the public, and the
oil companies. The distribution of influence over the NRF to different constituencies allows
them to check one another and thereby prevent misappropriation or malfeasance. It is no coin-
cidence that the most enduring NRFs exist in countries such as Norway, the United States,
and Canada, where separation of powers, democracy, and transparency are an entrenched
tradition. Without this separation of powers, an NRF can be easily plundered whenever the
government needs money. In Venezuela, for example, the super-presidential government
appropriated the state oil company’s $5 billion investment fund in 1982 with no opposition
from congress. Funds in Oman and Zambia were also raided when the government needed
cash. One form of insurance against the raiding of NRFs is an engaged citizenry, vigilantly
overseeing how public revenues are collected and deployed. 
This report concludes that the recently created NRFs in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are
an important first step toward good revenue management. However, for these funds to endure
and to promote the economic development of these countries, they must be rooted in a sys-
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tem of budgetary transparency and accountability, which includes a greater role for parliament
and the public in the budgetary process, and the removal of constraints on civil society’s abil-
ity to organize and monitor government fiscal policy.
The scope of this report is not limited to a narrow analysis of Azerbaijan’s and Kazakh-
stan’s NRFs, but rather to a more general discussion of how NRFs can be made to serve as a
compact between governments and citizens, and how the commitments made by governments
to transparent revenue management can be extended beyond their recently created NRFs.
The second part of this introductory chapter reviews findings on the resource curse and
provides explanations for why so many petroleum-rich states perform poorly in human devel-
opment, economic growth, and governance. A brief description of the contents of each of the
remaining chapters follows.
The Resource Curse
The last 30 years have provided oil-exporting countries with a golden opportunity to shape
their destinies. Following OPEC’s assertion of power, the price of oil increased from less than
$3 per barrel in 1970 to more than $30 per barrel in 1980, constituting perhaps the largest
capital transfer ever in such a short period. Yet, most beneficiaries were unable to translate
these windfalls into economic growth and social prosperity. The record on how resource-rich
countries managed their wealth is dismal, and dispiriting.
Low economic growth
Numerous studies have found that countries lacking oil and mineral resources had much
stronger GDP growth per capita than resource-rich countries. Between 1960 and 1990
resource-poor countries experienced growth rates two to three times higher than resource-
abundant countries. Most surprising is that the gap only widened after the 1970s, when oil
prices jumped from less than $3 per barrel to around $30.2 These findings hold up even when
controlling for population size, initial per capita income, region, and other variables that might
explain the different growth rates.
Poor performance on human development
Most countries with abundant oil resources have failed to translate oil-derived income into
better lives for their citizens. Of 48 countries for which oil comprised more than 30 percent
of total exports between 1965 and 1995, nearly half scored in the bottom third of the United
Nations 2002 Human Development Index, which ranks countries according to poverty, edu-
cation, health, and other indicators of quality of life. Only one-quarter scored in the top third,
and many of these, such as Norway and Canada, were wealthy long before oil exports became
a major source of income.
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An Oxfam study finds that oil and mineral wealth not only fails to reduce poverty, but
often aggravates it.3 The more dependent a country is on oil and mineral export income, the
higher its rates of infant mortality and malnutrition, and the lower its rate of educational
enrollment and life expectancy at birth.
Poor governance
In addition to exhibiting poor growth rates, too many resource-exporting countries tend to dis-
proportionately suffer from bad governance. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines
good governance as “the effective and transparent management of public resources; and a sta-
ble economic, regulatory, and legal environment conducive to sound management and effi-
cient use of private and public resources.”4 The World Bank’s indicators of governance include
the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the selection of their governments, free-
dom of media, stability of government, the likelihood of violent conflict, corruption, public
service provision, and enforceability of contracts.5 Those countries that possess abundant nat-
ural resources mostly cluster near the low end of the World Bank’s governance indicator. 
More specifically, several studies have found that capital-intensive natural resources are
a major determinant of corruption.6 These studies find that the direct accrual to government
of the large profits, or “rents,” from petroleum development, encourages both misappropria-
tion by government officials and rent seeking by outside groups hoping to capture some of
those profits. Pervasive corruption raises the transaction costs of doing business, thus under-
mining the non-oil sector’s ability to develop, and slowing the country’s economic growth rates.
It also disproportionately harms the poor who cannot pay the higher prices that corruption
imposes on them.
Violent conflict and human rights abuses
In addition to suffering from poor governance, most natural resource–exporting countries are
vulnerable to violent conflict. Numerous statistical and case studies have found not only a 
correlation but also a causal link between natural resources and civil war. Not only does
resource wealth increase the likelihood of civil war, but also the presence of minerals or oil
that can be siphoned away and sold provides financing that makes these wars longer and casu-
alties higher than in states lacking natural resources.7 Additionally, because of the increased
likelihood of violent conflict, oil-rich states spend a disproportionate amount on their military,
diverting resources from more productive and socially beneficial uses.
Militarization to ensure pipeline security has entailed human rights abuses in numer-
ous places. In Burma, the military has been accused of murder, rape, and torture while forcibly
relocating several villages to make way for the Yadana and Yetagun pipelines, and also of using
forced labor to build service roads, barracks, and other infrastructure for the pipelines. In Nige-
ria, years of clashes between people living in the oil-producing Niger Delta and with govern-
ment security forces have resulted in extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, torture, and
T H E  H A Z A R D S  O F  P E T R O L E U M  W E A LT H    5
the highly publicized execution of writer and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. Sudan has experienced
years of war between the government and rebels over oil income causing the deaths of an esti-
mated 2 million people.8
Reasons for the Resource Curse
Numerous studies exploring the reasons for the resource curse have uncovered a set of inter-
related constraints and incentives that resource wealth places on government leaders. As a
result, it is extremely difficult to minimize the adverse impact of oil on a country’s develop-
ment, even when leaders are guided by good intentions to transform that resource wealth into
economic and human development. The countries most vulnerable to the resource curse are
those that have not yet developed democratic institutions and a competent public adminis-
tration system and civil service.
Conducting sound fiscal policy is extremely difficult for any country with high depend-
ence on commodity exports, especially oil. The price of oil is not only highly volatile, but also
extremely unpredictable. Oil prices have no historical averages to which prices return after a
deviation. And there is no way to tell how long a price shock may last. These circumstances
make planning extremely difficult.
High oil prices, high expectations 
When oil prices are high, leaders face expectations of increased spending and find it harder
to justify saving for a rainy day. They typically launch ambitious multiyear capital-intensive
spending projects in an effort to absorb the windfall. But budgets based on a certain oil price
have to be slashed if prices change significantly. Cutting expenditures hurts the poor and oth-
ers who depend on the state for jobs or the provision of services. Because roller-coaster bud-
geting is so damaging and unpopular, leaders often turn to borrowing as a way to finance
commitments made in boom times. When oil prices are low, they must borrow at unfavorable
rates and accumulate sizeable debt. Even during the boom years, “capital-deficient oil
exporters” (oil exporters with large populations and relatively small oil reserves) were spend-
ing and borrowing so much that their debt service ratio was nearly twice that of oil-import-
ing countries.9 By 1983, the debt burden of capital-deficient oil-exporting countries exceeded
that of all less-developed countries combined.10 Even oil exporters with large reserves and small
populations, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are deeply in debt. 
Price volatility makes budget planning difficult. But oil or mineral development creates
other economic problems as well. One of the best known is the problem of Dutch Disease,
which gains its name from a phenomenon observed in Holland after the discovery of natural
gas in the 1960s.11 Dutch Disease occurs when the foreign exchange earnings from the export
of a country’s natural resources are converted into local currency, raising the value of that coun-
try’s currency. As a result, its tradable goods become more expensive and hence less compet-
6 T H E  H A Z A R D S  O F  P E T R O L E U M  W E A LT H
itive both domestically and as exports. With declining sales, the labor-intensive manufactur-
ing and agricultural sectors decline, creating unemployment and increasing dependence on
natural resources. In Nigeria, for example, the intensification of oil export and misdirection
of oil income devastated the country’s strong agricultural export sector, turning the country
into a net food importer. In Indonesia, the oil sector came close to destroying the country’s
labor-intensive rubber industry, for much the same reason.
The problems of price volatility and Dutch Disease can to some extent be alleviated with
natural resource funds. NRFs can stabilize spending patterns, breaking the cycle of govern-
ments spending extravagantly when prices are high and slamming on the brakes or borrow-
ing when prices fall. Stabilization funds, such as Chile’s Copper Fund or Norway’s State
Petroleum Fund, collect excess revenues when commodity prices are high, and channel rev-
enues back to the budget when prices fall. NRFs also combat the problem of Dutch Disease
by “sterilizing” revenues—keeping excess export earnings out of the economy and in foreign
exchange–denominated accounts to avoid upward pressure on the domestic currency.
“Normal” states versus rentier states
While NRFs can help address the problems of price volatility and Dutch Disease, they are
less helpful in resolving a more deep-rooted problem that particularly affects resource-rich
countries still in the process of state formation. Namely, the massive influx of foreign exchange
can forestall the development of “normal” states capable of extracting revenues from society,
regulating commerce, collecting information, enforcing contracts, and performing the other
functions of modern governments. Instead, these oil exporters still in the infancy of statehood
become rentier states. In rentier states, commodity-derived export earnings drive a wedge
between governments and citizens because governments are able to collect revenues without
the involvement of citizens. Hence, the extractive and regulatory functions of government
rarely develop while the distributive functions of government become bloated. Governments
launch capital-intensive spending projects designed to transform their economies and the size
of the public sector grows immensely. When oil prices are stable, this lopsided state develop-
ment often leads to wasted spending as a result of governments’ poor information-gathering
and project-planning capacity. When oil prices plummet, cutbacks in spending create politi-
cal instability. For example, Venezuela, Iran, Nigeria, and Algeria all experienced regime
change or regime crisis. Terry Karl finds that instability tended to be strongest where jumps
in state spending were most extreme.12
Why is developing an extractive, regulatory, and administrative apparatus so important?
Because taxation is the most direct relationship between a government and its citizens. It gives
the government the means to extract resources from the public and, in return, the public gains
the right to demand government expenditure accountability. The protest from the American
colonies, “no taxation without representation,” demonstrates the understanding that paying
taxes entitles one to political participation and government accountability. “When states do not
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have to depend on domestic taxation to finance development, governments are not forced to
formulate their goals and objectives under the scrutiny of citizens who pay the bills. . . . Exces-
sive centralization, remoteness from local conditions, and lack of accountability stem from
this financial independence.”13
Moreover, taxation provides the government valuable information about the country’s
economic development and needs. As Kiren Aziz Chaudhry explains, “institutions for taxa-
tion spin off related agencies, leading to a diversification of the tools available to decision-mak-
ers. . . . Taxation and the data collected through this process comprise one of the few means
to regulate the private sector and guide the economy.”14 Without adequate information about
the country’s economic activity and needs, “state spending is more likely to be informed by
primordial ties and political considerations rather than by economic rationality.” For example,
William Ascher finds that in Mexico, as much as 85 percent of contracts awarded by the state
oil company in the 1980s were made without any competitive bidding.15
During boom years, the public sector spending of petro-states aims to create a base of
public support. But when the only legitimacy a government can garner is through spending,
cutting back on spending weakens that legitimacy. A client class that exists on state largesse
is easily mobilized in opposition when benefits are withdrawn, as Saudi Arabia learned when
it tried to cut back on subsidies during the recession years of the 1980s.
Cautionary tales from resource-rich states 
With the windfalls of the 1970s, Saudi Arabia had lifted all direct and indirect taxes on com-
mercial activity. The department of income tax existed in name only. Regulatory functions lan-
guished; imports, local investments, and even construction went mostly unregulated. At the
same time the state carried out a “blind frenzy” of spending without the information and skills
to conduct sector planning, project identification, and feasibility analysis. Construction invest-
ment alone from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s was estimated at $270 billion. State spend-
ing “favored large projects controlled by well-connected businessmen or large landowners,
while information gaps almost guaranteed that state spending would favor powerful and vis-
ible social groups.”16 Because the state’s distributive policies were motivated by political con-
siderations, income did not trickle down evenly. In 1981, with annual oil revenue per capita
of $27,500, 42 percent of Saudi extended families had incomes of less than $5,400 per year.17
At the same time, the elite and well-connected top 1 percent of the population had wealth
estimated at $400 billion.18
In addition to its direct spending, the state carried out numerous other distributive func-
tions. It provided subsidies for the general population, such as free education and free energy
as well as interest-free loans for housing and agriculture. It created jobs for most of the pop-
ulation through its spending. Even in the late 1990s, government spending supported over
90 percent of the national labor force.19 The kingdom also gave out precious land grants to
princes, sheikhs, and other powerful figures to win their support. The availability of subsidies
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and easy loans bred carelessness and lack of competitiveness. Since good connections mat-
tered more than good business plans, many Saudi ventures were unable to attract private cap-
ital to replace state financing when hard times called for cutbacks.
With the drop in oil prices in the latter half of the 1980s, Saudi oil earnings plummeted
to less than a fifth of their 1970s’ peak, quickly exposing the limitations of a rentier distribu-
tive state. Efforts to begin taxing companies were ineffective, because the state did not have
the administrative apparatus to assess or collect taxes, and because many companies, not used
to being taxed, did not keep formal accounts. Nearly all attempts to prune back subsidies to
the affluent class (the core of the Saudi royal family’s support) brought protests and had to
be withdrawn. And because the government was the country’s largest generator of employ-
ment, cutting back on spending risked dislocating large portions of the workforce. Having
failed at trying to extract resources from its population, the government instead spent nearly
$120 billion of its financial reserves, while also growing a budget deficit close to 10 percent
of GDP. To finance its persistent fiscal deficit, the Saudi government began borrowing domes-
tically in 1988 and its debt now exceeds its reserves.20
Similar stories can be told about Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
and other OPEC member countries. Between 1974 and 1979 the five Middle East OPEC pro-
ducers (Iran, Iraq, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) expanded domestic spending by 48 percent
per year. Venezuela’s government expenditures increased by nearly 75 percent in one year.21
Iran had 108 projects averaging over a billion dollars each in the 1970s.22 The massive expan-
sion in government spending caused inflation, wiping away the value of people’s savings. 
In the Middle East OPEC countries, inflation was about 15 percent per year during the 1970s’
spending boom, and in Mexico, Indonesia, and Nigeria, inflation exceeded 25 percent per year
during this period. 
Much of the spending was on large-scale projects designed to develop the countries’
non-oil sectors.23 Unfortunately, the abundance of money for loans, coupled with poor proj-
ect-evaluation capacity, corruption, and favoritism led to many white elephant projects that
suffered from cost and time over-runs due to inadequate assessments of costs and benefits.
As Ascher documents, many of these projects were approved secretly with little effort to seek
competitive bids. There are countless stories of loans that should never have been made, such
as for the “towers of silence” apartment houses in Saudi Arabia that were never occupied, for
a rubber plant in Indonesia that failed to account for the absence of available water for rub-
ber processing, or for the Krakatau steel mill in Indonesia, which the government doggedly
pursued in its effort at modernization despite the obsolete factory’s losses of close to $100 mil-
lion a year.24
Much of the public investment in the oil-exporting countries went to heavy industry
with the intention of improving the competitiveness of the country’s non-oil exports. In fact,
however, easy access to money and poor project evaluation kept projects afloat that, without
subsidies, could not compete. For example, in 1983 Trinidad’s Caroni Sugar plant had pro-
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duction costs five times that of competitors in Australia, even though the latter had labor costs
several times that of Trinidad.25 Despite massive investments to boost their non-oil exports,
most countries saw these exports actually decline between 1972–1981.26 Even after the inef-
fectiveness of these projects became apparent, governments were often reluctant to admit fail-
ure and cause economic distress by cutting off funding. 
The Middle East states were not the only ones to relax their extractive capacities while
building up their distributive ones. Alaska, Alberta, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, and
Venezuela all cut or eliminated taxes. Subsidies in Venezuela and Indonesia on consumer
goods ranged from food to motor fuel. In Iran, Algeria, Venezuela, Mexico, Nigeria, Indone-
sia, and Trinidad, subsidies in the 1970s rose twice as fast as non-oil GDP.27 Powerful inter-
est groups in Ecuador succeeded in earmarking 65 percent of tax revenues for their specific
programs. In Colombia, the combination of oil revenue and decentralization resulted in a com-
petition among municipalities to spend more in order to get more.28 Venezuela’s legendary
spending extravagance to diversify the country’s economy was riddled with favoritism toward
well-connected groups and contributed to the country’s deficits and debt, tripling inflation 
and causing recession. Despite Venezuela’s receipt of about $600 billion in oil revenues since
the 1970s, real per capita income fell by 15 percent between 1973 and 1985, and continues 
to decline. 
Political instability
The dependence fostered by these distributive policies created the potential for social dislo-
cation, political instability, and even regime changes when oil prices inevitably dropped.
Ecuador and Venezuela, for example, have repeatedly attempted structural reform only to back
down as a result of rioting and social pressure. Venezuela, Iran, Nigeria, Algeria, and Mexico
all experienced political crisis or regime change before and after the end of an oil boom. 
The distributive nature of oil-exporting states and their absence of democracy go hand
in hand. Unlike diffuse resources such as coffee or cotton, which can be produced by multi-
ple domestic entrepreneurs, oil fields are point resources that, by virtue of their size and strate-
gic importance, are controlled by the government. The desire of oil companies to secure
contracts and the desire of governments to control oil rents or revenues coincide, contribut-
ing to the centralization of power in many oil-exporting states.29 The massive rents gener-
ated by oil give leaders the resources to forge mutually beneficial relationships with private
interests and provide little or no incentive to open the political process. According to Karl, 
“. . . rulers of oil-exporting countries have no incentive to be frugal, efficient, and cautious in
their policy-making, and they have no reason to decentralize power to other stake-holders. To
the contrary, revenues pouring into a highly concentrated structure of power lead to further
concentration and encourage further inefficient and unproductive spending to establish and
maintain rentier networks between politicians and capitalists.”30 Transparency threatens to
expose these rentier networks and is resisted by governments. 
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Leaders find that they can stay in power by “buying” the public’s support through sub-
sidies, tax cuts, and employment generated by public sector spending. As Karl puts it, “state offi-
cials become habituated to relying on the progressive substitution of public spending for
statecraft. . . .”31 These tendencies are confirmed by a study finding a strong negative correla-
tion between oil and mineral wealth and democracy, especially in poor countries. The obstacle
to democracy in these countries is not just the repressiveness of leaders, the study concludes,
but also the absence of a middle class, which historically has pushed for democracy.32
The absence of democracy in rentier states may also explain their failure to improve
living standards. Perhaps the best example is Nigeria, Africa’s largest oil producer. Nigeria
has received over $300 billion in oil revenues in the last 25 years, but 60 percent of its pop-
ulation still lives on less than $2 per day. In fact, per capita income in Nigeria has fallen
from about $800 in the early 1980s to about $300 at present.33 Numerous studies of spend-
ing to alleviate poverty in the developing world find little correlation between amounts spent
and outcomes.34 This is because the translation of spending into effective outcomes requires
good governance. 
Without an effective management system for public expenditures, and skilled civil ser-
vants with incentives to minimize corruption, even good intentions get misdirected to poorly
chosen spending projects, or leakage reduces the amounts that ultimately reach their targets.
The linkage between good governance and good outcomes from increased spending exists for
both resource-rich states and those lacking resource wealth. For example, one survey of 250
primary schools in Uganda found that on average, the schools received only 13 percent of the
money allocated to them.35
Several studies have identified the link between governance and development outcomes.
The better a country’s governance (as measured by the World Bank index described on page
4), the more likely that public spending on health and education will be effective in lowering
infant mortality and improving educational attainment and literacy.36 The high incidence of
poor governance among oil exporters may explain their failure to translate oil revenues into
improved living standards for their people. 
Implications for Caspian 
Petroleum Exporters
For Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the hazards of petroleum wealth are acute because the onset
of petroleum revenues is coinciding with a period of state building. The regulatory and tax sys-
tems that can extract revenues from society and regulate commercial activity are still under
formation. At the same time, these states will receive a large influx of foreign exchange, damp-
ening the incentive to conduct administrative reform. With high poverty levels, the govern-
ments of these states will find themselves at the center of demands for increased spending
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and revenue-seeking activity. Well-connected groups will pursue the governments for contracts
and subsidies.
Governments will be tempted to award contracts to these well-connected groups and
elites in order to buy the legitimacy and support that normally comes through the electoral
process. The risk is that, in the face of uncertain oil revenues, governments will commit to
unrealistic expenditures in inefficient enterprises in order to generate employment and reward
insiders. 
The centralization and democracy-dampening tendencies of petroleum development
are likely to undermine the already uneven progress toward democracy in these countries. The
lack of transparency, absence of separation of powers, political discretion afforded the presi-
dent’s administration, and unclear property rights in countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakh-
stan make it extremely easy for the kind of patronage politics to emerge that characterize
economies such as those of Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Nigeria. 
Weak governance makes these countries less likely to convert social expenditures into
improved outcomes. At the same time, the abundance of oil revenues removes the incentive
to improve governance. The weakness of parliament, the judiciary, and political parties pro-
vides few checks on the ability of powerful interest groups to capture the state. The result, as
elsewhere, could be a flood of wasteful state spending followed by fiscal, economic, and regime
crisis when oil prices fall. 
Although the resource curse has proved difficult for most governments to avoid, it is
not destiny. Countries like Botswana, Indonesia, and Malaysia have managed to improve human
development while diversifying their economies from excessive reliance on natural resources.
While transparency by itself does not cure the resource curse, it is a necessary starting point
for good revenue management. It introduces some of the checks and balances needed for the
public to monitor whether oil and gas export revenue is being used for its benefit. 
In Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, transparency is critical to the success of natural
resource funds, but it must also be extended to all revenues generated by oil and gas devel-
opment. Otherwise the transparent management of the NRFs may serve only to deflect atten-
tion from the leakage of oil revenues at numerous points before they even reach the NRF, such
as in access to oil supply, government contracts, or determination of pipeline tariffs. For this
reason, it is important to extend transparency to every payment made by oil and gas compa-
nies to host governments, as well as to the earnings of state-owned oil companies. Just as
important is the extension of transparency to the budget and procurement process, so that the
public can monitor how oil-generated earnings are being spent.
In the Caspian Basin region, Turkmenistan also appears to be a reasonable candidate
for adapting and applying NRFs and other practices to achieve transparency and stable macro-
economic management of natural resource wealth. However, there are a number of factors
that set Turkmenistan apart from its neighbors.
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Like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan enjoys vast reserves of both natural gas
and oil. It has the fifth largest reserve of natural gas in the world and the second largest reserve
of oil in the region. And like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and other resource-rich developing coun-
tries, Turkmenistan faces obstacles to economic growth and prosperity such as a hostile for-
eign investment environment, a weak private sector, and rampant corruption. 
Yet Turkmenistan’s prospects for energy-based development and economic growth are
far more dismal than those of Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan. Although Turkmenistan gained inde-
pendence in 1991, its gas exports are still tightly controlled by Russia. Turkmenistan is anx-
ious to pursue other export routes like the Trans-Afghan Pipeline (TAP) project, which, if built,
would carry Turkmen gas through Afghanistan to South Asia. The TAP project has not gone
past the study stage since crumbling in 1998 due to regional instability and lack of investors. 
The greatest challenge facing Turkmenistan, however, is political. Turkmenistan, ruled
by dictator Saparmurat Niyazov, is stagnating and starving for funds. International lending
institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and
the World Bank have suspended loans and investments because of the government’s lack of
commitment to multiparty democracy, pluralism, and market economics.37 Even if Turk-
menistan does find a way to increase its gas exports through alternative pipelines, these rev-
enues would only benefit Niyazov and a few others within his regime, not the Turkmen people.
Unfortunately, there is little value in considering natural resource funds in Turkmenistan as
long as Niyazov remains in power. 
Chapter Summaries 
2. Natural Resource Funds: Case Studies in Success and Failure 
Chapter two looks specifically at NRFs in North and South America, Africa, Europe, and the
Middle East; NRFs in established and younger democracies as well as in states that are not
democracies; NRFs at the national and subnational levels and an NRF managed by a com-
munity rather than a government. Best practice examples such as Norway and Alaska pro-
vide important guidelines on how to build transparency and accountability into an NRF.
Examples such as Venezuela, Oman, and Kuwait demonstrate how vulnerable NRFs are when
power is concentrated in the hands of an executive and an absence of democracy results in
no effective oversight. The examples of Chad and Chile illustrate how NRFs can function even
where democracy is weak and distrust of government high. 
Transparency, a strong sense of public ownership, and a separation of oversight pow-
ers are identified as three key ingredients in the success of an NRF. Some of the best per-
forming NRFs have accumulated savings, enjoyed popular support, provided some kind of
public expenditures, and/or smoothed out government spending while maintaining conti-
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nuity in the fund’s rules and functions. In the more problematic cases, an NRF’s assets
declined over time while the fund failed to raise living standards or to create a viable non-oil
economic sector. Revenues and expenditures were shrouded in secrecy, rules fluctuated, and
an absence of separation of powers allowed for easy raiding of the NRF. 
3. Securing the Take: Petroleum Litigation in Alaska
While NRFs lend greater transparency to a country’s oil revenues, they do not capture the
whole “oil picture.” NRFs typically receive only a portion of resource revenues. Accounting for
other earnings can be extremely difficult. Complicated swaps, offsets, subsidized sales, and
transfer-pricing operations make it difficult to estimate the size of the revenue pie and, in
the process, create multiple points of potential leakage. To plug these leaks, it is important to
extend transparency along the entire chain of custody over oil revenues, starting with the pro-
ducing companies, both state-owned and multinational. 
Chapter three draws on Alaska’s experience to demonstrate why such transparency is
important. Alaska spent 20 years litigating with oil companies in 60 separate cases involv-
ing disputes about corporate accounting, pricing tactics, and pipeline tariffs. The litigation
netted the state an additional $6 billion in revenues, or about 10 percent of total state proceeds
from oil. The chapter describes how production-sharing agreements (PSAs) can create incen-
tives for contractors to inflate costs to pay less to the host government. While there is no evi-
dence that such practices are occurring in Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan, certain terms of their
production-sharing agreements create incentives for cost inflation. Perhaps the greatest dan-
ger of misrepresentation of earnings is posed by the state-owned oil companies, which are
contractors in many PSAs in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, but lack the requirements of trans-
parency that other publicly traded oil companies must adhere to.
4. Models of Public Oversight of Government and Industry 
Mechanisms of citizen oversight of oil and gas development are the focus of chapter four.
Active citizen involvement can protect against tragedies such as the Exxon Valdez or Spanish
coast Prestige oil spills, and the repeated human rights abuses that have occurred in oil-pro-
ducing regions of Burma, Indonesia, and Nigeria. Citizen involvement can help ensure that
financial expediency not be the sole criterion in petroleum development decisions. 
One model of organized citizen oversight is the Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils
(RCACs) created in Alaska following public outrage over the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The
Alaskan legislature passed laws creating these councils, and the oil and pipeline companies
agreed to fund them. The RCACs provide direct citizen oversight of oil industry activities in
Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet by monitoring environmental impacts of oil extrac-
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tion, reviewing spill prevention and response plans, and recommending continual improve-
ments. The RCACs are also the primary conduit through which government and industry com-
municate to the public on oil issues. RCAC volunteer boards of directors include
representatives of environmental groups, native settlements, fishermen’s groups, and cham-
bers of commerce. 
If citizens’ advisory councils are established in the Caspian Basin, their role could also
include oversight of the petroleum fiscal system. Such councils would be a substantial step
toward informed public participation. The challenge, however, will be to ensure that such coun-
cils maintain their independence both from government and industry.
The chapter also describes models of citizen oversight of public administration, such
as integrity pacts and public hearings, in developing democracies. These stories provide exam-
ples of how the governments of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan can work with NGOs to help build
public trust in government, while fighting corruption and identifying savings. Integrity pacts
require officials and private sector bidders to pledge not to offer or accept bribes while bidding
on public projects. In Colombia and Panama, Transparency International, an anticorruption
NGO, was invited by the government to oversee development and implementation of the gov-
ernment’s integrity pact for privatization of state utilities. In Panama and Argentina, where
public procurement has long been associated with corruption, public hearings and integrity
pacts resulted not only in significant savings for the government but in high approval rat-
ings among recipients of the privatized services.
5. & 6. State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan and National Fund of Kazakhstan 
Chapters five and six apply the lessons learned from other NRFs to an evaluation of the oil
funds recently established in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The new oil funds, which have
already accumulated sizeable savings, are a major improvement in the transparent manage-
ment of oil revenues in these countries. However, the funds are a reflection of the political sys-
tems in which they operate. Both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan suffer from a deficit of
democracy and a surplus of executive discretion. Parliaments lack both power and independ-
ence and do not serve as effective instruments to debate national policy. Both oil funds are
directly subordinate to the presidents. The parliaments have virtually no role in overseeing the
oil funds, and there are no other institutions independent of the president to provide over-
sight. The risk of such a concentration of authority, as chapter two shows, is that there is vir-
tually no impediment to raiding, liquidating, or substantially rewriting the rules of an oil fund,
should the president wish to do so. Moreover, without separation of powers, both oil funds fail
to function as compacts between government and citizens because they place almost no con-
straints on government behavior. Already, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are considering using
savings from their funds for development of the oil and gas sector—a strategy that has been
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disastrous elsewhere and has done little to alleviate poverty. Chapter six provides recommen-
dations to the governments of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on how to improve the transparency
and accountability of their oil funds and of their petroleum revenue flows more generally.
7. A Road Map for Promoting Revenue Accountability in the Caspian Basin and Beyond
Chapter seven discusses what Western governments, international lenders, multinational oil
companies, and donors can do to promote fiscal transparency and sound revenue manage-
ment. It calls for action on the part of Western governments and multilateral lenders to make
transparency of oil contracts and payments a condition of their lending and aid. It urges oil
companies to support initiatives to create a reporting system of payments made to host 
governments. And it urges donors to devote more resources to building the capacity of civil
society in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to hold governments accountable for earnings and
expenditures from these public resources. 
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2. Natural Resource Funds: 
Case Studies in Success 
and Failure
Introduction
In creating natural resource funds, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have taken positive steps
toward developing a long-term strategy for how best to use their oil and gas revenues. But what
do we know about such funds? How effective are they? Under what circumstances are they
likely to promote good management of natural resource revenues? And what are the keys to
a successful natural resource fund? To answer these questions, this chapter examines 10 NRFs.
The purpose is not to rank the funds, but to identify the factors that contribute to positive or
poor performance. The NRFs examined are in Alaska, United States; Alberta, Canada;
Venezuela; Chile; Norway; Chad; Kuwait; Oman; Iran; and the Inuit state of Nunavut in
Canada. The case studies cover a range of NRFs in the developed and developing world, in
democracies and nondemocracies, and at both the national and subnational level.
“For the public and its representatives to take part effectively in a debate 
on the budget priorities proposed by the government, there must be
mechanisms of accountability, and information systems which show as 
fully as possible the way the government is meeting its responsibilities.
Developing tools to make the state’s financial management transparent 
to the public should be a priority for its authorities.”
—CHILE’S 2003 BUDGET BILL
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NRFs are a mechanism that some countries have adopted to address the principal chal-
lenge facing by budgets dependent to a great extent on revenues from the export of natural
resources, namely, the challenge of budget planning when commodity prices are highly volatile
and natural resources are depletable. NRFs can be used as stabilization funds or savings funds,
or, in some cases, a combination of both. 
Stabilization funds smooth out government spending by channeling excess revenues to
the stabilization fund when commodity prices are high, and transferring revenues back to
the budget when commodity prices fall. A trigger price is set in order to determine in what
direction transfers should go. Stabilization funds can help protect budgetary spending from
sharp fluctuations resulting from external price shocks. Additionally, stabilization funds, when
accompanied by constraints on borrowing, may help curb the excessive spending to which
petroleum-exporting countries are prone, and which often leads to inflation and debt accu-
mulation. 
Savings funds act as a kind of “rainy day” fund, storing up wealth for future generations.
Since natural resources are depletable, some countries channel a portion of these earnings
to a savings fund which can continue to generate wealth through its investment earnings even
after the natural resources are exhausted. 
Beyond their stabilization and savings objectives, NRFs provide two immediate bene-
fits. First, both stabilization and savings funds can prevent Dutch Disease if their assets are
“sterilized”—held in foreign currency abroad, and thus outside the country’s monetary sys-
tem. This way, they prevent upward pressure on the country’s real exchange rate, which can
affect the country’s non-oil tradable sector as discussed in chapter one. Second, NRFs can help
to regulate how much of a country’s resource revenues can be safely spent at a given time.
When large revenue streams come easily, there is a temptation for governments to ratchet
up spending. Such increases risk overwhelming the economy’s ability to absorb this spend-
ing. Unless expenditures are regulated to match the absorbtive capacity of an economy, there
is a risk of unleashing inflation, which is extremely damaging to wages and employment, as
discussed in chapter one.
What makes an NRF a success? This analysis looks beyond narrow fiscal criteria, which
evaluates NRFs on the basis of their ability to smooth out government expenditures in the face
of commodity price fluctuations. While this task is extremely important, it can also be accom-
plished without an NRF through normal tools of fiscal policy, such as multiyear expenditure
planning and saving a stock of liquid financial assets.1
The greatest “value-added” benefit of natural resource funds is that they serve as a com-
pact between governments and their citizens. NRFs restrain governments from either mis-
appropriating or misallocating natural resource revenues. As institutions with their own
boards, mandates, and regulations, NRFs are more enduring and difficult to change than bud-
gets.2 They can force governments to use resource revenues rationally for public ends. The
creation of such constraints is extremely important because natural resource development con-
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stitutes a depletion of wealth. Extraction of crude oil or minerals is a net loss for a state unless
it is able to translate revenues from the sale of these resources into an enduring source of
wealth. 
If NRFs are to serve effectively as a compact between governments and citizens, they
must be able to reduce the discretion of a single branch of government in making expendi-
ture decisions. An NRF that is easily changed or liquidated is unlikely to constrain the gov-
ernment from irresponsible behavior. There are three particular factors that compel
governments to respect their NRFs:
 Checks and balances. One of the principal reasons for creating an NRF is to help gov-
ernment resist the temptation to spend heavily in the short run, at the expense of future
generations. A separation of powers creates layers of oversight into an NRF and mini-
mizes opportunities for diversion of resources. 
 Transparency. NRFs that operate in secrecy are more likely to be diverted from their orig-
inal goals. An aggressive disclosure policy minimizes opportunities for abuse.
 Public involvement. The more engaged a citizenry is in the fate of its country’s resource
revenues, the less likely it is that a government will risk public ire by tampering with an
NRF.
Below, each fund is analyzed from the possibilities it creates for checks and balances,
transparency, and public involvement. Each NRF’s function and structure is described, fol-
lowed by an explanation of its oversight mechanisms, investment policy, and commitment to
transparency.
Alaska Permanent Fund
Background
Among natural resource funds, the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) is one of the oldest and
most original. The state has put more than $10 billion of its $70 billion in oil earnings into
the Fund since North Slope production began in 1977. Through investments and inflation
proofing, the APF has grown to over $20 billion and has generated over $20 billion in net
income. 
The presence of oil in Alaska was recognized as early as 1923 when U.S. President War-
ren Harding created a naval petroleum reserve in Alaska. The importance and influence of
Alaskan oil, however, was thoroughly established in 1967 when the Atlantic Richfield Com-
pany (ARCO) discovered North America’s largest oil field, Prudhoe Bay, in Alaska’s North
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Slope. Estimates put production at over 2 million barrels per day (bpd). By 1969, state devel-
opment leases were bringing substantial oil revenue into Alaska.
At the time of the North Slope discovery, Alaska had been a state for only eight years.
It was a vast territory with a tiny population of 300,000, severe climatic conditions, the high-
est cost of living in the United States, and one of the nation’s highest unemployment rates at
11 percent. Because oil extraction is highly specialized and does not create a significant num-
ber of jobs, many Alaskans continued to rely on state support after North Slope began pro-
ducing oil. In 1979, about 40 percent of the workforce received some form of public support.3
A 1979 study by one of the state’s senior economists, Robert B. Richards, warned that
the state faced an impending fiscal crisis if it failed either to diversify its economy or cut gov-
ernment growth. North Slope production was expected (mistakenly) to decline within 10 years,
and oil revenues, which by 1979 constituted 70 percent of state income, were not expected to
be able to support state expenditures at current levels. 
Fund function and structure 
The Fund is rooted in the belief that Alaskans are the primary stakeholders of their oil wealth.
Article VIII, Section 2, of Alaska’s constitution states:
The legislature shall provide for the utilization, development, and conservation of all
natural resources belonging to the State, including land and waters, for the maximum
benefit of its people.
This language provides the legal and philosophical underpinning for returning Alaska’s
oil wealth to its people. 
From the start, the public was pulled into the decision-making process about what to do
with Alaska’s oil windfall.4 The state took an active part in encouraging public discussion about
the creation of a natural resource fund. Governor Jay Hammond directed the State Investment
Advisory Committee, composed of representatives from consumer groups, business, govern-
ment, and the public, to conduct hearings to gauge public opinion on this issue.5 The Brook-
ings Institute was hired to hold public seminars around the state to hear citizens’  suggestions
about what to do with Alaska’s oil income. Concurrently, the House Special Committee on the
Permanent Fund took its hearings on the road to gather opinions from around the state, and
produced a report, “A Proposal for the Alaska Permanent Fund,” summarizing the opinions
of the public, the consultants they interviewed, and the committee itself.6
The debate over the best use of the money sharpened in the 1970s after a $900 mil-
lion one-time bonus payment from a 1969 Prudhoe Bay oil lease sale was absorbed almost
entirely by state government. Although much of the $900 million was spent on infrastruc-
ture, the expenditure of an amount that was nearly nine times the state’s annual budget gen-
erated a media outcry implying that the money had been wasted.7 The state had also begun
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to accumulate debt in anticipation of future oil income.8 Media coverage expressed a grow-
ing concern that government would continue to expand, leaving no reserve for the future.9
Governor Hammond held the view that people rather than government should decide how
to spend the money. He believed that giving each citizen a portion of the state’s oil wealth
would lessen the demand for increased spending by the state.
These concerns gave momentum to the idea of creating some kind of permanent fund
to check state spending. Early proponents justified it to the Alaska Chamber of Commerce
in 1969 this way:
In the investment-banking world, we are constantly exposed . . . to situations, which
demonstrate the insatiability of the demand for funds once they become available and
the ease with which capital can be dissipated. . . . It is at the government level, how-
ever, that we find this intense pressure for current expenditure in its most extreme
degree.10
A permanent fund would also provide an investment base for generating future income
when oil revenues began to diminish, transforming the proceeds from a nonrenewable
resource into renewable wealth for future generations. Numerous consultants were hired to
conduct in-home surveys and opinion polls on the goals of a permanent fund.11
In 1970, and again in 1975, the legislature attempted to create a permanent fund. How-
ever, since the state constitution prohibited the creation of dedicated funds that bypassed the
appropriations process, only a constitutional amendment could authorize the establishment
of a permanent fund.
In November 1976, a majority of voters approved an amendment establishing the Alaska
Permanent Fund (APF). This amendment required that a minimum of 25 percent of all min-
eral-based royalty revenues be placed in the Fund, with the principal used for designated
income-producing instruments.12 The fact that the APF was created by amendment, and not
by a legislative act, has provided the APF with institutional protection against change by any
single branch of government. 
The Fund’s principal comes from three sources. First, the Fund receives 25 percent of
oil proceeds from fields discovered prior to 1980, and 50 percent of proceeds from fields dis-
covered after 1980. Second, a portion of the earnings is transferred back to the principal annu-
ally to guard against erosion due to inflation. Third, the Fund receives additional transfers
from the Earnings Reserve Account that the legislature chooses to reinvest in the principal.
The Earnings Reserve Account is that portion of the APF’s annual earnings left over after
dividends have been paid and inflation adjustment has occurred. The legislature may choose
how it wishes to spend money from the Earnings Reserve Account. In most years, however,
it has chosen to reinvest this money into the APF.
After creation of the APF, an extended public debate ensued about whether to use the
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Fund’s income for economic diversification, for public works, or to provide annual dividends
to Alaskan citizens. Among the factors that dissuaded the state from using APF earnings for
economic development was its study of the many instances of misguided state spending
among OPEC countries. 
After extensive public consultations, the dividend program was chosen on the belief that
Alaska’s citizens, as owners of their state’s natural resource wealth, are entitled to benefit
directly from this wealth. In 1978, the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC) was cre-
ated to manage the APF. The APFC would be dedicated to growing the Fund’s principal and
providing citizens with a dividend based on earnings. Other programs, such as the Alaska
Renewable Resources Corporation, which was dismantled in 1984, provided grants for the
development of renewable energy products. Other major loan programs, such as the Alaska
Housing Finance Corporation, would be funded from the state budget. 
The dividend program provided all Alaskans who had resided in the state for six months
or more with a $1,000 check and future payments based on the earnings of the Fund.
Oversight of the Fund 
In order to isolate the APF from political influence, the APFC was created as a separate cor-
poration to manage it.13 Although independent in its investment decisions, the APFC is
accountable to both the government of Alaska and to Alaskan citizens. 
The APFC is guided by an independent board of trustees composed of four governor-
appointed members of the public, the commissioner of revenue, and another member of the
administration. The public members are appointed to four-year terms and the chairmanship
rotates among them each year. Revenues to the Fund are transferred from the Department
of Revenue.
The legislature maintains control over the board by having final say over proposed
investments and conducting oversight through its Legislative Budget and Audit Committee.
One check against “crony appointments” by the governor is the requirement that the terms
of the public members of the board are staggered. Thus, the governor is unable to staff the
board entirely with personal favorites. Moreover, removal of any board members by the gov-
ernor must be accompanied by a publicly disclosed written statement of the causes for
removal. The legislature approves the APFC’s operating budget each year. By giving the gov-
ernor, the legislature, the state administration, and the public a role in the governance of the
APFC, the Alaska Permanent Fund builds in a separation of powers among those with over-
sight of the Fund. This separation keeps the power of any one body in check and helps explain
the APF’s endurance.
Fund investment, dividends, savings, and income
The first task for the Fund’s new trustees was to define their investment strategy, finding the
right balance between maximizing returns with greater risk and accepting lower returns with
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less risk. The best model, according to Elmer Rasmuson, first chairman of the board of
trustees, came from university endowments, because they tried to provide a reliable annual
income while maximizing earnings within certain bounds of safety.14
Following in the tradition of public engagement, the board of trustees held a series of
seminars throughout Alaska to which it invited speakers who had advised other governments
about how to manage their oil wealth. The goal of the series was to foster an informed pub-
lic debate about the Fund’s investment strategy.15
Economic development was rejected as an investment strategy on the grounds that soft
loans were risky and would only benefit a select group of people. The chosen strategy was more
conservative. In choosing their investments, the trustees adopted the Prudent Investor Rule,
calling for the exercise of “ordinary prudence, discretion, and intelligence” in managing large
investments. Prudent investment requires attention to diversification, risk and cost mini-
mization, consistent returns, and protection against inflation. 
The types of investments permitted were spelled out by law, and gradually expanded
as the investment climate changed. Initially, investment was only allowed in fixed-income
instruments guaranteed by the federal government, debt of federally insured financial insti-
tutions, and corporate investment grade securities. In 1982, U.S. stocks and certain kinds of
real estate were added to the list of permissible investments, followed by foreign stocks in
1989.
The board of trustees develops the Fund’s investment strategy, which seeks an average
real rate of return of at least 4 percent per year over the long term. The APFC’s overall nominal
rate of return has been closer to 9.5 percent.16 In 2002, the principal was allocated as follows:
35 percent in bonds, 37 percent in U.S. stocks, 17 percent in foreign stocks, and 11 percent in real
estate.17
Dividend payments, designed to maintain consistency from year to year, are calculated
by averaging the Fund’s net income over the last five years, dividing by two, and then divid-
ing among the eligible recipients. Between 1982 and 2001, the Fund distributed $11 billion
(45 percent of earnings) in dividends. Annual dividends have ranged from $331 in 1984 to
$1,963 in 2000. To protect the Fund from erosion due to inflation, a portion of each year’s
earnings is returned to the principal for “inflation proofing.” Since its inception, $7 billion has
been added to the Fund to protect it from inflation. 
What remains after dividends and inflation proofing becomes the Earnings Reserve
Account, which the legislature may disperse. Because of the Fund’s popularity, in most years,
the legislature chose to return the earnings reserve to the principal. The APF is one of the 100
largest funds in the world and also one of the most successful in generating returns.
Settlements of tax and royalty disputes between oil companies and the state and fed-
eral governments also contribute to fund revenues. Over 60 legal cases spread over 20 years
have netted Alaska an additional $6.8 billion in direct payments, plus an additional $3.8 bil-
lion in increased royalty and severance tax payments generated by reduced pipeline tariffs,
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representing more than one dollar out of every seven Alaska received in oil revenues (see chap-
ter three on petroleum litigation in Alaska). The litigation has addressed many issues, includ-
ing the valuation of Alaska crude, field costs, tanker and pipeline costs, and other accounting
issues. A particular point of contention has been formula apportionment accounting, which
allows oil companies to pay less in taxes by using their lower worldwide corporate revenues,
rather than their revenues from Alaska production to assess their tax obligations.18
Since 1990, payments received by the state from settlement of legal disputes with the
oil companies have been deposited in a Constitutional Budget Reserve Fund (CBRF) created
in 1990, which is used to balance the state budget. Loans from the CBRF to the state budget
may be made with three-quarters of the vote from each legislative chamber. The constitution
mandates, however, that if the state budget has a surplus at the end of the fiscal year, this
surplus must be used to repay the CBRF. Repayments do not have to include interest. 
The state has deposited $5.6 billion in the CBRF and has earned approximately $1.5
billion on that money. However, in all but two of the years since its inception the state has
withdrawn funds from the CBRF to fill the difference between unrestricted revenue and the
annual budget. These liberal borrowing policies have rapidly depleted the CBRF. In Novem-
ber 2002, the CBRF balance was $2.1 billion.19 At current spending levels, the CBRF is pro-
jected to run out of money by 2005.
Critics of the CBRF charge that the state lost hundreds of millions of dollars in returns
by not placing the CBRF’s initial deposits in the Permanent Fund. Since the CBRF requires
liquidity, its managers have placed deposits in shorter-term investments yielding significantly
less than the annual earnings of the Permanent Fund. Moreover, the three-quarters vote
required for appropriations has allowed legislators to bargain their votes in exchange for fund-
ing of their regional interests.
Transparency
Transparency underpins the APF’s operations. The law on the Fund states that all information
possessed by the APFC is of public record (except for confidential information about compa-
nies in which the Fund is a shareholder). The APFC’s board produces an annual report, which
must be written in “easily understandable language” and widely available to the public. It can
be accessed over the internet, and hard copies or compact disc copies can be requested.20 The
report must include audited financial statements, a breakdown of earnings from each invest-
ment made that year, and an appraisal of the value of each investment, a comparison of invest-
ment performance against intended goals, and other details. Additionally, the Fund’s website
contains all legislation and resolutions that apply to the APF, papers commissioned for the
APF’s trustees, and past reports (see Appendix 9). 
Conclusion
The Alaska Permanent Fund is a bold and innovative approach to managing natural resource
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wealth. It is based on the principle that citizens are the owners of their mineral wealth and
that every citizen is entitled to an equal share of this wealth. It adheres to the libertarian belief
that people will be better off spending their own money rather than allowing the state to spend
it on their behalf. By involving citizens in every aspect of the Fund’s creation and evolution,
the APF has given the public a stake in its preservation, and restrained the government from
spending away oil wealth in a more effective way than any formal rules could. Although no
rules require payment of dividends, the program is so popular that the legislature has always
chosen to continue it.
Such an approach, however, has drawbacks. The absence of a needs component has
led to an inefficient distribution of wealth, since individuals in the highest tax bracket receive
the same amount as the poorest Alaskans. The diffusion of economic resources that results
from sending a check to every Alaskan comes at the cost of targeting funds to address social
and economic needs. Moreover, one might also question the prudence of sending dividend
checks to every citizen as the state slashes its operating budget and lays off employees to make
ends meet. Critics of the libertarian approach also argue that governments are better placed
to pursue economic diversification and wealth distribution than individuals in the market-
place.
In addition to ideological debate over revenue use, the Fund faces a more immediate
challenge. Prudhoe Bay production hit its peak in 1988. Since then, oil revenues have been
in decline and income from the Fund exceeded oil revenues for the first time in 1998. While
the APF can continue to grow on its earnings, the state budget, which derives 80 percent of
its receipts from oil, is facing more dire cash shortages and a $1 billion deficit. The crunch has
once again inspired debates about the choices available.21
Like many OPEC states, Alaska relaxed its tax collection when oil revenues became
abundant. Now, however, the state finds itself with the uncomfortable choice of slashing spend-
ing, raising taxes, cutting back on dividends, or some combination thereof. Those mechanisms
which were so successful in helping the APF endure—its constitutional mandate, the checks
and balances built into it, and its tremendous popularity—are now preventing the state from
being able to use the APF to address its budget deficit. An advisory vote was held in Septem-
ber 1999 to gauge citizen support for using Fund earnings to balance the state budget. An
overwhelming 83 percent majority cast a “no” vote. 
There has been relatively less discussion in the legislature about increasing oil taxes.
One possibility, proposed by the NGO Oilwatch Alaska, the Alaska Public Interest Research
Group, and the Alaska Forum for Environmental Responsibility, is to impose a windfall tax,
which would kick in only if oil prices rise above a set level.22 Another possibility is to change
the state income tax formula, which is currently based on an apportionment formula that
allows oil companies to use their lower worldwide corporate earnings rate instead of their rev-
enue from Alaska operations.23 A likely outcome will involve a combination of cuts in state
spending, reintroduction of an income or sales tax, and some reduction in dividends.
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Alberta (Canada) Heritage Savings Fund
Background
The Alberta Heritage Savings Fund (AHSF) in Canada was created at the same time as the
Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) and has similar royalty injections and goals. Yet, the APF has
grown to over $26 billion, while the AHSF has less savings than it did 15 years ago. Why is
there such a difference in outcomes?
Unlike the APF, the AHSF was created through the normal legislative process. As a
result, the AHSF’s management structure, investment rules, and organization can all be
altered by a simple majority vote in the legislature. By contrast, since the APF was created by
a constitutional amendment approved by a popular vote, any change to its basic structure and
purpose requires another constitutional amendment. Thus, the APF has experienced virtually
no change in its objectives and structure, while the AHSF has altered direction frequently in
response to shifts in oil revenues and legislative priorities.
Fund function and structure
Alberta’s legislature created the AHSF in 1976 to pursue four competing purposes: 1) to save
for the future; 2) to lessen the need for the province to borrow; 3) to improve quality of life;
and 4) to diversify the economy.24
Initially, priority was given to saving for the future and to diversifying the economy. As
Alberta’s debt grew in its pursuit of economic diversification, and the success of the diversi-
fication program was unclear, the legislature focused on another objective—using Fund
income to reduce debt. The AHSF has also been used for financing ordinary government
expenditures. When the Fund principal began to dwindle, the government restructured the
Fund in 1997, simplifying it and putting more emphasis on the savings function as well as
changing the asset mix to a more conventional combination of fixed-income instruments and
equities.25
Similar to Alaska, officials in Alberta had attempted to solicit public opinion on the
creation of a resource fund. However, since the legislature did not need direct public approval
to create the Fund, Alberta’s attempts to engage the public in this complex debate were not
as widespread and comprehensive as those of Alaska. In Alberta, the burden was largely placed
on citizens to make their concerns known to their legislature. In Alaska, attempts at public
involvement and education were vigorous and lengthy, because the APF could not be created
without a majority of citizens voting for it. Three and a half years of discussion following the
creation of the APF forced citizens and legislators to define what they wanted from their nat-
ural resource fund. According to Smith, “It was the ensuing debate . . . that gave the Perma-
nent Fund a clarity of purpose and structure never achieved by the Heritage Fund.”26
As a result of the limited debate in Alberta, the AHSF never acquired a strong guiding
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focus and has struggled to find a balance between saving for the future and spending in the
present. Because of the AHSF’s competing objectives, actions that furthered one goal some-
times undermined another. For example, one of the Fund’s objectives was to save for the future
through prudent investments. However, some loans provided to Crown corporations to help
diversify the economy were never repaid. One study calculated that once such loans and other
capital investment projects were taken into account, the actual value of the AHSF is 20 per-
cent lower than claimed by the Treasury Department.27
The Albertan government has also changed the AHSF’s earnings rules as needs shifted.
Initially, the Fund was designed to receive 30 percent of oil and gas revenues. From 1984 to
1987, the government revised this figure to 15 percent as it wrestled with recession. When
oil prices continued to plunge, the government froze any additional transfers to the AHSF in
1987. Although the Fund’s original design provided for inflation proofing to protect its prin-
cipal, in 1987 the government began diverting Fund earnings to its general revenues and the
AHSF’s purchasing power eroded.28 Consequently, the AHSF reached its peak at $8.6 billion
USD in 1998, and in 2003 it is valued at $8 billion USD.
By contrast, the government of Alaska is forbidden by constitutional amendment to
spend any of the APF’s principal. Because the dividend program has created such popular sup-
port for the APF, the legislature has faithfully transferred a portion of earnings back to the
APF to prevent inflation from eroding its principal, even as the Alaskan legislature struggled
with a growing budget deficit. As a result, the APF has grown consistently, while the AHSF
has stagnated. Yet the AHSF does provide the legislature with the flexibility of using Fund
income for the budget in times of need, while the APF creates a large fund that can not be
used even when the state faces financial troubles. 
Oversight of the Fund
While the APF was created as a public corporation not subordinate to either governor or leg-
islature, the AHSF was managed by the provincial treasury and subordinated to the governor’s
cabinet.29 It may manage and invest 80 percent of the AHSF’s assets without legislative
approval. 
Differences in management between the two funds also have resulted in differences
in accountability. As a public corporation whose shareholders are the citizens of Alaska, the
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC) makes an abundance of information available to
the public.30 The AHSF, on the other hand, is subordinated to the governor’s cabinet and is
part of the political process. Its administrators have an interest in shielding themselves from
politically motivated criticism by the legislature. As a consequence, the information it discloses
to the public is comparatively more limited. For example, audits are conducted by a provin-
cial auditor, not by an outside independent agency, and do not include a market value appraisal
of the Fund’s investments.
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Fund investment, savings, and income 
Differences between the two funds are also reflected in their investment goals and earnings.
The APF’s mission is to earn money while safeguarding the Fund’s principal. It established
an earnings objective of 4 percent real return over time. Only 5 percent of the APF’s invest-
ments were made in Alaska.31
By contrast, the AHSF initially created five different divisions reflecting its different
objectives. These operated until the AHSF was restructured in 1997. Only the Commercial
Investment Division, which handled less than five percent of the Fund’s principal, invested in
securities with the sole purpose of earning money, and even this investment was required to
be in Canadian securities. The largest portion of the Fund was assigned to the Alberta Invest-
ment Division. This division provided loans to Albertan corporations with the aim of diversi-
fying the economy but “not necessarily” making a commercial return.32 Another sizeable
portion of the Fund was controlled by the Capital Projects Division, which used its portion of
the principal to build parks and hospitals, and to fund other capital spending projects that were
not expected to earn a return. Some of the beneficiaries have included the Alberta Heritage
Foundation for Medical Research, Alberta Heritage Scholarship Fund, and the Reforestation
Nursery Enhancement Program. 
While these projects have helped improve the quality of life of Albertans, they did not
translate into support for the government’s management of the AHSF. The government came
under fire because the province was not only spending from the Fund, but also borrowing
extensively. The Fund had provided over $16 billion USD in revenues for the general provin-
cial budget since 1982, yet by 1995 the province had accumulated $14 billion USD of debt,
nearly twice the amount held by the Fund. To help service this debt and to finance its ordinary
expenditures, the government began withdrawing from the AHSF, which reached its peak in
1998 and has since declined. The province’s former treasurer, Jim Dinning, admitted, “We
made the mistake of drawing too much out of the Heritage Fund to use it as a buffer to avoid
making some tough decisions. As a result, we spent a lot of revenues that could have made
the fund worth $80 billion ($53 billion USD) today.”33
In 1995, in a survey entitled, “Can We Interest You in an $11 Billion Decision?” the
government asked Albertans for their views on the future of the Fund. Based on survey respon-
dents’ preference for saving for the future, the government restructured the Fund in 1997,
no longer allowing it to be used for direct economic development or social investment pur-
poses.34 Instead, a new business plan was adopted with a focus on income-generating long-
term investments. 
The different strategies and priorities of the AHSF and the APF have resulted in sig-
nificant earnings differences. While the AHSF has declined in value over the last 15 years,
the APF had a real rate of return of over 12 percent over the same period.35
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Conclusion
A comparison of the APF and the AHSF provides some lessons about the endurance of NRFs.
Although begun at around the same time and with similar revenue injections, the APF is more
than twice the size of the AHSF. The reasons for this have much to do with the institutional
structures of the two funds. 
Because the APF could not be created without a majority of Alaskans’ support, the state
led an exertive campaign to educate the public and assess its opinions. The prolonged public
debate created a consensus to distribute fund earnings as dividends to citizens. The manage-
ment of the Fund was entrusted to an independent corporation accountable to both execu-
tive and legislative bodies. The constitutional basis of the APF, its popularity, and the
separation of powers built into oversight of the Fund have made it highly resistant to change.
This resistance has both positive and negative sides: It has helped the APF grow to substan-
tial proportions. At the same time, it has made it more difficult to use the Fund to cover large
budget deficits as oil revenues taper off. Debt incurred to cover the budget deficit will become
the burden of future generations—precisely those generations the APF has been designed to
support.
By contrast, the AHSF is much smaller and has experienced frequent changes. Because
the AHSF could be created by a legislative act, it never acquired the clarity of purpose the APF
had. The AHSF’s mandate changed frequently, as did the rules on its investments, earnings,
and expenditures. Citizens received no dividends, giving them little stake in what happened
to the Fund. Consequently, Alberta’s citizens have not been vocal about the frequent changes
to the Fund and its poor earnings performance.36 Like many of the OPEC countries discussed
in chapter one, Alberta engaged in an expansive program of state spending and debt accu-
mulation. When the province could no longer pay down the debt, it dipped into the AHSF.
This flexibility can also be seen as an advantage, however, because it is easier for Alberta to
redirect Fund income back to the budget in times of need. By contrast, Alaska has accumu-
lated a large pot of money that it cannot tap into, even as the state struggles to make ends meet. 
Both the APF and AHSF deserve praise—the former for its endurance and investment
success, the latter for its spending on public goods—as well as criticism—the APF for its insti-
tutional rigidity and the latter for its lack of it. The comparison provides a useful lesson for
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on the long-term consequences of choices regarding public
engagement, investment strategy, and institutional design for NRFs. 
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Venezuela’s Stabilization Investment Fund
Background
If there is one lesson to learn from Venezuela’s efforts to benefit from petroleum production
and exports, it is that oil booms tend to exacerbate rather than alleviate pre-existing political
tendencies, especially the weakness of political institutions. 
Venezuela lacked the institutions and bureaucracy of a modern state when foreign oil
companies first arrived around the turn of the 20th century. The “ultra-presidentialism” that
developed throughout the 20th century can be seen as the result of the mutual interests of
early presidents and oil companies. The companies preferred to deal with one “negotiator,”
either the president or his representatives, and the executive branch grew all-powerful as oil
rents flowed through it.37 As a consequence, legislatures lost their ability to effectively direct
oil revenues. Nationalizing the oil industry by creating Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and
frequently using oil money in efforts to alleviate social problems have done little to eliminate
poverty and related societal ills. 
Venezuela has fallen back to standards of living present in the 1970s, and, from the
point of view of its citizens, has lost decades of development. Yet high gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) per capita and moderate unemployment ($6,200 and 14 percent in 200038) 
continue to conceal Venezuela’s severe structural problems.
Systemic corruption and misguided public spending have much to do with Venezuela’s
inability to turn its petroleum riches into real wealth. Rentier economics combine with the
country’s administrative backwardness to create a self-perpetuating cycle of crony capitalism
and poor governance.39 Given these inescapable realities and Venezuela’s unusually high
dependence on oil revenues, the inevitable boom-bust cycle of oil prices has been especially
damaging.40 Expansionary policies and lack of fiscal discipline spawned by boom times con-
tinued through tighter periods, leading to unmanageable deficits and resource misallocation.41
The government’s determination to reduce dependence on oil by developing other sectors has
inflated public expenditures, driven inflation, and caused deficits even when oil prices spiked. 
Fund function and structure 
Venezuela has repeatedly established special funds to manage its petroleum wealth. All have
either failed or fallen far short of expectations. The most recent fund is the Macroeconomic
Stabilization Investment Fund (FIEM), established by the Caldera government in 1998. The
same absence of fiscal discipline that has plagued Venezuela for decades has also affected
the Fund’s performance. Frequent rule changes, failure to comply with Fund requirements,
and continued debt accumulation have diminished FIEM’s effectiveness as a stabilization
mechanism.
With oil prices declining in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Caldera
government acted upon IMF recommendations to create FIEM as a stabilization fund. The
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Fund stores up fiscal reserves when oil revenues are high, and pays them out to the budget
when revenues fall. According to the law, the purpose of the Fund is to “prevent fluctuations
in petroleum-related income from affecting the country’s necessary fiscal, exchange rate, and
monetary balance.”42
The Fund had straightforward rules for accumulation. A reference price for a barrel of
oil was set based on a five-year moving average of past oil revenues.43 All oil-derived income
above the reference price was to be deposited into the Fund. If prices fell below the reference
point, the Fund would be drawn down. In those instances, the Fund transfers to the treasury
the difference between the income that was to be collected and the average of the same from
the preceding five years. Additionally, if the Fund’s holdings exceeded 80 percent of the five-
year average from oil export revenues, the excess resources could, with congressional approval,
be used to pay down government debt. To prevent the Fund from being depleted, the law
required the Fund’s balance to be no less than a third of what it contained the previous year. 
Oversight of Fund 
The election of President Hugo Chavez in 1999 was a rejection of past patterns of distribu-
tion and utilization of oil monies. Immediately upon assuming office, the Chavez government
dramatically changed the Fund’s rules, increasing the president’s discretion over the Fund and
reducing transfers to it. Fund revenues were cut to 50 percent of oil earnings above the 
reference price. Moreover, the reference price was cut from $14.7/a barrel (bbl) to $9/bbl,
resulting in a loss of $4.2 billion to FIEM in 1999. The changes also allowed the president 
to authorize expenditures from the Fund by decree.44 The new rules were to be in place 
through 2004. 
Fund investment, savings, and income 
Despite the reduction of required payments to the Fund, the government failed to deposit even
this reduced amount in 1999.45 Although accumulation obligations were met in 2000, they
were only achieved through borrowing, despite the surge in oil prices. The absence of con-
straints on the government’s ability to borrow meant that a fund designed to improve fiscal
discipline was now encouraging the opposite.
Moreover, the existence of the Fund did not prevent the government from increasing
spending by 46 percent when oil prices rose in 2000. In the same period, public sector debt
rose by 10 percent.46 An Economist article pointed out, “Certainly, [Venezuela’s 2000 fiscal pol-
icy] resembles the fiscal policies that have so often got Venezuela into trouble in the past: spend
like crazy when the oil price is high, and slam on the brakes when it plummets.”47 In a coun-
try where every $1 increase in crude prices translates into $1 billion in export earnings (with
up to two-thirds going straight to the government48), high oil prices have not stopped irre-
sponsible borrowing and wasteful spending.
In an effort to free up resources for increased government spending, FIEM’s rules were
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changed in October 2001 for the second time in four years, with these changes diminishing
the Fund’s holdings. Under the new rules, there would be no transfers to the Fund from the
fourth quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2002, freeing approximately $2.7 to $3.5 bil-
lion to service the budget deficit.49 In 2003, FIEM would receive 6 percent of oil revenues, fol-
lowed by annual 1 percent increases up to 10 percent in 2007. In 2008, the Fund would revert
to the accumulation rules established in the original 1998 law. 
Analysts place little confidence in the endurance of the new rules because the Fund’s
stabilization function is undermined by the progressive increase in transfers, independent
of the price of oil. “This could lead the Fund to experience, during the 2003–2007 period,
the rather absurd situation of simultaneous deposits and withdrawals,” according to one
report.50
Conclusion 
Venezuela’s experience with its stabilization fund demonstrates that even with good inten-
tions, a natural resource fund cannot force a government into responsible petroleum revenue
management if a concentration of power provides no fiscal restraints. Venezuela’s experience
underscores a warning made by the IMF: that stabilization funds are ineffective in the absence
of constraints on government expenditures and borrowing. Because capital is fungible, a
Fund’s resources can be used all too easily as collateral for additional borrowing.51
Concentration of power in the hands of the executive has resulted in frequent rule
changes and failure to abide by existing rules, undermining FIEM’s effectiveness as a stabi-
lization mechanism, just as they undermined the previous Venezuelan investment fund.52
According to Clemente et al, had the Venezuelan government adhered to the rules for deposits
and withdrawals from the Fund, FIEM would have held over $10 billion rather than the $3.3
billion it held in November 2002.53 If FIEM has experienced so much change and failure dur-
ing its short life, with oil prices as high as they have been, one must question how the Fund
will fare when oil prices decline. With no independent controls or transparency, FIEM has
proven itself to be almost irrelevant.
The Chavez government has been enthusiastic in pursuing its campaign promises of
fighting corruption and poverty. To do so, it added even more power to an already powerful
executive. This concentration of power combined with an effort to disturb the system of patron-
age that had developed over many years has exacerbated bureaucratic infighting, alienated the
powerful PDVSA, and encouraged Chavez to spend even more money to bolster his tenuous
base of political support. Resistance to Chavez’s efforts to redistribute benefits from
entrenched interests culminated in a crippling eight-week strike from December 2002 to Feb-
ruary 2003 that paralyzed the oil industry and cost the government an estimated $50–60 mil-
lion per day. One lesson to be drawn is that an oil fund, no matter how well designed, will have
little impact unless it is embedded in a democratic and open system of government that pre-
vents rigid patronage relationships between government and industry from forming.
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Venezuela’s failures are particularly relevant for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Like
Venezuela, these countries have “ultra-presidential” systems. The power of the presidents,
their tight control over petroleum contracts, and the excessive discretion they have over the
operation of their respective natural resource funds do not bode well for the endurance of
the Caspian funds.
Chilean Copper Fund
Background
Not all commodity funds established over the years deal with revenues obtained from oil
exports. All commodity prices are subject to considerable price fluctuations over time. For
example, Papua New Guinea has a fund to collect revenues from mining while the island of
Nauru has established several funds for holding earnings from phosphate sales. 
Chile’s Copper Fund provides an example of how a stabilization fund can work effectively
to limit the impact of commodity price volatility on public finances despite decades of extreme
changes in government. Chile, long a democracy, succumbed to a military coup in 1973 when
General Augusto Pinochet ousted the government of Salvador Allende, the first-ever elected
Marxist head of state. Pinochet’s murderous regime lasted for 17 years. After losing in a national
plebiscite, the military ceded power to a democratically elected government in 1989. 
The new government strengthened the macroeconomic structural reforms and softened
the super-presidential system. It also placed greater priority on fighting poverty. Government
programs targeting poor households increased incomes in the poorest 20 percent of the pop-
ulation by close to 85 percent by the late 1990s, and decreased the poverty rate by 18 percent
between 1990 and 2000.54 These programs were successful because they did not simply
increase outlays for the poor, which, as chapter one describes, seldom achieves the desired
effect when mechanisms of budget accountability are absent. The increased spending was part
of an overhaul of the fiscal governance system, giving parliament more oversight of the exec-
utive’s handling of public finances, thus improving fiscal discipline.
With the end of military rule, civil society has had a strong revival and public forums
are frequently used by government to learn public opinion on policy matters. The government
has also made a commitment to fiscal transparency, by working with the IMF and the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to meet their transparency
guidelines. Chile’s 2003 budget bill called for “developing tools to make the state’s financial
management transparent to the public.” According to Miguel Schloss, Transparency Interna-
tional’s expert on the natural resource sector, in Chile, “participatory decision-making
processes are a cornerstone for decisions aimed at enhancing the strength of the economy and
the welfare of citizenry, and as a result, levels of corruption are lower.”55
Chile, the world’s largest copper producer with 28 percent of proven and probable
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reserves, experienced historically high prices for copper in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but
these highs gave way to low prices in the 1980s. Chile’s business and economic cycles have,
with close proximity, coincided with cycles in copper prices.56 To reduce the public sector’s vul-
nerability to changes in copper prices, the government created the Copper Fund in 1986; its
assets currently stand at about $2 billion. 
Fund function and structure 
As a stabilization fund, the Copper Fund has helped the government avoid budget deficits
(except in 1999) in the face of continuing low world prices for copper following the economic
slowdown in OECD member countries. Surpluses generated by the Fund were to be used to
prepay external debt and to sterilize foreign exchange in the interest of avoiding Dutch Dis-
ease. The Fund has helped Chile become one of the only countries in Latin America to achieve
an anticyclical fiscal policy. 
The Fund’s trigger mechanism for determining the direction and size of flows between
the budget and the Fund was established in an agreement with the World Bank. Benchmark
prices are adjusted quarterly. Benchmark rates are informed by analysis from a panel of experts
chosen on the basis of their understanding of the economic outlook for copper prices rather
than being filled ex officio. The larger the difference between the benchmark and the actual
price, the more is deposited into or withdrawn from the Fund.57 If the actual price exceeds
the benchmark, then the difference is transferred to the Fund. But if the actual price falls below
the benchmark, then the difference is withdrawn from the Fund. For example, in 1998–1999,
the government received large transfers from the Copper Fund due to a sharp drop in world
copper prices. 
Oversight of the Fund 
The Copper Fund is an account held in trust and managed by the Central Bank. The Central
Bank is obliged to generate a specified return on the Fund’s resources and does so as part of
its normal liquidity management operations in the capital markets. The Copper Fund is over-
seen by a board, which includes representatives of the state-owned copper company, Corpo-
racion National del Cobre (CODELCO). The presence of the company creates the kind of
contestation that separation of powers accomplishes in other NRFs. Since the copper company
has an incentive to limit its payments to government, it is in its interest to see that the Cop-
per Fund is run responsibly. 
Fund investment, savings, and income
As a stabilization fund, the Chilean Copper Fund’s transfers go directly into the budget and
are not earmarked for particular expenditures. It is up to legislators, through the normal bud-
getary process, to determine how those transfers will be allocated. For example, a 1958 Cop-
per Reserve Law earmarks 10 percent of CODELCO’s export earnings for purchase of
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armaments for the military. To ensure receipt of this transfer, the military government decreed
in 1987 that, at a minimum, the military must receive $180 million, to be adjusted annu-
ally.58 With the drop in world copper prices to a 50-year low around 1998, funds for the mili-
tary came from the Copper Fund instead of CODELCO. Other expenditures have included
financing to pay for higher than expected imports, for buy-back of public debt, and to com-
pensate fruit growers and exporters for losses following boycotts of their produce.59
Exceptions to the spending rules have occurred. In the past, special transfers of $460
million have been made from Copper Fund assets to the Oil Stabilization Fund, which was
created in 1991 to subsidize fuel for consumers. However, such exceptions were accompanied
by public debate and the issuance of corresponding parliamentary laws establishing the nec-
essary conditionality for repayment and corrective actions by the agency receiving the trans-
fer. The transfers to the Oil Stabilization Fund have since been repaid.
As expenditures from the Copper Fund mounted to counter the low price of copper, the
government resorted to borrowing to replenish Fund. In 2001, the government sold $650 mil-
lion in bonds with the intention of depositing these proceeds in the Copper Fund if prices had
not recovered within 18 months.60
Conclusion
Several reasons can be identified for the Copper Fund’s continuity and success in helping Chile
maintain balanced budgets despite low copper prices. First, copper plays a relatively small role
in the Chilean economy, in contrast to the role of oil in the Venezuelan, Alaskan, or Azerbai-
jani economies. The mining sector accounted for 8 percent of GDP in 1997. CODELCO turns
over all profits to the treasury, which represented 3.6 percent of GDP and only 10 percent of
the government’s revenues in 1997.61 Although the mining sector grew rapidly from 1988 to
1997, so did the nonmining sector, encouraged by structural reforms and a stable macroeco-
nomic climate. 
Second, since the transition to democratic rule, there have been a number of reforms
designed to enhance budget accountability. The Fund came into being by decree in 1986 as
Pinochet, struggling to remain in power, initiated a number of structural reforms designed
to improve transparency and accountability of the government’s budget. The government that
replaced Pinochet introduced its own governance reforms to improve accountability in the
public finance system in the 1990s by increasing parliament’s role in fiscal oversight, reduc-
ing the president’s discretion over spending, and improving fiscal transparency. Among the
reforms were limits to unplanned increases in spending by government agencies, publication
of detailed reports on the basis for and the execution of the budget and their availability on the
Ministry of Finance web page, and performance evaluations of government agencies and pro-
grams to help parliamentarians and the public make more informed budget decisions. 
Third, the strength of Chile’s fund is not so much in its rules as in the civil society con-
text in which it operates. This is perhaps best seen when viewed in comparison to Venezuela’s
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stabilization fund. Although Venezuelas’s fund is reinforced with strict rules, the country
retains a super-presidential system, and its presidents have displayed a tendency to circum-
vent their own rules when it is convenient. Hence, Venezuelan president Chavez encountered
little resistance to a dramatic change in the rules governing transfers to the oil fund, which
contributed to its poor performance as a stabilization mechanism. By contrast, since the depar-
ture of the repressive military regime in Chile, Chileans have shown a reluctance to adopt rigid
rules. Instead, an active civil society and a vigilant parliament keen to enhance its oversight
of the executive have helped maintain fiscal discipline in the absence of explicit rules about
oversight of the Copper Fund.
Norway’s State Petroleum Fund 
Background
Norway’s State Petroleum Fund (SPF) is widely touted as a model natural resource fund. In
designing its own national fund, Kazakhstan, for example, extensively studied the Norwe-
gian model. But, for those countries that might consider following Norway’s example, four
points must be kept in mind. First, Norway struggled for years with the same petroleum rev-
enue management challenges that plague other oil producers. Second, Norway’s SPF func-
tions within a wealthy, sparsely populated, and firmly established democracy. The same success
is unlikely in states where these conditions are absent. Third, oil prices have been high for
most of the SPF’s seven-year existence. There has been no test of the government’s commit-
ment to the Fund when oil prices plunge. Fourth, when oil production began in 1970, Norway
already enjoyed high living standards and a diversified industrial base. 
Despite these inherent advantages after the discovery of North Sea oil, Norway began
to experience the same economic dislocations as other petroleum producers.62 OPEC oil pro-
duction cuts in late 1973, as part of the Arab oil embargo directed primarily against the United
States for supporting Israel in the Arab-Israeli war, caused oil prices to skyrocket just as Nor-
way’s oil came onto the market. The resulting windfall raised expectations of immediate afflu-
ence and increased public spending. Throughout the 1970s, the governing Labor Party
explicitly adopted the goals of full employment, equalization of living conditions and incomes,
and an expansion of the welfare state.63
The increased spending drove up wages and inflation. Between 1970 and 1984, nomi-
nal earnings rose an average of 11.4 percent every year, and inflation averaged 9 percent a
year.64 The country’s current account deficit widened and its currency appreciated as oil became
the primary export. Non-oil sectors of the economy contracted.65 As state spending expanded,
so did the state’s share of employment. From 1972 to 1984 the public sector increased from
18 to 27 percent of total employment,66 further reducing the availability of workers for the pri-
vate sector and limiting economic growth. Like many oil producers, Norway’s government
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began accumulating public debt in anticipation of oil revenues. External debt nearly doubled
in four years (1975–1979).67 Control of the government switched back and forth between Labor
and the Conservatives in the 1980s as both parties found that dismantling a welfare state was
much more difficult than building one.
Fund function and structure
Spiraling inflation and debt prompted Norway’s legislators to consider creation of an oil fund.
A fund could sterilize the economy against inflation from excess revenue flows and also hold
these revenues until they could be smoothly absorbed into the economy.
Another concern was Norway’s demographic time bomb. An aging population, combined
with a pay-as-you-go system and an expected decline in oil revenues in the next two decades,
meant that future generations faced substantial pension reductions. Public pension expenditures
are expected to nearly double as a share of GDP over the next 30 years. To meet these challenges,
the legislature established the SPF in 1990. However, no deposits to the Fund were made until
1995, when the country finally had recovered from the 1986 oil price plunge and subsequent
recession.
After only six years, the SPF’s market value stood at $68 billion. According to conser-
vative government projections, the SPF will represent between 130 to 150 percent of GDP
within 20 years.68 Currently, the Fund has accumulated more than 50 percent of annual
GDP.69 The SPF’s rapid accumulation is due not only to generous oil prices in recent 
years, but also to the restraint practiced by Norway’s legislators. The SPF’s revenue and 
expenditure rules are so lax that it is difficult to imagine them succeeding in any environment
without a strong tradition of accountability and transparency. This laxity stands as further
warning that the Norwegian Fund is not a good model for countries lacking that kind of 
environment. 
Unlike the resource funds in Alaska, Alberta, and Venezuela, Norway’s SPF does not
specify what share of oil revenues are to be deposited each year. Deposits are determined annu-
ally by the legislature; they consist of net oil revenues after the non-oil budget deficit has been
covered.70 Thus, it is entirely up to the legislature to determine, through its spending, how
much it will deposit to or withdraw from the SPF. The parliament could easily deplete the SPF
by failing to balance the budget over time. 
The design was adopted to induce parliamentarians to be fiscally prudent, by giving
them responsibility not only over the budget, but also over the SPF. Along with no require-
ment to deposit money into the Fund every year, there is no reference price to determine the
size of transfers and no limit to how much can be withdrawn. Such rules could just as easily
encourage uncontrolled spending. The fact that the SPF works is a testament to the powerful
role that transparency and an entrenched sense of public ownership have played in encour-
aging fiscal accountability. In other states marked by weak institutions, corruption, or urgent
social needs, stronger requirements on fund withdrawals and deposits are necessary. 
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The SPF provides for both stabilization and savings. The stabilization function is
achieved by having parliament withdraw whatever oil revenues are needed to balance its
budget. The savings function is achieved by annual deposits and by adding earnings into the
principal.71 No decision has been made about how to use the bulk of the savings, but they will
most likely be used to pay pensions, given the expected increase in outlays just as oil revenues
begin to decline.
There has also been renewed interest in spending earnings for current social needs
rather than putting everything away for future generations. A new rule that went into effect
in 2002 stipulates that 4 percent of the annual earnings of the SPF be returned to the budget
for social spending. 
Oversight of the Fund 
A separation of powers in overseeing the SPF allows various institutions of government to
keep one another in check (see Appendix 1). Parliament’s discretion in determining transfers
to the SPF has given the executive branch an incentive to be more accountable to the legisla-
ture. Although the executive branch may change the SPF’s regulations without legislative
approval, in practice the government has always consulted with parliament and has kept it well
informed of any developments concerning the SPF. The Office of the Auditor General reports
to the parliament on the results of its annual findings. 
The Ministry of Finance, responsible for managing the SPF, formulates its investment
guidelines and risk limits, and establishes a benchmark portfolio with indices of expected per-
formance in those countries where investment is permitted. The ministry sets maximum lim-
its on deviation from the benchmark. Day-to-day management of the Fund is delegated to
Norges Bank, the country’s central bank, which is independent in its investment decisions,
but which must operate within the investment guidelines and risk limits set by the Ministry
of Finance. 
One original provision is the existence of an oversight council that, at the request of the
Finance Ministry, may examine whether the SPF’s foreign investments contradict any obli-
gations that Norway bears under international conventions. Another important provision is
the prohibition against using the Fund as collateral for government borrowing. As Venezuela’s
example has shown, a natural resource fund accomplishes little if the state saves with one hand
and borrows with the other.
The SPF is a model of transparency. As the manager of the SPF, Norges Bank is required
to submit reports to the Finance Ministry four times a year. These reports, as well as the annual
report, are made available to the public over the Internet.72 The reports provide information
on transfers to and from the budget, all of the Fund’s holdings, their value, their returns, risk
exposure, methodology, and administrative costs. Additionally, the Finance Ministry hires an
independent auditor to evaluate both the benchmark and the actual return on the Fund. The
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results of these audits are also available over the Internet.73 All regulations governing the SPF
can also be found on Norges Bank’s website (see Appendix 9).
Fund investment, savings, and income
The SPF is invested entirely abroad in order to sterilize assets and diversify away from domes-
tic industries whose fortunes parallel those of oil. All financial instruments and cash deposits
of the SPF are denominated in foreign currency. Originally, the SPF could only buy bonds, but
in 1998 the rules were relaxed to allow equity investments so that returns could be improved.74
Between 30 to 50 percent of assets can be invested in equities, the rest in fixed instruments.
To minimize volatility, the SPF can hold no more than 3 percent of total stock of a single com-
pany. In 2000, investments were spread across 2,025 companies in 21 countries.
Geographic risk is minimized by assigning limits (determined by GDP) on the per-
centage of bonds and equities from different regions: 50 percent for Europe, 30 percent for
the Americas, and 20 percent for Asia and Oceania. Twenty-eight countries qualify for invest-
ment. By setting limits to different kinds of investments and to investments in particular
regions and companies, the SPF aims to avoid losses attributable to any specific risk factor.
Ethical considerations have also entered the SPF’s investment guidelines. Initially, the
administration advocated banning investment in tobacco companies. Although the initiative
ultimately failed, another proposal to set aside money for investment in environmentally
friendly companies passed. The environmental portfolio, created on a three-year test basis in
2000, has received over $240 million in transfers. The Ethical Investment Research Service,
an independent agency that analyzes corporate behavior for socially responsible investment
funds, determines portfolio guidelines.75
Cumulatively, the Fund achieved a 15.4 percent net real return between 1997–2001, aver-
aging a 3.6 percent annual real rate of return (adjusted for inflation and management costs).
Average management costs have been less than 0.1 percent of total assets.76
Conclusion
The success of Norway’s SPF has much to do with the country’s reasonably diversified econ-
omy, relatively small population, discipline exercised by the legislature, and separation of pow-
ers in oversight of the SPF. The Fund has helped Norway maintain a counter-cyclical fiscal
stance, reigning in spending when oil prices surge in order to avoid inflation, and making
money available when oil prices contract to avoid sudden cuts in spending. Even during record
oil prices in 2001, the Labor-led government passed a tight budget, which cost it significantly
in the ensuing general elections.
Parliament has considerable discretion in determining how much, if anything, to trans-
fer to the petroleum fund, and how much to take out in any given year. To date, it has exer-
cised this authority responsibly. However, if oil prices fall, there are no impediments to the
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parliament authorizing the use of the Fund’s principal, as occurred in Alberta. In those cir-
cumstances, a natural resource fund can quickly dwindle. In countries like Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan, where budget transparency and controls are still in formation, tighter rules on nat-
ural resource fund revenues and expenditures are needed.
Although the advantages held by Norway at the time of creation of the SPF limit its
applicability as a model for others, much of its success can be traced to the separation of pow-
ers, transparency, and accountability that underlie its operations. These are attributes that can
be built into the Azeri and Kazakh oil funds. For example, in Norway, both the Ministry of
Finance and an outside auditor conduct audits, which are presented to parliament and posted
on the Internet. The SPF’s website provides all regulations governing its activities and all of
its highly detailed reports about the Fund’s investment activities. Such transparency does much
to inspire confidence in the professionalism and endurance of a natural resource fund.
Chad’s Oil Revenue Management Plan
Background
Chad will not be an oil-producing and exporting country until 2004. It currently imports all
the oil it consumes. When Chad does start producing oil, virtually all of it will be available
for export. By international standards, Chad will be a minor player on the world oil market.
Nonetheless, earnings from oil development projects should approach $200 million annually.
The question of how these sums will be spent holds important political, economic, and finan-
cial implications for a country whose annual per capita income in 2001 was about $200.
Once construction of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project is complete in 2004, 
Chad can anticipate oil revenues of $200 million a year for the next 25 years—double 
current government revenues.77 The challenge for Chad is to overcome years of civil war,
poverty, corruption, and human rights abuses, and to use these revenues for development and
the public good. 
Since achieving independence from France in 1960, Chad has been marked by suffer-
ing and instability. The two authoritarian leaders who have ruled Chad for the last 20 years—
Hissene Habre and Idriss Deby—both seized power in coups in 1978 and 1990 respectively.
In 2001, Deby postponed legislative elections until spring 2002 and won 63 percent in a first-
round presidential election that was characterized by the arrest and murder of opposition
activists.78
Neither parliament nor the judiciary is independent. Parties aligned with the president
controlled 97 of 125 seats in parliament in 2002. Arrests and persecution of representatives
who criticize the government have stifled parliamentary opposition.79 The president makes
most key judicial appointments. Journalists and the media are the targets of defamation pros-
ecutions and deadly violence if they report on government corruption. 
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The World Bank ranks Chad as the world’s fifth poorest country. The country ranks 155
out of 162 countries in the United Nations Human Development Index.80 Life expectancy is
just 50 years, and three-quarters of the population lack access to clean water and sanitation.
Crude oil deposits discovered in the 1960s offer a source of funding to raise living 
standards and bring stability to Chad but civil war has hampered development. It was not 
until the Deby government’s suppression of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic 
(FARF) rebel group in the late 1990s that oil field development became possible again. But 
oil field development would have to be accompanied by construction of an oil export pipeline
and export facilities in Cameroon. Domestic demand is far too small to justify development
by itself.
A consortium of Exxon, Petronas, and Chevron was eager to develop a pipeline through
Cameroon to Chad’s oil fields in the Doba Basin, but the partners were wary of the project’s
risks. “The Chad consortium’s members realized that 20 years down the road, they would be
held responsible for any outcome, whatever their direct responsibility. . . . They needed a buffer
against both a demanding government and a potentially resentful population,” writes Peter
Rosenblum.81
The World Bank eased the consortium’s concerns by agreeing to provide $115 million,
or 3 percent of the project’s financing.82 The consortium pursued the World Bank’s involve-
ment because the latter possessed sufficient clout to protect against misappropriation of oil
development revenues. From the World Bank’s perspective, the project would increase its lever-
age by linking continued project financing to successful petroleum revenue management and
create a model for other mineral-rich but otherwise poor countries. According to a World Bank
press statement, the Bank’s involvement provided “an unprecedented framework to transform
oil wealth into direct benefits for the poor, the vulnerable, and the environment.”83
Revenue management function and structure
From the very beginning, the Chad-Cameroon pipeline has been strongly opposed by a vari-
ety of NGOs, particularly those concerned with human rights and environmental protection.
As one of a number of conditions for its involvement, the World Bank required Chad to adopt
a revenue management plan outlining how petroleum income would be used to reduce
poverty. The Revenue Management Law, passed in December 1998, specifies how oil revenues
from the Doba fields may be spent and how expenditures will be monitored. Assessment of
the law’s effectiveness can only begin once oil begins to flow, probably early in 2004, yet it
could be an innovative measure for increasing transparency, accountability, and public involve-
ment in government finance in a country where all three are absent.
According to the Revenue Management Law, 80 percent of the government’s oil rev-
enues will be dedicated to education, health and social services, rural development, infra-
structure, and environmental and water management. Ten percent of revenues will go to a
future generations trust. Five percent will be returned to the oil-producing area for regional
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development, and the remaining 5 percent will be used for “pressing Government operational
needs.”84
Several concerns have surfaced about the potential for significant revenue to bypass the
revenue law. The Agence Française de Développement pointed to the fact that only royalties
and dividends are subject to the revenue law. Some 45 percent of revenues generated over
the lifetime of the project will not be required to comply with the Revenue Law.85 It is also
not clear whether the Revenue Management Law will apply to revenue generated from new
oil fields being explored in Chad. 
Revenue management oversight 
Past problems with Chad’s failure to account for expenditure of aid money led international
lending agencies to require that the Chad Treasury Department be placed under the control
of a Swiss company, COTECNA. Similarly, income received from the production and export
of crude oil is required to be deposited in a foreign escrow account.
The Revenue Management Law also created an oversight committee, the College de
Controle et de Surveillance des Resources Petrolieres (CCSRP), to monitor use of oil revenues.
The nine-member committee, headed by the country director of the Bank of Central African
States, is composed of five representatives from the executive branch, the legislature, and the
judiciary as well as four representatives from civil society. The committee’s task is to “verify,”
“authorize,” and “oversee” expenditure of oil revenues. In a continuing debate, committee
members, supported by the U.S. Treasury Department, have asked for a more substantive role
in monitoring revenue collection and allocation. 
The World Bank is providing $41 million in aid to help build a system of revenue man-
agement and financial control. The money is being used to develop a financial management
information system, build a poverty database, improve the competence of civil servants, and
support the oversight committee.86 According to the law, there will be annual published audits
of the government’s petroleum accounts, as well as expenditure reviews by the government
and the World Bank. 
Additionally, the World Bank has appointed a six-member International Advisory Group
(IAG), with a 10-year mandate, to advise it on the progress of the government’s poverty alle-
viation, its management of oil revenues, and the involvement of civil society in these processes.
IAG members have no direct relationship to the government of Chad, the World Bank, or the
oil companies.87 They have conducted several field visits and are making their reports avail-
able to the public. 
An additional layer of oversight is the World Bank’s internal ombudsman, the Inspection
Panel. After its inspection in 2002, the panel expressed grave concern that the infrastructure for
producing and delivering oil was developing at a much faster rate than the infrastructure for
absorbing and managing oil revenues.88 The panel noted that the Revenue Management Law fails
to constrain the government’s ability to borrow against future oil revenues. The IAG cautioned,
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“What must not be done is to accept that the state of preparedness for the arrival of oil revenues
‘will be whatever it will be.’”89 Inadequate capacity to absorb oil revenues could be aggravated if
oil prices exceed those expected by the Revenue Management Law. The law was designed with
expectations of oil at around $15 a barrel.90 It is crucial not only to have the means to absorb that
revenue, but also to sterilize excess revenue in order to avoid the risk of Dutch Disease.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the success of any revenue management plan hinges on the political will to make
it work. Where political will is absent, vagueness in regulations to ensure transparency can be
easily exploited. An analysis of the Revenue Management Law by the Human Rights Pro-
gram at Harvard Law School found many ambiguities in the law.
An important finding was that the law does not specify where funds should be spent.
In other words, all the investments could be made in one region. In Chad, where ethnic cleav-
ages coincide with geography, such inequitable spending could easily re-ignite Chad’s long-
running war. 
As in other cases where oil funds have failed in their objectives, Chad’s revenue man-
agement plan gives too much discretion to the president. He may alter the allocation of rev-
enues by decree every five years and can “fill in gaps” by decree more regularly. The president’s
first opportunity to revise the Revenue Management Law will be in 2004—just as oil revenues
begin to flow. An earlier version of the law, approved by parliament, had required legislative
approval for any changes. The exclusion of this requirement illustrates the president’s unwill-
ingness to relinquish control over oil revenues.
Perhaps the area where lack of political will is likely to have the most impact is the over-
sight committee. While the committee’s composition appears representative, it is unlikely to
enjoy much, if any, independence. The Petroleum Revenue Management Law was passed in
three hours with 108 votes and no opposition. The only parliamentarian who had openly
opposed it was sitting in jail.91 The government has a history of co-opting opponents, and there
is no mechanism to ensure that NGO representatives on the oversight committee remain
accountable to their constituencies. 
Moreover, the oversight committee lacks the power to enforce its mandate. Without
the right to subpoena information, without a staff, and without a requirement to make its find-
ings public, the committee is unlikely to function as an effective check against abuse. The gov-
ernment has rejected the committee’s draft regulations and has supported rules greatly
reducing the committee’s power and independence. The World Bank stepped in to support
regulations more in keeping with the Revenue Management Law. Members of the commit-
tee also report being pressured by the government to approve expenditures without congres-
sional approval.92 According to Ian Gary, Catholic Relief Service’s advisor on Africa, “the worry
is that the committee’s mandate will be too narrowly interpreted and they will be starved of
funds, especially if they do their job too well.” Nevertheless, the committee has succeeded in
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blocking two procurement contracts for roads because they did not follow established bidding
procedures. 
In countries lacking a tradition of accountability, political will is often the hardest thing
to secure. In December 2000, after repeated inquiries from the World Bank, President Deby
finally admitted to using $4.5 million of the first bonus payment to purchase arms—without
parliamentary approval. Although the bonus payment was not required to comply with the
Revenue Management Law, the president had widely publicized that the bonus would be spent
according to its guidelines and monitored by the oversight committee.93 The World Bank said
it was “sobered and disappointed,” and claimed that the Chadian authorities did not provide
the World Bank with information about the expenditure until after the fact.94 Whether simi-
lar lapses will occur once petroleum revenues begin to flow remains to be seen.
Oil Funds in the Persian Gulf
Oil funds exist in several Persian Gulf countries, including Kuwait, Oman, and Iran. The three
share certain traits with the oil funds created in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan: they operate in
countries that are not democracies and where transparency of governance is not a cultural
norm. Leaders of these countries have a large amount of freedom in determining fund rules
and expenditures. As a result, the oil funds in the Persian Gulf have been subject to frequent
rule changes and operate in near total secrecy.
Kuwait Reserve Fund for Future Generations
Kuwait’s fund was first begun in 1962 as a secret account of the finance minister, who allegedly
wanted to keep the legislature from spending the money. Institutionalized in 1976 as the
Kuwait Reserve Fund for Future Generations (KRFFG), it receives 10 percent of Kuwait’s total
government revenues annually. The Fund, run by an office attached to the country’s ruler,
invests its assets in overseas equities, bonds, and real estate, reportedly earning consistently
excellent returns. Little is known with certainty about the Fund since it does not disclose infor-
mation about its holdings or activities to the public or the country’s legislature.
Originally, the Fund, which had accumulated $89 billion by 1989, was supposed to incur
no expenditures until the turn of the century. However, the invasion by Iraq, as well as other
discretionary expenditures, necessitated spending. The lack of democracy in Kuwait and the
absence of transparency and accountability in the Fund’s governance have essentially turned
it into a second budget for the government. There have been reports that spending is moti-
vated more by the desire of the government to stay in power than by economic rationale. For
example, a parliamentary inquiry into $32 billion taken from the Fund after the war reported
that $22 billion had been used to pay off the bank debts of close to 10,000 citizens, includ-
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ing members of the wealthiest merchant families and the ruling family. The Fund was also
used to pay seven months salary to everyone who stayed behind during the war. 
Because of Kuwait’s small size and abundant oil reserves, the government is able to use
the KRFFG as a means to buy the loyalty of its tiny population. The lack of democracy and
the absence of transparency have made it difficult for anyone, including Kuwait’s citizenry,
to oversee the Fund’s activities. 
Oman General Reserve Fund 
Oman has less opportunity for squandering oil wealth than Kuwait. Although Oman has a tiny
population like Kuwait, its oil reserves are less than half of Kuwait’s, and the expectation is
that they will be exhausted in the next 15–20 years. The Oman General Reserve Fund (GRF),
established in 1980 as a savings fund for future generations, has functioned as a stabiliza-
tion fund since 1998. Originally, the GRF received 15 percent of all oil revenues. After sev-
eral rule changes, transfers are now determined by a reference price for oil. Since its inception,
the GRF has transferred $14.5 billion to the government budget.
Little is known about the size and operations of the GRF. The Fund publishes no annual
report, maintains no website, and shares no information with the public. According to Oman’s
director for budget and contracts, this secrecy is meant to deter the legislative assembly from
exerting pressure on the government for more spending.95 Several mechanisms for oversee-
ing the Fund exist: there are monthly internal audits and investment performance reviews,
quarterly external audits, and twice yearly portfolio performance reviews. However, none of
these are shared with the parliament or the public.
Because it is so easy for the government to withdraw money from the GRF, it has
repeatedly done so to finance its budget deficits. In most years, withdrawals from the Fund
have exceeded contributions and analysts expect the Fund to run out of money before Oman
runs out of oil.96
Iran’s Foreign Currency Reserve Account 
Established in 2000 against the rebound of oil prices, Iran’s Foreign Currency Reserve Account
is the newest NRF in the Gulf region. The need for sound oil revenue management is partic-
ularly acute in Iran. Oman and Kuwait are tiny countries that can use oil revenues to subsi-
dize their entire populations. Iran, however, has a population of over 65 million and struggles
with the legacy of a 10-year war with Iraq and international sanctions. 
Like many oil-rich states, Iran bears the marks of the “resource curse.” The country has
large domestic and foreign debts, a moribund economy, and low levels of tax collection. The
state directly or indirectly controls most economic activity and spends a large share of its oil
earnings on subsidies. Iranian demand for gasoline, stimulated by the low price of four cents
per liter, exceeds supplies from local refineries and the gap in demand has to be covered by
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imports.97 The quality of life of its population has suffered as well. Iran has high levels of
unemployment and few prospects for job growth. GDP per capita declined by nearly 40 per-
cent between 1979 and 1995. Indeed, the Iranian GDP estimated for 2001 was little changed
over the GDP attained 15 years earlier, in 1986.
Iran’s stabilization fund has two goals: to build up reserves in case of a downturn in
oil prices, and to develop Iran’s non-oil sector. Half of the resources transferred to the fund
are saved, and half may be used as loans to private enterprises. The Central Bank manages the
fund, which now stands at close to $8 billion, but oversight of the fund rests with a board of
trustees made up of government ministers and presidential appointees. The rules for invest-
ing and spending the savings portion of the fund are not known. The development portion,
however, is put at the disposal of 10 approved banks that may lend to private Iranian compa-
nies within the guidelines established by the board of trustees. Loans are for three-year peri-
ods and must be repaid with interest. As of July 2001, 87 projects had received approval, with
$548 million dispersed.98
Although it is still too early to tell, the hope is that Iran’s current stabilization fund will
operate with greater transparency and accountability than an earlier one, established in 1957.
Seventy percent of oil revenues were channeled into this earlier fund to be used for economic
development. However, an absence of mechanisms for monitoring expenditures resulted in
large allocations for items unrelated to economic development, such as offices for the secret
police.99
Despite the questions of transparency and accountability that still exist around Iran’s
stabilization fund, its establishment is a positive development and one that can offer some
examples for the Caspian. Like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Iran faces the challenge of creat-
ing job opportunities and developing its non-oil sector. Iran’s stabilization fund provides one
example of how a state can use excess oil revenues for stabilization and savings purposes, as
well as for economic development.
Nunavut Trust of Canada
Background
Unlike government-run oil funds, the Nunavut Trust is a community-managed fund. It has
earned strong returns while maintaining accountability to its constituents and serves as a good
example for Kazakhstan’s underdeveloped oil-producing regions such as Atyrau or Aktyubinsk.
The Trust also demonstrates how these communities can be compensated for the negative
external consequences of oil development, and how they can turn such compensation into
an enduring source of income.
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The Nunavut Trust was developed to administer the proceeds from the historic 1993
Land Claim Settlement between the Canadian government and the Inuit people of Nunavut,
which is a self-governed northern Canadian territory above Hudson Bay inhabited by approx-
imately 21,000 Inuit. The agreement transferred 350,000 square kilometers of land to the
Inuit, gave the Inuit equal representation on a number of wildlife and resource management
boards, and entitled them to royalty payments from natural resource development on this
territory. Additionally, the agreement provided for payments of $1.1 billion by the Canadian
government to be transferred to the Nunavut Trust over 15 years (roughly $52,000 per capita),
ending in 2007.
The Nunavut Trust is unique because its beneficiaries run the fund independent of any
government. The trustees overseeing the fund are appointed by regional Inuit associations.
The government of Nunavut was offered tax-free status for the Trust if it agreed to state invest-
ment guidelines such as those used for pension funds. The trustees declined, however, in order
to maintain the independence of their investment decisions.100 One challenge for the Trust
in coming years will be to avoid creating dependencies on the part of beneficiaries and to resist
pressure for spending the Trust’s principal.
Fund function and structure 
The designers of the Nunavut Trust rejected a dividend program because they wanted to avoid
what they considered the mistakes of other funds. The Samson Cree of oil-rich Alberta had
received over $2 billion since the oil booms of the 1970s, with every Cree entitled to a divi-
dend of about $40,000 upon turning 18. Much of the money was spent on personal con-
sumption, leading to high levels of alcoholism and death, and generating little material
improvement for the community. 
The Trust’s designers also wanted to avoid investing the principal in pursuit of local eco-
nomic development while sacrificing returns from investments. The separation of investments
from expenditures of Trust income allowed trustees to focus on earning returns while a sep-
arate organization representing beneficiaries, Nunavut Tunngavik, Inc. (NTI), concentrated
on how best to spend the money. Consequently, fund managers invest in a mix of fixed income
securities and foreign and domestic stocks with the sole purpose of maximizing return on
investment while minimizing risk.
Oversight of the Fund 
Like other funds, the Nunavut Trust struggled to find the right balance between independence
and accountability for its trustees. To insulate the trustees from political pressure, the deed
creating the Trust makes them appointed rather than elected positions. They serve three-year
terms and can only be removed for cause. Conflicts of interest are reduced because the regional
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Inuit associations that appoint the trustees are not beneficiaries of Trust spending. Account-
ability is achieved by giving every Inuit beneficiary the right to sue the trustees for breach of
duties.
Fund investment, savings, and income
Until economic downturn in 2001, the Trust was earning an average rate of return of 17 per-
cent, placing it in the top quarter of 500 investment funds ranked by the Canadian Trust Uni-
verse Comparison Service. These high returns were achieved  not only  by diversifying
investments, but also by hiring four different money managers to invest different portfolios
of the Trust.
Spending the Trust’s earnings is done through separate nonprofit organizations. The
NTI is the largest of these organizations and implements the Land Claims Settlement on
behalf of the Inuit people. The NTI uses Trust earnings to fund Inuit programs such as a
Nunavut elders benefit plan, a program for Nunavut hunter support, a bereavement travel
fund, and various sports programs. The NTI also created a for-profit venture capital fund for
Inuit-owned businesses.
NTI functions as a “parliament” of sorts representing the Inuit. The Inuit population
elects its executive director, and the three regional Inuit associations (whose boards are
elected by the Inuit they represent) nominate members for the 10-person board. The NTI
meets regularly with different Nunavut communities to discuss spending priorities. These
frequent meetings, an elected executive director, and board members nominated by the
regional associations provide constituents with three forms of accountability regarding Trust
spending decisions.
Conclusion 
A challenge facing the Trust in coming years is the growing demand for spending. In a 2000
review, the NTI submitted requests for additional expenditures, including the creation of a
new trust providing $50 million over five years for local business development, a 50 percent
increase to NTI’s operating budget, add-on funding to cover past NTI cost over-runs, and a
50 percent increase in benefits for Inuit elders. Though the Trust has performed strongly, it
is subject to market volatility and will not always generate enough revenues to meet expendi-
ture goals. 
As beneficiaries become dependent on Trust income, pressure may grow for borrowing
from the principal or for making riskier investments that yield higher returns.101 The Nunavut
Trust does not have the same hurdles to borrowing from its principal as Alaska does. Amounts
can be advanced from the principal with the approval of two-thirds of the trustees (provided
that each of the regional Inuit associations is represented). With increased demand for expen-
ditures, and federal transfers ending in 2007, the Trust’s endurance will depend on the vigi-
lance of its trustees.
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Making Funds Work: Lessons Learned 
What distinguishes good from poor performance among the natural resource funds discussed
in this chapter? In the success stories, the NRF achieves some combination of the following:
it accumulates sizeable savings; enjoys the support of the public; smoothes out government
spending; and maintains continuity in the fund’s rules and functions. In more problematic
cases, the NRF’s assets decline over time while it fails to raise living standards or to create a
viable non-oil economic sector; prodigal spending of fund assets leads to inflation; the fund’s
rules are in flux; revenues and expenditures are shrouded in secrecy; and an absence of sep-
aration of powers makes the NRF easy to raid.
This section summarizes the lessons, both positive and negative, of the NRFs described
above. In doing so, it provides insight into the means by which NRFs can be designed to limit
government’s discretion in misallocating or wasting natural resource revenues and to pro-
vide incentives for good management of resource revenues.
Transparency keeps leaders honest.
When the public knows little about its NRF, there are fewer obstacles to prevent leaders from
making expenditures outside the NRF’s guidelines. Secrecy surrounding the oil funds in
Kuwait, Oman, and Iran has allowed these funds to be used as backdoor budgets at best and
as personal bank accounts at worst. In Abu Dhabi, another fund that operates under secrecy,
there have been scandals involving reports that investment managers had stolen more than
$70 million.102 By contrast, NRFs in Alaska, Norway, and Alberta have established transparency
as an operating principle in their founding documents. As a result, they make information
available to the public, ensuring its accessibility in easy-to-understand language.
Several mechanisms exist by which transparency can be incorporated into an NRF. First,
all transfers to and from a natural resource fund should be recorded in the budget and treas-
ury accounts. Second, as a keeper of the public’s money, an NRF should have the same com-
mitment to disclosure as a public company has to its shareholders or an investment fund to
its investors. It should publish annual and quarterly reports, results of external audits, and
announcements of tenders. It should disclose its asset management guidelines, its risk-return
benchmarks, and its actual performance relative to these goals. 
Transparency should apply not only to the NRF’s activities, but along the entire chain
along which natural resource revenues are earned and spent. Most misappropriation happens
long before oil revenues reach an NRF. Outside agencies can be retained to monitor produc-
tion, costs, and sales in order to provide an independent audit verifying companies’ produc-
tion, tax payments, and subsequent transfers to the NRF. Transparency of the entire chain of
payments can begin with a requirement for oil (or other resource extraction) companies to dis-
close all payments made to host governments and their mediators. Transparency should also
extend to the budget planning and implementation process.
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A strong sense of public ownership over an NRF protects it against abuse. 
It is no coincidence that the best-functioning NRFs exist in established democracies. From a
design point of view, both Norway’s and Alaska’s oil funds leave considerable discretion to
their legislatures. What has kept these bodies from abusing these monies is the strong sense
of public ownership over the oil funds. A commitment to transparency has put full informa-
tion about the NRF’s development into the hands of the public. Citizens’ ownership over
“their” savings funds has provided a stronger check on legislatures than rules could have. By
contrast, the poor performance of Venezuela’s and Oman’s funds has much to do with the
absence of transparency and accountability in these countries. More important than choos-
ing the right model for an NRF is infusing the public with a sense of ownership over the fund.
But how do you give the public a sense of ownership over a fund? The most direct
means—the payment of dividends to citizens—only works where the population is small
enough and oil or gas revenues large enough for dividend payments to amount to much.
Where dividends are impractical, it is possible to give a targeted population a stake in the NRF.
Norway’s state oil fund, for example, will be used to pay the pensions of future generations.
The Nunavut Trust functions as an overall community development fund, giving its benefici-
aries a stake in its preservation. Alberta’s fund has been used to provide widely shared bene-
fits such as parks, hospitals, libraries, and medical research institutes.
Another means of developing a sense of public ownership is by having nongovernment
representatives sit on NRF oversight boards. In Alaska, for example, four of the six board mem-
bers are members of the public. In Alberta, three of the nine board members are representa-
tives of the opposition party. In Chad, the nine-member oil revenue oversight board includes
an NGO representative, a trade union representative, and a rotating position for a represen-
tative from one of the country’s three religious communities. Large pension funds, such as
the New York State Teachers Retirement System or the California Public Employees’ Retire-
ment System, provide another model with half of their respective boards elected by members.
Separation of powers and multiple lines of accountability encourage fiscal responsibility.
Effective oversight over an NRF creates incentives for responsible fiscal policy by making it
more difficult for leaders to raid funds to pay for unplanned expenses. Such dipping into fund
assets risks not only frittering away future assets, but also destabilizing the economy by spend-
ing more than can be absorbed. The less oversight there is over an NRF, the greater the oppor-
tunity for abuse. When a concentration of power in one branch of government makes it easy
to change the rules by which an NRF operates, it is less likely to endure in its original form.
A super-presidential system in Venezuela and monarchies in Kuwait and Oman have made
it easier for leaders to change the fund rules in order to accommodate spending needs of the
moment, or to allocate expenditures not within the guidelines of the NRF. Where democracy
is weak and leaders do not have mandates from the electorate, they resort to spending to gain
and keep popularity.
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There are several mechanisms by which to protect an NRF from such tampering. One
way is to make rule changes extremely cumbersome. For example, any change to the Alaska
Permanent Fund’s basic structure requires a constitutional amendment. An alternative might
be to require a parliamentary super-majority for any changes. Another option is to make cri-
teria for allocation crystal clear. The more ambiguous the spending directives, the more likely
leaders will exploit ambiguity to use funds as secondary budgets.
Another way to prevent leaders from diverting NRFs is by creating multiple lines of
accountability within the NRF, between the NRF and the government, and between the NRF
and the legislature. The parliament, the president, the treasury department, the central bank,
and the department responsible for economic development should all have some role in over-
seeing NRF revenues, expenditures, investment strategy, and performance evaluation. In
Alberta, for example, the AHF is directly overseen by an Investment Operations Committee
(IOC), comprised of financial sector professionals, a lawyer, and a representative from the Min-
istry of Revenue, who provide investment and allocation advice. The IOC’s recommendations,
filtered through the Ministry of Revenue and the Treasury Board, go to a legislative oversight
committee, comprised of members of government and the opposition, which sets overall pol-
icy directions for the Fund. 
Layers of accountability are also built into Norway’s State Petroleum Fund. The Fund
is managed by the Central Bank, which reports to the Ministry of Finance, which sets per-
formance benchmarks and evaluates the Central Bank’s investments relative to these bench-
marks. The Ministry of Finance reports on the bank’s performance to the parliament.
Additionally, the Office of the Auditor General conducts an annual audit of the Fund, which
it submits to a parliamentary supervisory council. 
These layers of accountability only work, however, if the separation of powers is real.
There must be some contestation and independence between the various organizations that
oversee the NRF for there to be effective oversight. When legislatures are dominated by the party
or coalition in power and opposition forces are marginal, then they are unlikely to provide effec-
tive oversight, even if they have the formal authority to do so. This is the concern in Chad, where
a strong president and a lack of effective opposition in parliament may well negate its carefully
crafted Revenue Management Law. A creative way of building in contestation is Chile’s inclu-
sion of its copper company on the board of the copper stabilization fund. The company wishes
to avoid having its tax burden increased upon accusations that it is not paying the government
enough, and hence has an interest in seeing its payments managed responsibly. 
NRFs are most likely to succeed when they operate with full transparency, in an envi-
ronment with an engaged citizenry, and where there is a real separation of powers and mul-
tiple layers of accountability among those entrusted with overseeing the NRF. By contrast,
NRFs are unlikely to endure when there are pressing economic and development needs, no
separation of powers, strong presidencies, lack of transparency and accountability, and an apa-
thetic citizenry. 
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What does this mean for emerging oil exporters like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan? The
fact that most successful NRFs exist in developed wealthy democracies should not lead these
countries to throw up their hands. Chile’s example shows that even in developing economies
with a recent transition to democracy, NRFs can operate successfully. On a smaller scale,
the Nunavut Trust provides the same lesson. These two lessons, along with those provided
by Alaska, Alberta, and Norway, suggest that for emerging oil exporting countries, a com-
mitment to separation of powers, enhancing the strength of parliament and the judiciary, and
building systems of budget accountability should not be delayed until after oil revenues have
begun to flow. Good revenue management is most likely to be achieved if revenue flows are
not shrouded in secrecy and if power over their disbursement is not vested in one branch of
government. 
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3. Securing the Take: 
Petroleum Litigation 
in Alaska       
Richard A. Fineberg
Introduction
The development of major oil fields and construction of pipelines to transport oil to Western
markets have ushered in a petroleum boom in the Caspian Basin. The terms of production-
sharing agreements (PSAs) between Caspian Basin host governments and the petroleum
industry1 imply great future wealth for the people those governments represent. But public
riches from petroleum development are neither guaranteed nor automatic. 
In addition to the uncertainties of geology and the inherent volatility of oil prices, the
citizens of the Caspian Basin face another major challenge to realizing the full potential of
their petroleum resources: ensuring that their governments receive the full value of their share
of revenues under the terms of the contracts signed with oil extraction and transport compa-
nies. The public share of the net revenue split between host government and industry (some-
“I was an ARCO employee. Some of the issues being discussed were 
still being litigated. My plan was to get to retirement. . . . I would not 
have been there in any capacity had I continued to . . . dissent. . . . I did 
not get to be a manager and remain a manager being 
oblivious and blind to signals.”
—RETIRED ARCO EXECUTIVE HARRY ANDERSON 
EXPLAINING IN 1999 WHY HE HAD DEFENDED ARCO’S 
PRICING PRACTICES IN A 1994 DEPOSITION
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times referred to as the “take”) can be significantly reduced or delayed by accounting practices
used to determine and report key factors such as the price of the oil, the production costs, or
the transportation costs charged to each barrel of oil produced and delivered to market. 
The tension between host and industry interests is inherent in petroleum development
around the world. Consider, for example, the experience of the State of Alaska, another remote
region that has developed a super-giant oil field in recent decades.2 Over the past 25 years,
more than one dollar out of every six that Alaska has received from its oil development has
been obtained through legal challenges to the industry’s original payment.3 These challenges
typically involved disputes over industry reporting of the value of the oil produced and/or the
cost of producing that oil and transporting it to distant markets. The importance of these
arcane conflicts to the Alaskan commonweal is made evident by this fact: During the 1990s,
the fruits of the disputes over industry payment practices became the funding mechanism for
Alaska’s multibillion-dollar Constitutional Budget Reserve Fund, which was discussed in chap-
ter two.  
The lessons learned in Alaska may be particularly relevant for the people of the Caspian
Basin, where contracts ostensibly favorable to the host countries are particularly vulnerable
because the region’s governing systems have little experience regulating current-day corpora-
tions and lack a strong tradition of democratic checks and balances. This problem is compounded
by the fact that state-owned oil companies are not subject to the financial reporting requirements
that govern their publicly traded development partners.4 In this situation, the extension of the
transparency principle (discussed below and in other chapters of this book) from the receipt of
revenues to the economics of prospective and actual petroleum development may help the peo-
ple of the Caspian understand the potential pitfalls associated with that development. To this
end, the creation of comprehensive, simplified public economic models for major petroleum
reservoirs in the Caspian Basin can provide the basis for evaluating revenues earned, respec-
tively, by the host government and the industry. 
Transparency in reporting resource revenue payments to host governments has been
proposed by a group of nongovernmental organizations to aid the public in determining
whether those payments are properly accounted for and managed.5 In regions where even basic
facts about public budgets are shrouded in secrecy, this is an important first step in public
accountability. But disclosures regarding the receipt and disposition of oil revenues do not
answer this fundamental question: Do those payments by industry to the host constitute a fair
and equitable share of the wealth generated from public resources? To answer this impor-
tant question, the doctrine of transparency needs to be expanded to include the processes by
which payments are calculated and made. The rationale for improving transparency of the
process by which oil company payments are determined will be the focus of this chapter. 
To further discussion of public petroleum revenue accounting models for the Caspian
Basin, the first part of this chapter will look more closely at the underlying background for
potential host-industry disputes. The next section examines lessons from the history of
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Alaska’s petroleum litigation, followed by a discussion of the implications of those lessons for
prospective public revenue under Caspian PSAs. The chapter concludes with recommenda-
tions for development of comprehensive, simplified models that will help extend transparency
from the receipt and expenditure of petroleum revenues to the generation of that wealth.
What Drives Host-Industry Disputes?
The underlying tension between the petroleum industry and its government hosts arises from
this fact: Each party seeks to maximize its share of the net revenue, or the difference between
gross revenue (total proceeds from oil production) and costs (the industry’s expenditures for
leasing, exploring, developing the field, producing the oil, and transporting it to market). The
timing of revenue receipt is also important. To the investor, whose capital is at risk, a policy
of accelerating or “front-loading”6 cost recovery is attractive. Therefore, in order to encour-
age development, a prospective host may structure development contracts that give industry
the lion’s share of initial proceeds.7
Investment risk and host risk are different entities. The host government may not wish
to assume development risks. On the other hand, the investor provides capital precisely in the
hope of receiving compensation. For placing that investment at risk, the investor typically
receives a premium that is added into the project rate of return.
In this regard, Caspian Basin PSA terms vary markedly. Royalty payments and cost
recovery limits produce significant early payments to the host government under some PSAs;
under others, most of the host government share of net income is deferred (“back-loaded”)
until the industry recoups investment costs.8 While it may be reasonable under some cir-
cumstances to allow the investor to recover costs before the host receives a significant return
from production, a policy of accelerated investor repayment has potential negative conse-
quences for the host that should be considered carefully. The host cannot put its share of petro-
leum revenue to work (for example, providing public services or earning interest) until that
money is received. For this reason, the value of a deferred payment is diminished by delay.
Moreover, under a deferred payment schedule, by the time the host receives the money, infla-
tion is liable to have eroded its value. Finally, if recoverable reserves turn out to be smaller than
originally expected or oil prices slump, the host’s share of net revenue may be significantly
smaller than anticipated. 
Gold-plating and the over-reporting of costs 
Some observers have said that front-loading arrangements are inherently prone to gold-plat-
ing, or the practice of making unreasonably large expenditures due to lack of cost-cutting
incentives.9 At the same time that front-loaded cost recovery postpones government take, the
accelerated repayment provides industry with positive cash flow. These payments to industry
may include contractor costs (with a reasonable profit), transportation costs (again including
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a reasonable profit), and repayment of borrowed capital (with interest). Under a front-loaded
PSA, most (or all) of these legitimate payments to industry must be made from the proceeds
of production before the producer and the host government begin sharing the net profits from
development. In these circumstances, higher costs mean larger up-front profit payments to
various industry parties. Therefore, industry may have little or no incentive to reduce those
costs. Even a government inclined and staffed to vigorously defend its interests against indus-
try gold-plating may have difficulty suppressing excessive spending by a government oil com-
pany. 
When development costs are finally repaid, the host may not be on easy street. Spe-
cific PSA provisions may actually give the producer incentive to increase reported costs or delay
efficient field investments in order to decrease the net revenue that must be shared with the
host. One such mechanism found in many PSAs is the large, stair-step increases in the per-
centage of net revenue payments to the host country as the internal rate of return on invest-
ment goes up. An investment that raises the project rate of return to the next stair-step level
may increase the host government’s percentage take; the corresponding reduction to producer
take may create an incentive to increase reported costs or slow development in order to delay
reaching the trigger point that will increase the percentage of net profit payments to the host
government.10
Closely related to gold-plating is the artificial inflation of reported costs. Over-report-
ing of actual costs cuts government take by reducing the reported profits to be split between
government and industry. Again, a front-loaded cost repayment structure will function to
increase industry gains from overstated costs. Examples of host/industry conflicts over
reported costs can be found in the next section on petroleum litigation in Alaska.
In order to have value, a commodity must be delivered. Because transportation costs
must be paid, the typical PSA subtracts the necessary expense from gross revenues before
net revenue can be determined. For this reason, the expense associated with the necessary
upgrading of old pipelines or the construction of new ones provide fertile grounds for host-
investor conflict (stated or unstated) that may result in significant reductions to host country
revenues. The pipeline cost element is of particular relevance to the development of remote
reservoirs, whose oil must be transported long distances to reach potential markets. The
important effect of the transportation costs on production revenues will be discussed in sub-
sequent sections of this chapter.
Sakhalin-II project (Russian Far East)
The Sakhalin-II project in the Russian Far East appears to be an example of a project in which
the PSA has failed to deliver on its promise of public revenue. The first phase of Sakhalin-II
began producing oil from a single platform in the Sea of Okhotsk in 1999. When that plat-
form was being prepared for installation, a government hungry for revenues was looking at
a glossy brochure distributed by the producing consortium. That pamphlet emphasized a long
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revenue bar, colored bright red, representing net revenue payments to Russia and Sakhalin
that appeared to dwarf contractor costs, the small bonus payments, and a 6 percent royalty.
But there was a catch: Under the PSA at Sakhalin, the public revenues shown in that long
red bar would not materialize until investment costs were repaid. It was not at all clear when
(if ever) the limited production from the lone initial platform would repay its costs. 
Two years before Sakhalin-II entered production, Pedro Van Meurs, a respected fiscal
analyst, observed that the gold-plating effects of the typical Russian PSA “are very difficult to
suppress.” In fact, Van Meurs said, the rate of return mechanism in the Russian PSA gov-
erning the Sakhalin-II project creates a situation in which “the slower a project proceeds, the
lower the profit share payable to the government.” Therefore, he observed, the PSA for
Sakhalin-II “rewards companies for delaying their investments.”11
By the time the platform began producing in 1999, depressed oil prices were on the
rebound. The producers were able to market Sakhalin oil at high prices, retaining almost all
of the early-year proceeds as cost reimbursement. In late 2000, the Institute of Sea Geology
and Geophysics of the Far East Academy of Science expressed concern that Sakhalin-II would
never be profitable. In the view of the Institute scientists, it appeared that oil from the Far East
would be produced to be sold abroad while the Far East continued to shiver in darkness each
winter. Further, they said, the much larger Sakhalin projects planned for development under
the same PSA also appeared likely to have similar inequitable results.12
PSAs, audits, and an informed public
In sum, even when oil prices are high enough to sustain profits for industry, creative inter-
pretation of the fine print in the complicated contracts between the host government and the
producing companies may result in significant reductions to the government take. When cost
repayment is front-loaded, the consequences of increased reported costs are beneficial to the
producer and pernicious to public interest in two ways: public receipts are both delayed and
reduced. In view of the inevitable tension between the host government and the industry, the
importance of auditing both the inputs and the methodology by which the industry calcu-
lates its payment to the host government cannot be underestimated. Although auditing of
the details of PSA implementation is not readily amenable to public participation, a public that
is well informed about the economics of petroleum development is vital to creating a politi-
cal climate that will encourage and ensure the vigorous defense of the public’s share of net
petroleum revenue. 
Alaska’s Petroleum Litigation
To understand the magnitude of the potential conflicts between host governments and the
industry regarding revenue generation and sharing, one needs only to examine the experience
of Alaska, where protracted battles over arcane accounting issues have produced more than
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one dollar in additional public petroleum revenue for every five the industry voluntarily paid.
Almost all of Alaska’s oil revenue comes from production in the vicinity of Prudhoe Bay,
located at the northern edge of the North American continent.13 Since Prudhoe Bay entered
production in 1977, three firms—now known as BP, ExxonMobil, and ConocoPhillips14—have
controlled more than 90 percent of North Slope production and a similar share of the 800-
mile Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS). Alaska has received approximately $70 billion in
petroleum revenue from North Slope production, feeder pipelines, and TAPS. This revenue
is derived, in the main, from royalties (generally 12.5 percent of the value of oil) and three prin-
cipal taxes (corporate income, production, and property tax). Additionally, the state receives oil
revenues from several minor taxes, as well as lease bonuses and rental payments.15 The Alaska
Department of Revenue has estimated industry and government net income from Alaska pro-
duction and pipeline operations between 1988 and 2000. The agency analysis is summa-
rized in Figure 1.16
FIGURE 1. Allocation of Net Income from Alaska North Slope Production and Associated Pipelines 
(including TAPS), 1988–2000
Industry Share 41.6%
State of Alaska Share 36.1%
Federal Share 22.3%
Source: Alaska Department of Revenue, “State of Alaska’s Oil Revenue Pie (Production and Value Added by TAPS),”
March 22, 2000 (in letter from Dan E. Dickinson, Director, Tax Division, to Representative Jim Whitaker, Chair,
Special Committee on Oil and Gas, Alaska State House of Representatives). 
As noted earlier, Alaska has found it necessary to pursue a path of prolonged and inten-
sive litigation in order to obtain what public officials consider a fair share of the take from
petroleum development. Essentially, the State of Alaska found that the industry chronically
reduced the bases for calculating royalty, severance, and income tax payments by understat-
ing the market value of a barrel of oil at the point of sale. Overstated pipeline shipping charges
(tariffs) had the same result.17 The disputes often turned on differences between the state and
industry regarding interpretations of contractual, statutory or regulatory language; many could
be chalked up to legitimate differences of opinion, but others could not.  
These cases were argued in different institutional forums. Royalty disputes proceeded
directly from agency audits to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska’s court system; tax set-
tlements resulted from audit findings preliminary to proceedings before an administrative
hearing officer of the Alaska Department of Revenue; pipeline tariff issues were handled by
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) or the Regulatory Commission of Alaska
(RCA, or its predecessors).18 It was not unusual for the same issue—and even the same set
of facts—to be argued separately by different agencies, in different venues, and with differ-
ent results. In sum, the cases were complicated—and, consequently, costly—to research, brief,
P E T R O L E U M  L I T I G A T I O N  I N  A L A S K A    5 9
and present. In 1994, the Alaska Department of Law reported that since 1977 it had paid con-
tract attorneys and accounting specialists from 30 different firms more than $217 million. But
the investment of public revenue paid off; up to that point Alaska had received approximately
$2.7 billion in settlements.19
By 2001, the Alaska Department of Law reported it had taken in an estimated $6.8 bil-
lion to settle charges of underpayments on taxes and royalties since 1977—much of it in statu-
tory interest on long-delayed payments. According to the department, this figure excluded
the gains to Alaska from reduced pipeline tariffs that were secured through a separate,
extended litigation effort.20 A closer look at public reports of some of the petroleum litigation
suits that have surfaced in Alaska may help the reader grasp the complexity—and the impor-
tance—of determining the appropriate net revenue split. 
False royalty returns
Alaska’s mounting disappointment with industry practices became public in January 1989
when the State of Alaska filed a claim alleging that two of the three major North Slope pro-
ducers were deliberately filing false royalty returns. According to the complaint, ARCO, one
of the original major North Slope producers, committed “fraud and intentional misrepresen-
tation by adopting a hypothetical, posted price for ANS (Alaska North Slope crude oil) that was
not based on actual sales and purchases in order to understate the value of its crude oil for roy-
alty purposes.” According to the complaint, ARCO structured a small number of visible sales
of its oil off the coast of California solely to provide support for this hypothetical posted price,
while other producing companies reported a substantially higher value for ANS. The major-
ity of ARCO’s oil was not sold on the market, but was transferred to its own refinery; the
marker sales at artificially low prices were then used to calculate the value of that oil for roy-
alty and tax payments to Alaska. In addition, the complaint stated, ARCO “wrongfully and
knowingly depressed its calculated wellhead value by intentionally inflating the costs associ-
ated with transporting ANS to market.”21
The complaint also alleged that BP affiliate Standard22 cheated by manipulating the qual-
ity or price differential between ANS and other crude oils.23 For example, the complaint alleged
that Standard would deliver one barrel of ANS at its official price of $27.50 per barrel and
exchange a second barrel for a barrel of light sweet crude worth $30.00 per barrel in the same
transaction. But instead of reporting the sale at a net average of $28.75 per barrel, Standard
paid royalties “as though both barrels had been sold at the lower price.”24 To establish the basis
for the case that such practices had cost Alaska hundreds of millions of dollars, the state’s con-
tract attorneys spent years setting up a filing system that attempted to track every barrel that
left Valdez to its destination.
The only major North Slope producer that was not accused of fraud in the 1989 roy-
alty complaint, ExxonMobil, was the last to settle its royalty disagreements with Alaska. The
ExxonMobil dispute was settled in 1992, on the morning that its trial in the ANS royalty liti-
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gation was finally scheduled to begin; it would have been the first and only royalty trial. None
of the companies admitted fraud. However, ExxonMobil’s payment of $128 million brought
the total collected on royalty litigation over a 15-year period to $631 million. Subsequent roy-
alty settlements bring the total for royalty oil settlement payments between 1977 and 2000
to $979 million.25 The major settlements included an agreement by ExxonMobil to price their
ANS in the future using a basket of six crude oils that were listed daily and electronically on
the open market. Formulas were also established for tanker costs.26
ExxonMobil was charged with fraud in a state income tax dispute running from 1979
through 1986. More than a decade later, the state and ExxonMobil fought this battle in an
administrative proceeding before a special hearing officer that lasted for over a year. The state
initially sought over $1 billion27 but the hearing officer, who dismissed the fraud charge,
awarded the state $254 million ($62 million in tax and $192 million in interest). When the
case was settled in 1998, it was described as the last of Alaska’s major tax cases from the
1970s.28
Inflated pipeline tariffs
Pipeline tariffs compensate the owner for construction, operating and dismantling costs, prof-
its, and taxes. One of the principal reasons for determining correct pipeline tariffs is to ensure
that pipeline owners do not over-charge shippers. In the case of an isolated, producer-owner
pipeline such as TAPS, excessive tariffs could inhibit competition from nonowner shippers
who must pay that tariff out-of-pocket, as opposed to the producer-owner, for whom the
pipeline tariff is actually a transfer payment.29 From a state fiscal standpoint, an appropriate
pipeline tariff is important for another reason: A $1.00 increase in transportation costs reduces
Alaska state revenues on production by approximately $0.21 (and vice-versa).30 Because trans-
portation costs are subtracted from the price of oil to determine production tax and royalty
payments, all else being equal, the producer-owner would prefer higher pipeline tariffs. Pro-
ducers or shippers who do not own a share of the pipeline, along with the State of Alaska, find
themselves in exactly the opposite position.
These conflicting interests have led to protracted litigation involving the State of Alaska,
pipeline shippers, and the TAPS carriers over correct pipeline charges. At the core of this bat-
tle, which has been described by the Alaska Department of Law as the largest and most com-
plicated ratemaking case in the history of the United States,31 were issues that included: the
actual costs of designing, building, and operating the pipeline; the correct amortization period,
methodology, and rate; interest rates; rates of return; ultimate throughput; and a host of other
financial and economic issues.32 In 1985, the TAPS carriers and the state sought to end 10 years
of litigation with a settlement agreement establishing a novel and complex formula for deter-
mining maximum annual tariffs. The settlement was adopted at the FERC and was accepted
provisionally by the RCA, which has jurisdiction over tariffs on oil that does not leave Alaska
(approximately 8 percent of all TAPS oil).33
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Alaska’s attorney general has estimated tariff reductions due to pipeline tariff battles
have resulted in the State of Alaska’s collection of an additional $3.8 billion in postsettlement
severance tax and royalties.34 Nevertheless, extensive litigation over implementation of the
agreement has continued before both regulatory bodies.35 In 2002, the RCA upheld intrastate
shipper challenges to TAPS tariffs filed under the 1985 settlement ceiling by nonowner ship-
pers of oil destined for Alaska refineries. The commission found that between 1977 and 1996
the settlement allowed TAPS owners to overcharge TAPS shippers by nearly $10 billion dol-
lars, and that tariffs in recent years were more than 50 percent too high.36 While the state com-
mission’s decision appears to affect only the portion of TAPS oil shipped to in-state refiners
between 1996 and 2000, state officials said that if the commission’s order were applied to
all future TAPS shipments, the state would receive an additional $110 million per year in
increased royalty and production tax payments.37
According to the state commission, its 486-page decision marked “the first time in more
than twenty years . . . that a regulatory agency has reviewed TAPS rates for consistency and
statutory standards.”38 The TAPS owners have challenged the RCA order in court39 and the
state commission, as noted, has jurisdiction over a small percentage of the oil shipped on
TAPS. Therefore, the ultimate outcome of this case is not clear; nevertheless, this decision
appears to confirm charges that Alaska’s negotiated TAPS tariff settlement cost the state bil-
lions of dollars in public revenue.  These overcharges occurred despite the fact that the 1985
settlement reduced later-year tariffs to approximately $3.00 per barrel, compared to early-
year filed tariffs of approximately $6.00 per barrel.40
By the end of 2000, Alaska had collected settlements in 29 North Slope royalty cases,
104 separate tax cases, and eight tariff proceedings at the FERC. The Alaska Department of
Law reported that this litigation effort had produced an estimated $10.6 billion in additional
revenue. This figure included $6.8 billion in direct payments for taxes and royalties, plus $3.8
billion in increased taxes and royalties attributed to reduced pipeline tariffs resulting from the
1985 TAPS tariff settlement.41 This amount does not represent the total increase in govern-
ment take due to petroleum litigation because it does not include efforts by the federal gov-
ernment to secure that government’s portion of the income from North Slope petroleum
development.42
North Slope crude prices and California’s oil price dispute
Ripples from North Slope crude oil accounting, pricing, and transportation litigation extended
far beyond the State of Alaska’s coffers. In 1999, ExxonMobil was once again the lone hold-
out in a set of long-running oil price disputes its partners had settled long ago. This one
involved the price of oil from the Wilmington field in Long Beach Harbor, California. Previ-
ously, various companies in the California producing consortium had paid an estimated $320
million to settle charges of underpricing their crude.43 In that case, the State of California
and the City of Long Beach argued that ARCO, a producer at Long Beach and on the North
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Slope, had underpriced its California oil by $4 to $5 per barrel to support the artificially low
price it reported in Alaska on its much larger volume of ANS, thereby reducing its Alaska
royalty and severance taxes. ARCO presumably made up the difference in the resulting
increased refinery profits, on which royalty and severance tax payments did not apply.   
In the California case, the testimony of retired ARCO executive Harry Anderson was
of particular interest. In a 1994 deposition, Anderson had defended ARCO’s pricing practices.
But at the trial, under cross-examination, the former oil company official testified that inter-
nal company analysis demonstrated that ARCO’s posted price for ANS was $4 to $5 per bar-
rel too low, that ARCO knew Chevron was paying Standard the higher figure for ANS on the
West Coast, and that the posted price ARCO used for ANS royalty simply did not represent
fair market value. Asked why his 1999 testimony contradicted his affidavit five years earlier,
Anderson explained the difference this way:
I was an ARCO employee. Some of the issues being discussed were still being litigated.
My plan was to get to retirement. . . . I would not have been there in any capacity had
I continued to . . . dissent. . . . I did not get to be a manager and remain a manager being
oblivious and blind to signals.44
Industry settlement payments to Alaska, California, and Long Beach do not represent
the totality of underpayments by the North Slope producers. In efforts similar to those of
Alaska, the U.S. government also secured additional tax payments by demonstrating that the
producers had under-reported the value of their profits on ANS in their federal income tax
reports.45 Even with the inclusion of the federal component, settlement sums do not neces-
sarily represent the amounts by which payments by producers fell short of their obligations
to their host. Settlements typically reflect a compromise acceptable to both parties at the time
of the agreement. But the outcome of any given settlement may not reflect the actual costs and
values at issue.46
Most of the Alaska disputes were settled in quasi-judicial forums before they went to
trial; few cases were actually heard in a court of law. Nevertheless, the courts played a major
role in enabling the public to obtain this significant portion of petroleum revenue. A strong
and stable court system provided assurance that disputes over the administration of the terms
of development could eventually be decided, if necessary, in a carefully structured proceeding.
In contrast to the importance of the courts, input from legislative bodies and the public on
petroleum litigation matters has been limited. Although it is the executive branch that repre-
sents the state in dealing with the petroleum industry, the State Legislature does receive occa-
sional settlement briefings, with key information typically disclosed only behind closed doors.47
With a few notable exceptions, the critical details of the important arguments between
Alaska and the North Slope producers have taken place behind a veil of confidentiality. In most
cases, public information about a settlement is limited to the totals received, without quan-
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tification or discussion of specific issues or their resolution. Occasionally, the public learns
of a dispute only when its final settlement is announced. Definitive information is generally
unavailable through freedom of information challenges due to laws protecting taxpayer con-
fidentiality and corporate assertions that such information would aid competitors. The result,
by and large, is to leave the public in the dark regarding these matters. 
Despite these barriers to public reporting on petroleum revenue disputes, the tradition
of public disclosure of government activities in Alaska assures that the broad dimensions of
petroleum litigation issues are at least partially visible, with detailed information emerging on
a sporadic basis. Alaska’s experience indicates that the compilation and publication of aggre-
gate data on petroleum litigation issues can provide interested members of the public with the
information necessary to understand the broad dimensions of salient economic issues affect-
ing petroleum development without infringing on taxpayer confidentiality or threatening com-
mercial positions. 
Caspian Basin Development 
The development of significant reserves in the Caspian Basin present the oil-consuming 
nations of the world with an enticing alternative to the Persian Gulf, where five nations possess
more than 60 percent of the world’s proven reserves. In March 2002, an article in Foreign 
Affairs magazine reported that new forecasts showed that the Caspian shelf held 75 billion 
barrels of oil—115 percent more than the BP Statistical Review of World Energy credited to the
entire Commonwealth of Independent States in 2000. The article enthused that Kazakhstan’s
Kashagan field, recently discovered in the shallow north Caspian, looked to be even larger 
than its older, on-shore twin, Tengiz, just a few miles to the east. However, the same article
warned, similar bright promise also beckoned a decade ago, only to vanish as “investors bogged
down in a swamp of corruption and the difficulties of doing business in rapidly changing
economies.”48
While the prospect of vast wealth from petroleum beckons to the people of the Caspian
Basin, the brief history of the petroleum industry is littered with broken dreams, and the
Caspian region has lived both sides of this story. With the hopes of impoverished populations
hanging in the balance, a clear understanding of the prospects for Caspian oil development
is imperative.49
According to petroleum financial analysts Daniel and David Johnston, Kazakhstan gov-
ernment target returns from the PSAs for Tengiz and the more recently discovered Kasha-
gan should be approximately 83 percent of net revenue over the life of those fields.50 Elsewhere,
Daniel Johnston also estimates that two Azerbaijan PSAs result in host government take to be
between 64 percent and 70 percent of net revenue.51 According to Johnston, these estimates
of the government take compare to world averages of 78 percent for the government take for
PSAs in more favorable regions.52
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The target percentages that host governments expect from Caspian Basin develop-
ment—64 to 83 percent—are significantly greater than the estimated 58.4 percent state and
federal government share of net income from Alaska production and pipeline operations
between 1988 and 2000 indicated in Figure 1, above.53
The Caspian region is still undergoing major social, political, and economic transfor-
mations associated with the end of Soviet power. Moreover, transportation systems to deliver
oil to market have yet to be fully developed. Alaska, on the other hand, is a relatively stable
region with a major transportation system in place. In view of these factors, one might expect
that Alaska’s producers might pay a premium over the Caspian. Instead, it is the other way
around.  
Before tackling this apparent anomaly, a brief discussion of background factors affect-
ing comparison between Alaska’s actual rewards and the projected returns from Caspian Basin
development may be of use. There are striking similarities between Alaska and the Caspian
Basin: both belong to the exclusive club of regions possessing super-giant fields; the oil from
both provinces must find its way in a global market dominated by oil from the Persian Gulf;
finally, to reach tanker connections to world markets, production from these remote reservoirs
must bear the cost of long overland pipelines. Ranged against these broad similarities are
significant differences between these two petroleum basins. For example: Alaska’s principal
development terms were forged approximately 30 years ago, in a different economic envi-
ronment; did the emerging need for non–Persian Gulf oil supply that propelled the develop-
ment of the North Slope prevent the United States and Alaska from securing terms comparable
to those achieved by the Caspian nations three decades later? It should also be noted that North
Slope development faced significant physical challenges posed by Arctic and subarctic envi-
ronments; did the original investment risk translate into a premium that should continue to
augment industry’s share of net revenues 30 years later, even though Alaska development is
no longer risky from a physical standpoint? 
With these background observations and questions in mind, we turn now to three prin-
cipal factors that partially explain why the government share of the income from Alaska’s North
Slope operations appears to be significantly smaller than the government take under the
Caspian Basin PSA projections.
Government participation. The Caspian host government often holds an investment inter-
est in the project as a member of the contracting group. The government take therefore
includes not only royalties and taxes, but also the government share of return on risked invest-
ment. At Tengiz, for example, the government of Kazakhstan holds a 20 percent financial
stake.54 To compare to Alaska, it is necessary to transfer the profit on the Kazakhstan govern-
ment investment shares to the industry side. A simplified calculation indicates that at Tengiz
the industry share of net revenue would increase to 21 percent, resulting in a 79 percent gov-
ernment take. 
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Timing of cost recovery. A second significant difference between Alaska’s returns and pro-
jected returns for the Caspian Basin is the timing of the payment of oil revenue to investors
and to the host country. As discussed in the second section of this chapter, under some PSAs,
most of the host government returns are deferred until investment is repaid, resulting in accel-
erated return of investment to the producer. This policy is attractive to investors, but the value
of the payments to government is diminished during the corresponding delay. In the long run,
the host government receives a larger percentage share as compensation for deferring its share
of the net revenue. But the host government now shares a significant portion of the oil price
risk (if oil prices remain unexpectedly low, the anticipated net profits might not materialize).
Consider in this regard the Kashagan development: According to the Johnstons, in the early
years of Kashagan development the contracting group will retain 98 percent of all revenue
from Kashagan, leaving the host government with 2 percent. The Johnstons estimate that this
extremely high back-loading of the government take (and the corresponding front-loading of
investment costs) will continue until investment costs are recovered—perhaps until Kasha-
gan has produced one billion barrels of oil.55 During this period, the producers retain almost
all of that revenue as repayment of costs instead of sharing it with the host as net profits. 
Pipeline arrangements. A third explanation for the significant difference between returns
realized in Alaska and those projected for the Caspian is that the Alaska data include pipeline
operations; the PSA estimates for the Caspian projects do not. The State of Alaska analysis
summarized in Figure 1 estimated that Alaska pipeline operations—principally TAPS—pro-
vide, on average, approximately one-quarter of the industry’s net revenue from its Alaska oper-
ations. Under the Alaska system, pipeline operators pay only property and income taxes to the
host governments; the producing companies must pay royalty and severance taxes to the host
in addition to (and before calculating) property and income taxes. It is therefore reasonable
to assume that inclusion of TAPS in the Alaska analysis increased the industry’s percentage
share of the net revenue take.56 Inclusion of the transportation arrangements in Caspian cal-
culations would similarly reduce the host government’s percentage share. 
After years of uncertainty, transit routes from the landlocked Caspian are finally under
construction. Two major pipeline links to European and world markets are being developed,
older pipelines through the former Soviet Union are slated to receive costly upgrades, and
other projects are being considered.57 Alaska’s experience suggests that who will transport
Caspian Basin oil and the terms on which that oil is shipped will play a significant role in deter-
mining who reaps the riches from that development. The principal transportation links and
the regulation of their costs therefore deserve closer scrutiny.
The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) system, running nearly 1,000 miles from
the Tengiz oil field to Novorossiysk on the Black Sea, pumped its first oil in October 2001. (see
map at front of book) Start-up was delayed by five months while Kazakhstan negotiated vari-
ous aspects of the pipeline charges with Russia.58 At the end of 2002, CPC pipeline tariffs were
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essentially unregulated because that pipeline was shipping oil belonging only to the pipeline
owners.59 Initially, the CPC pipeline was able to carry slightly over half a million barrels per
day (bpd); it is expected that between now and 2015 the CPC pipeline will be expanded to carry
1.34 million bpd from the super-giant Tengiz and other western Kazakhstan fields.60 Govern-
ments hold 50 percent participation in the CPC—Russia (24 percent), Kazakhstan (19 percent)
and Oman (7 percent). The remaining 50 percent is divided between a number of compa-
nies, including Chevron (15 percent), LukARCO (12.5 percent), ExxonMobil and Shell/Rosneft
(7.5 percent each).61
During the summer of 2002, construction began on another major pipeline link to West-
ern markets, the one million bpd BTC Pipeline, which will run from Baku through Tbilisi (Geor-
gia) to Ceyhan (Turkey) on the Mediterranean. Although final approvals from Georgia were not
in place when construction began, completion was anticipated in 2004.62 BTC pipeline tariffs
are spelled out in the construction agreement rather than in regulations; these arrangements
include discounts for shipper-owners and a fixed fee for the Turkish portion.63 The principal
owners of the pipeline were BP (38.21 percent) and the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (25
percent), with six other companies holding smaller interests. Initially, the BTC line will carry
oil from the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli field, in which BP holds a major stake.64 Some observers
have suggested that the line might carry oil from Kashagan, the recently discovered super-giant
field scheduled for production in 2005 but still looking for a transport route.65
As mentioned above, with these projects underway, proposals for other major oil and
natural gas pipelines from the Caspian Basin are competing for capital with other proposed
projects that would bring oil and gas from other regions of the former Soviet Union to mar-
kets in both Europe and Asia.66
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The people of the Caspian Basin and their governments face many challenges in the quest to
ensure that they receive fair and full compensation for their petroleum resources. To under-
stand the dimensions of these problems, this chapter examines the experience of another
remote oil province with a super-giant field linked to world markets through a long pipeline
connection—the state of Alaska. The resulting analysis of potential revenue issues related to
Caspian development suggests important public policy issues in two areas. 
One set of questions arises from the disparity between the terms the industry has
offered to pay in the Caspian Basin and in Alaska. As noted in the preceding analysis, the
industry will pay its hosts in the Caspian an estimated 64 to 83 percent of net revenue, com-
pared to approximately 58 percent actually paid in Alaska. The disparity between the terms
of development in two remote provinces with super-giant petroleum reservoirs brings to mind
an adage frequently employed by investment advisors: If a deal sounds too good to be true, it
probably is.67 This concern may have particular relevance where people looking to improve
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their living conditions have been asked to postpone the major portion of that revenue while
assuming the economic risks associated with deferral.
A second significant problem identified through consideration of Alaska’s experience
is that differences in the accounting for price received, production costs, and transporta-
tion charges, as well as other accounting practices, can significantly reduce the public’s share
of the revenue split between the host government and the industry. To deal with these con-
flicts, Alaska has had to engage in litigation efforts that have increased its take on North
Slope development from $59.4 billion to approximately $70 billion, an increase of approxi-
mately 18 percent.68
Receipt of these additional revenues was tedious and administratively burdensome, with
the additional payments often lagging behind the original payments by more than a decade.
Despite the existence of democratic institutions in Alaska, including a strong court system and
tradition of public accountability, important facts pertinent to the government/industry split
of net revenue are generally not part of the public record, in Alaska or elsewhere. 
Due to the nascent character of public accountability in the Caspian states, the challenge
of securing fair and full public compensation is even more daunting than that faced by Alaska.
In the absence of well-developed audit institutions and a court system, Caspian nations prob-
ably cannot place their reliance on a litigation effort such as that employed by Alaska. Never-
theless, as development issues unfold, it would be fatuous to suggest that industry
representatives will not seek to maximize profits—or that corporate objectives are not liable
to conflict with public interests. With amounts potentially totaling billions of dollars at issue,
the citizens of the Caspian have a fundamental interest in assuring that government officials
exercise their stewardship responsibilities vigorously to assure prompt receipt of the public
share of petroleum resource revenue.  
The public policy choice in this regard is simple: Citizens of the Caspian Basin can
assume that whatever revenue they receive from petroleum development is the correct amount,
or they can explore the best ways to evaluate in a timely manner the complicated cost, account-
ing, and pricing mechanisms that may be used by industry to enhance its returns at public
expense. The assumption that petroleum revenues paid voluntarily represent the total amount
due ignores the Alaska experience and flies in the face of common sense. Because the com-
plicated economics of petroleum finances are not readily amenable to public analysis, the peo-
ple of the Caspian would benefit greatly from clear reports that delineate how major petroleum
development projects are being translated into private and public wealth. To this end, the peo-
ple of the Caspian Basin can do three things: 
 Create comprehensive, simplified economic models for evaluating potential petroleum
earnings.
The creation of comprehensive and transparent economic models for specific petroleum
reservoirs can be of assistance in dealing with these problems by providing the basis for
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evaluating potential petroleum earnings. In the absence of transparent development
models, whether a project should go forward and, if it does, the actual results for the
producers and their host governments remain matters of mystery and conjecture to
the public. Information gained from a simplified simulation of the physical and eco-
nomic performance of large Caspian Basin petroleum reservoirs and the associated
infrastructure can help the public and policymakers to get a realistic fix on the prom-
ises and the pitfalls of proposed development projects. As those projects unfold, com-
prehensive public models can assist in determining whether actual payments, as
reported in government documents and Publish What You Pay reports, constitute fair
and appropriate compensation to the host government for the right to extract public
resources. A tracking model has already been developed for the government of Kazakh-
stan with the assistance of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, but
it is confidential. Because they concern such a large portion of public finances, infor-
mation about these models should be made public.
To avoid issues of confidentiality, the public model for specific development should
use publicly available estimates of (a) production, (b) price, (c) operating and capital
costs and (d) transportation costs. The model should distinguish up-front government
payments, such as royalties and bonuses, from net revenue payments. Using the for-
mulas established by the governing PSA, costs would be subtracted from the gross pro-
duction revenues to determine net revenue available for the split between the host and
the producer.
 Monitor expenses for excessive costs that reduce net share payments.
As noted earlier in this chapter, front-loading of industry cost recovery increases the
potential for aggressive cost reporting that delays or reduces host government receipt
of production revenues. Understanding the complicated economics of petroleum devel-
opment becomes more difficult when state-owned oil companies are involved.  The sub-
jects discussed in this chapter that provide empirical support for these concerns include
Alaska’s litigation history, the Sakhalin-II experience, and the disparity between Alaska
and projected Caspian returns. In combination, these factors suggest that careful mon-
itoring of Caspian Basin development costs and payouts is warranted. 
 Carefully analyze pipeline costs.
Transportation charges take on particular relevance because these costs must be calcu-
lated before a producing reservoir earns net revenue that will be divided between pro-
ducer and host. When a producing company is also invested in a pipeline that carries
its own oil, transportation expenditures may remain with that company while simulta-
neously decreasing net production revenue available for sharing, and stifling competi-
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tion. From this theoretical perspective, the Caspian Basin host nations should look
closely at pipeline financial arrangements to ensure that excessive costs and shipping
requirements do not reduce payments to producer host governments. In Alaska, even
though a 1985 settlement reduced per-barrel pipeline tariffs on TAPS, a recent regula-
tory decision found that those tariffs are still too high when compared to tariffs calcu-
lated using standard economic formulae; excessive TAPS tariffs reduce state production
revenue and inhibit competition. 
The importance of pipelines to development in both Alaska and the Caspian was
evident in the experience of Conoco after the company left Alaska’s North Slope in
1993.69 At the time, Conoco was the only company operating a field on the North Slope
without a share of the super-giant Prudhoe Bay or TAPS. When Conoco sold its North
Slope interests to BP during a period of relatively low oil prices, the guaranteed profits
from pipeline ownership might have kept the company afloat until oil prices rose
again.70 Later, reflecting on his company’s departure from Alaska, Conoco Chairman
and CEO Archie Dunham said, “It broke my heart to trade Milne Point, but we had to
do it. All the value of that property was taken away from us in the pipeline tariffs. It
was a valuable strategic lesson—just look at why the producers in the Caspian Sea are
so worried.”71
The development of models that simulate the economic performance of major
petroleum reservoirs can help citizens of host countries to understand and control their
own destinies. In sum, creation of comprehensive, transparent, simplified petroleum
revenue models to supplement the information produced under the Publish What You
Pay doctrine will increase public understanding of the risks and rewards of petroleum
development in the Caspian Basin. 
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4. Models of Public 
Oversight of Government 
and Industry
Richard G. Steiner
Importance of Informed Public Participation
Democratic governance very much depends on informed public participation, yet even in
mature democracies such participation is often an elusive goal. The emerging democracies
of Russia and the other former Soviet republics, including the countries of the Caspian region,
present both a challenge and opportunity to improve public participation. 
Much discussion in civil society has been devoted to the concept of transparency, while
less attention has been given to the concept of informed public participation. There are impor-
tant differences between these two ideas. Transparency implies simply that the public has
unfettered access to information about government and industry, and a clear understanding
(or literally a “clear view”) of what government and industry are doing. However, transparency
does not imply that the public has a formal, active voice in the operations of government and
”[The Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council of Prince William Sound] adds
accountability on the part of regulators like me, and the government and
the industry. We have to operate in the open, and talk about things in 
the open, and take time to bring the citizenry along with us in the logical
path to the solutions for our problems. It’s an organized and disciplined
way to get citizen involvement in what we do. I think that’s good, because
the system isn’t really worth much unless citizens are involved with it.”
—COMMANDER ED THOMPSON, 
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD (1992)
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industry.  For instance, even though the government provides an unprecedented level of pub-
lic transparency in the United States—through the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
state open meetings and public records disclosure acts, and other administrative disclosure
instruments—much of the U.S. public remains uninvolved in the policy formulation processes
that affect their lives. 
Put simply, transparency is a necessary but not sufficient component of informed pub-
lic participation in democracy. To have an active voice, the public, or at least a representative
body of the public, needs to have a legitimate and formalized role overseeing and interacting
with industry and government.   
The relationship between government, industry, and the public
Even in long-established democracies the relationship between government, industry, and the
public is problematic and often fails to serve the common public interest.1 Although govern-
ment agencies and legislative bodies are legally obliged to operate in the highest and best inter-
ests of the public, many regulatory agencies are too closely tied to the industries they regulate
to provide effective oversight. Regulation and legislation in such a symbiotic environment tends
to favor industry at the expense of the environment, social justice, and economic justice. 
One reason for industry favoritism is simply that campaigns for public or consumer
interests are generally poorly organized, poorly funded, and short-lived whereas groups rep-
resenting corporate interests are well organized, well funded, and a permanent presence in
government circles.2 Public opinion tends to flare up when there is an obvious, acute failure
in the system, such as an oil spill, plane crash, or financial collapse, or during an electoral
campaign, but it dies down again just as soon as the crisis or election is over. 
Thus, our ideal of a well-informed, participatory public, a government always recep-
tive to public concerns, and a cooperative industry all working to protect the public interest
is in fact far from the actual practice of democracy.
Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils—mechanisms for informed public participation
To create a more equitable, transparent, and truly participatory process for important activi-
ties that affect the public, such as oil and gas development, it is necessary to establish a fully
funded, empowered, independent, and aggressive citizens’ institution to provide oversight.
The Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils (RCACs) in Alaska represent such an initiative.
The disastrous 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska resulted in part from a prior 
lack of informed public participation and oversight as well as from the recklessness of the
Exxon Corporation. Had the local public provided oversight to the spill prevention and
response system prior to the spill beyond the obviously ineffective government oversight, the
system’s shortcomings—such as the lack of tug escorts, inadequate tanker traffic monitor-
ing, and insufficient stockpiles of spill response equipment—would have been apparent and
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likely corrected. In the aftermath of the spill, citizens in the region set about immediately to
remedy this problem. Two RCACs were established in Alaska to provide direct citizen over-
sight of oil industry activities in Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet. Similar citizens’ coun-
cils were established in California and Maine. 
Although these councils were established in reaction to oil spill disasters and focus on
preventing and responding to such incidents, their structure and function could serve a
broader mandate in the emerging democracies of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. In these coun-
tries, citizens’ advisory councils could provide citizens with an opportunity to participate in
and provide oversight of various aspects of petroleum development—permitting, exploration,
development, transportation, refining, government revenue collection and distribution, risk
management, and environmental compliance. Such councils could represent citizens in the
oversight of the petroleum fiscal system and would be a substantial step toward informed pub-
lic participation. 
This sort of public participation will no doubt require a long and difficult evolution for
civil society in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. This chapter recognizes that with the current chal-
lenges to freedom of association in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, discussed in greater detail
in chapters five and six, citizens’ advisory councils will take time to take root. However, as
the discussion of the role played by NGOs in assisting privatization efforts in Latin America
will show, citizen oversight of public administration is possible and desirable in developing
democracies. Closer to home, in Georgia, civil society has been active in helping draft and
improve public awareness about legislation. The discussion of RCACs and these other mod-
els of public oversight suggests that citizen oversight of petroleum activities and their ensu-
ing revenues is not only possible but desirable for the public good. 
Exxon Valdez and the rise of RCACs in Alaska
Even before the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster, there was sufficient public concern regarding the
safety and integrity of the oil transportation system through Prince William Sound to war-
rant the establishment of an RCAC. In 1986, the author of this report had studied an effective
citizens’ council at the North Sea oil terminal in Sullom Voe, Scotland, and proposed the estab-
lishment of a similar council in Alaska. The Shetland Oil Terminal Environmental Advisory
Group (SOTEAG), established by the local government and oil industry at the time of oil ter-
minal construction in the Shetland Islands, seemed to provide a good template for public par-
ticipation in Alaska. 
The request to establish an RCAC for Prince William Sound was made in 1986 directly
to the president of Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (the owner and operator of the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline System or TAPS)—a consortium of BP, Exxon, ARCO, Mobil, Amerada Hess,
Phillips, and Unocal. At that time, oil companies felt no compelling political need to accom-
modate any increase in citizen oversight of their operations, and the request to establish an
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RCAC was declined. Further efforts by the author to establish such a group through the Alaska
legislature met with similar resistance, and the proposal to study the establishment of such
groups was quickly defeated in 1987 in the State Senate by the powerful oil lobby. Thus, the
oil companies and the state and federal governments continued conducting their business
largely beyond public view. 
With the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the political dynamic took a dramatic shift in response
to an outraged local public. In a private meeting with all TAPS owners and oil shippers called
by local commercial fishing industry leaders in June 1989, most of the companies present,
in particular the majority owner BP, consented to the demand for an RCAC. To ensure the
companies kept their promise to fund and cooperate with this new citizens’ oversight group,
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) mandated the establishment of two national demon-
stration RCACs in Alaska—one in Prince William Sound, and the other in Cook Inlet. OPA
90 was the federal government’s response to the Exxon Valdez spill, and in addition to the
RCACs, it also mandated the phase-in of double-hulled oil tankers in U.S. waters, stricter lia-
bility provisions, the establishment of the federal Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, more research,
and more stringent safety protocols for tanker crews.
In the OPA 90 RCAC provision, the U.S. Congress noted that “the present system of
regulation and oversight of crude oil terminals in the United States has degenerated into a
process of continual mistrust and confrontation. . . . Only when local citizens are involved in
the process will the trust develop that is necessary to change the present system from con-
frontation to consensus.” 
In December 1989 (prior to the passage of OPA 90), the Prince William Sound (PWS)
RCAC had been incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, and in February 1990, it entered into
a contract with the pipeline owner, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company.3 Through the negoti-
ated contract, Alyeska agreed to provide four things to the PWS RCAC: at least $2 million in
annual funding, adjusted for inflation; absolute independence from Alyeska; access to Alyeska
facilities; and that the contract would continue “for as long as oil flowed through the pipeline.”
The Cook Inlet RCAC was incorporated in December 1990, and entered into a contract with
a consortium of oil companies and tanker operators in its region—Cook Inlet Pipeline Co.,
Kenai Pipeline Co., Phillips Petroleum, Tesoro Alaska Petroleum, UNOCAL, Marathon Oil,
and Cross Timbers—with an annual funding level of approximately $600,000.4
The subsequent requirement in OPA 90 for the RCACs simply made such institutions
mandatory. It is also worth noting that OPA 90 required that “similar [RCAC] programs
should be established in other major crude oil terminals in the United States.” And although
the federal government has been resistant to implementing this provision, citizen advisory
councils were established by the states of Maine and California subsequent to the Exxon
Valdez. The Maine Oil Spill Advisory Committee has eight members appointed by the gov-
ernor, two by the president of the state senate, and three by the speaker of the state house of
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representatives. The California Oil Spill Technical Advisory Committee consists of five citi-
zen representatives appointed by the governor and four appointed by the speaker of the state
assembly. Many of those involved in the Alaska RCACs feel that gubernatorial appointment
is an unsatisfactory method by which to constitute a citizens’ council. To retain independ-
ence and work effectively, the council members should be appointed by their respective organ-
izations—not the governor or federal administration. 
More recently, citizens in the U.S. state of Washington have proposed the establishment
of a citizens’ oversight group modeled on the Alaska RCACs. As envisioned, the proposed
“Pipeline Safety Trust” would use $8 million of the $13.5 million in fines paid by the com-
pany responsible for the Olympic pipeline explosion in 1999 that killed three people. The $8
million would be managed as an endowment to provide annual funding to operate the citi-
zens’ group which would provide continuing oversight of pipeline safety, and a national cen-
ter for information on pipelines.5
Structure and Function of an Alaskan RCAC
These RCACs provide citizens an advisory role in oil issues in the region, monitor impacts,
review spill prevention and response plans, and recommend continual improvements in the
system. The broad concept is to give local citizens a direct voice in the corporate and govern-
mental decisions that affect them and their communities.  The group is also the primary con-
duit through which government and industry communicate to the public on oil issues. In a
real sense, the RCAC has become the “the eyes, ears, and voice” for the local public on oil
issues.  The public relies on the RCACs to safeguard its interests and assure transparency in
the relationship with industry and government. This is a novel, and indeed experimental effort. 
Among RCACs, the Prince William Sound RCAC (PWS RCAC) is the largest and per-
haps most successful. The PWS RCAC has three main structural components: the board of
directors, the staff, and the committees.  
Board of Directors: consists of 19 members representing the communities and major citizen
constituencies affected by the Exxon Valdez oil spill—commercial fishing, Alaska Natives,
aquaculture, conservation, recreation, and tourism. Members represent the cities and organ-
izations affected, such as the Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corporation, Cordova Dis-
trict Fishermen United, Oil Spill Region Environmental Coalition, Alaska State Chamber of
Commerce, Alaska Wilderness Recreation and Tourism Association, and the Native villages
of Tatitlek and Chenega Bay. The city of Valdez, as home to the tanker terminal, has two mem-
bers, and all other organizations have one member appointed for a two-year term. RCAC board
members are chosen by their respective institutions, generally by the institution’s board of
directors, city council, etc. Board members are thus ultimately accountable to the institution
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they represent. There is no limit to the number of consecutive terms an RCAC board mem-
ber can serve. Both the Prince William Sound RCAC and the Cook Inlet RCAC, with a 13-
member board, have several ex officio, nonvoting board members representing the relevant
state and federal agencies.  
All RCAC board members are volunteers. They receive no financial compensation other
than for travel expenses to attend meetings and other events (as discussed below in the Caspian
section, the compensation issue may need to be reconsidered in order to attract the best pos-
sible people to serve on citizen councils in the emerging democracies). The RCAC board of
directors meets at least four times a year, one of which is the annual meeting. At each RCAC
board meeting, representatives of industry and government report on their issues of concern
and operations, and hear from the citizens regarding issues of importance to them. This reg-
ular interchange provides a line of communication vital to the interest of each constituency,
and results in a constructive climate for problem solving.  
The board is responsible for allocating the annual budget. The PWS RCAC has an
annual budget that has averaged about $3 million (FY 2003 was $3.2 million), of which, on
average, about 38 percent ($1.14 million) is devoted to staff, 33 percent ($1 million) for con-
tracts and research, and 29 percent ($860,000) to office rent, supplies, equipment, and audits.
An annual audit of all finances is conducted and approved. The U.S. Coast Guard also con-
ducts an annual recertification of the group as being in compliance with the terms of OPA 90.
All of the RCAC’s work is open to the public on whose behalf it operates, and interested citi-
zens can attend and provide public comment as well. These checks and balances provide a
high level of integrity and credibility to the process.
Staff: Much of the day-to-day activity of the PWS RCAC is the responsibility of a paid staff of
18, located in two offices—one in Anchorage, where most business in Alaska is conducted and
where Alyeska headquarters are located; and the other in Valdez, where the pipeline termi-
nal is located. Staffing includes an executive director, two deputy directors, public information
manager, community liaison, finance manager, seven project managers, and administrative
assistance.6 The staff is hired by and reports to the council’s executive director. 
Committees: Much of the council’s work is conducted by four technical committees, each with
a dedicated RCAC staff liaison: Oil Spill Prevention and Response; Terminal Operations and
Environmental Monitoring; Port Operations and Vessel Traffic Systems; and Scientific Advi-
sory. These volunteer committees are appointed by the board to two-year terms, and mem-
bership is solicited from citizens throughout the region. Council board or staff members solicit
committee members based on their expertise, interest, and willingness to serve. The techni-
cal committees meet regularly to discuss any and all issues within their purview, draft and rec-
ommend policy actions to the RCAC board, and conduct research approved and financed by
the board. The board’s seven-member executive committee meets every few weeks to handle
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details and issues that arise between the quarterly board meetings. The technical commit-
tees advise the board of directors, the executive committee, and staff.7
Responsibilities: The council’s broad mission is to organize citizens to promote the environ-
mentally safe operation of the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company terminal in Valdez and the
oil tankers that use it. The council reviews and submits written comments on any and all oper-
ations of the Alyeska pipeline terminal and its associated tankers. Also, there is presently an
effort to establish a similar citizens’ oversight group with responsibility for the pipeline itself.
These oversight, review, comment, and recommendation functions can address such issues
as state and federal legislation, regulations and permits, industry policy and procedure, and
so on. 
At the request of its committees, the RCAC commissions independent scientific stud-
ies and reports on relevant issues to the public, the media, government agencies and legislative
bodies, and the industry. The research reports often form the basis of policy recommendations
from the RCAC to either government or the oil industry. Much of this research, conducted
jointly with government and industry, has fostered a more cooperative spirit among these
groups, minimizing conflict and contention. The RCAC monitors and plays an active role in
all spill drills and exercises and recommends improvements. In the response effort to actual
spills, the organization’s formal role is to observe the response, keep its members informed,
verify information from the command structure, and advise the incident commander. 
Not surprisingly, the initial relationship between these citizens’ councils and the oil
industry was somewhat distrustful, but gradually became dynamic and effective. In 1993, for
example, the PWS RCAC and Alyeska Pipeline agreed to a detailed communication protocol
in which, as stated by the U.S. Government Accounting Office report, “representatives of
industry and the council meet regularly to discuss and attempt to resolve issues of concern,
including problems associated with the review and release of study results.” The councils
and industry meet regularly to discuss planned projects, communicate study results, and
clearly convey advice and recommendations between citizen and industry representatives.
These meetings facilitate changes in project scope and methodology, reduce unnecessary dupli-
cation, and consideration of further projects. Industry representatives are present at each of
the quarterly meetings of the RCACs, and RCAC board members meet with oil company exec-
utives—shippers, Alyeska owners, etc.—often to apprise them of their issues and concerns.
The communication protocol has helped to reduce the acrimony between the councils and
industry. As a last safeguard, the RCAC contracts include an arbitration provision to resolve
disputes.
RCAC successes 
According to the U.S. Government Accounting Office’s 1993 congressionally mandated review
(a one-time mandate) of the two Alaska “demonstration” RCAC programs,
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The demonstration programs have substantially increased the level of citizens’ involve-
ment with the oil industry and with government regulators in the environmental over-
sight of oil terminal and tanker operations. Through various projects and activities, the
citizen councils have provided extensive input into matters such as oil-spill contingency
plans, tanker navigation and escort procedures, and oil terminal operations. Industry
and government officials acknowledge that many of the councils’ projects and activities
have been helpful.8
The recommendations of the RCAC are nonbinding, and government regulators and industry
do not always take the council’s advice. Yet many recommendations are adopted because of the
thorough research and vetting facilitated by the council’s public/industry/government frame-
work that provides regular meetings to discuss research objectives, methodologies and results. 
The extraordinary successes of the PWS RCAC attest to the sort of cooperative prob-
lem solving that can be accomplished with genuine, informed public participation. Overall,
the council has been a primary driver in the improvement of the safety and integrity of the
system for oil transportation through Prince William Sound, making this arguably the safest
system anywhere in the world. And, it is important to underscore that this improvement was
largely due to the RCAC. The following are some of the more significant improvements that
the RCAC either recommended or played a pivotal role in: 
 Deployment of powerful, maneuverable tugs to escort all outbound, laden tankers
 Monitoring the compliance with phase-in requirements for double-hull tankers
 Installation of ice-detecting radar to warn of iceberg hazards in the shipping lanes
 Development of nearshore spill response strategies and contingencies
 Improved Vessel Traffic System (VTS) surveillance of all tankers in the system
 More stringent weather restrictions and speed limits for tanker traffic 
 More stringent tanker inspection, both in Alaska and beyond 
 Advocacy for better government oversight, more personnel, and more funding
 Deployment of new weather buoys along the shipping lanes for real-time weather
 Improved spill contingency plans, response equipment on hand, and training
 Improved understanding of community impacts from technological disasters
 Comprehensive environmental monitoring to assess oil impacts
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 Improved control of ballast water treatment to control pollutants and
nuisance species
 Construction of a Vapor Control System to capture volatile hydrocarbon vapors released
during tanker loading
 Improved fire prevention and response capability at terminal and on tankers
Lessons Learned
As described in the “RCAC Retrospective,” there have been many important lessons learned over
the PWS RCAC’s history.9 Although the oil production and transportation sectors in 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan differ from those in Alaska, the public process lessons learned in
Alaska should be of relevance. Many of these lessons may be somewhat counter to conventional
models and practice of public advocacy, but have nonetheless proven to work in the RCAC’s par-
ticular context. Without necessarily condoning all of these as the best and most appropriate pub-
lic advocacy methodologies everywhere and at all times, a number of lessons with relevance to
the issue of public participation in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are briefly outlined below:  
 Cooperation works better than confrontation: A good-faith effort to resolve conflicts and
disagreements leads to positive change faster than public criticism.
 Conflict is inherent: Priorities of citizens and the petroleum companies are inherently
different, but do not preclude common ground.
 Trust between citizens and industry is difficult to establish and even harder to maintain: Trust
and mutual respect are fragile, can develop on some issues and not on others, and can
be maintained by regular informal meetings.
 Sufficient funding is essential: A significant difference between the RCAC and other cit-
izens’ councils is that they have the financial resources with which to hire technical con-
sultants and to commission independent research, dramatically improving their
credibility and level of participation.
 A citizens’ group can be independent with industry funding: The contract between Alyeska
and the PWS RCAC specifically protects the RCAC’s independence, and provides con-
tinued funding for the life of the pipeline. Although there will always be concerns
regarding independence, thus far RCACs have done a better job of representing the pub-
lic interest than government regulatory committees. 
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 Agreeing on how to disagree reduces conflict: The PWS RCAC and the industry agreed to
a protocol in 1995 with which to handle sensitive and controversial issues, outlining
communications and mediation procedures. This arrangement has eliminated surprises
and led to a better working relationship. Collaboration has worked better than adver-
sarial confrontation for resolving disputes.
 Logic makes passion persuasive: Using sound reasoning, scientific documentation, and
logic, citizens impassioned by an issue argue more persuasively for progressive change.
 It pays to acknowledge industry and regulators when they do right: Positive recognition rein-
forces the notion that good works generate reward, and makes constructive criticism
more credible.
 All affected citizens should be represented on boards of directors: Members from across the
affected region and across the political spectrum add to the influence of the group.
 A small board, whenever possible, is more efficient and easier to manage: Boards with about
8–10 members are recommended as ideal, but they should not be created at the expense
of adequate representation for all affected citizens. Although the PWS RCAC has a 19-
member board, this was deemed necessary to provide adequate public representation.
 Expectations of directors should be realistic: Time demands on a volunteer board can be
high, even though some can incorporate RCAC work into their normal jobs.
 Expectations of directors should be clearly communicated and enforced: Inactivity and absen-
teeism can be a problem for the board of directors, and should be managed.
 Board members do not have to be experts: But they need to be diligent and sufficiently
oriented to the issues and tasks when assuming a board post.
 The role of technical advisory committees should be clear from the start: Conflict between
committees, the board, and staff could be avoided with clear understandings of their
respective roles. 
 Concerned citizens should have the opportunity to participate in a meaningful way: Each
board member represents the interests of their own group, but other citizens should
always have a way of contributing their concerns, knowledge, and perspective. The
RCAC meetings are open to the public, and any citizen is provided the opportunity to
speak before the meeting.
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 A diverse constituency needs strong community outreach: Part of each board member’s job
is to act as liaison between the RCAC and their group or community. The RCAC pub-
lishes a quarterly newsletter and has a staff position dedicated to community liaison.
 Funding should not have strings attached: Although the contract between the pipeline
owner and the RCAC stipulates that the RCAC will be funded for the life of the pipeline
at a level of at least $2 million a year, the exact level of funding is renegotiated every
three years. Some have suggested that an independent, third party should arbitrate the
level of funding in order to retain independence and protect the group from industry
pressures and reprisals.
 Advisory groups should be mandated by state or federal statute: The statutory mandate in
federal law (OPA 90) to establish the Alaska RCACs represents an assurance that the
groups will continue, regardless of changes in oil industry leadership or priorities.
 A clear mission and identity should be established early on: The group needs to decide
whether they intend to be just a watchdog—implying oversight, criticism, and a hint
of enforcement—or a partner. Members of the PWS RCAC sees themselves more as a
“vocal advisor” than an industry or government “watchdog.”
 Citizens are more effective if they have formal relationships with those who make decisions:
The PWS RCAC contract formalizes a relationship between the pipeline owner, Alyeska,
and the RCAC, but not necessarily with the Alyeska owner companies nor the ship-
pers per se. The formal relationships should be considered carefully in negotiating the
most effective contract.
 Backsliding is always a threat: Large accidents can generate a great deal of public atten-
tion, but memories dim and complacency can set in for industry, government, and the
public. Thus the RCAC must remain vigilant to such degradation.
Confidentiality, independence, and transparency
Another central issue for these citizen advisory councils is confidentiality versus public access.
In Alaska, although there was disagreement between the RCACs and the oil industry regard-
ing this issue, it was resolved in the only real way it could have been in order to retain trans-
parency—in favor of open access.10 Citizens recognized that for the RCACs to succeed, all of
their business had to be open to the public on whose behalf they were established. On this
issue, the Alyeska/RCAC contract states the following:
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The independence, and public perception of independence, of the [RCAC] Committee
is of overriding importance to the Committee in fulfilling its functions and in meet-
ing public needs. This Contract shall be interpreted in such a way as to promote the
independence, both actual and perceived, of the Committee from Alyeska.
And, as a former RCAC staff member stated on this issue:
[For the RCAC] to work in anything less than an open, public environment invites sus-
picion and charges that it is a lapdog rather than a watchdog. The RCAC cannot func-
tion under a veil of confidentiality. . . . Its contract with Alyeska places the highest
premium on both the fact and perception of independence.11
Another component of transparency that should be considered is the statutory mandate for
open process in government. In the United States, for instance, the federal Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA) allows citizens to request information on any topic from federal agencies,
establishes a time period within which the agency has to respond, and provides a judicial
process for appealing denials of information. Further, some states, such as Alaska, have strong
public records and open meetings acts that give citizens access to meetings of state officials
and to documents they generate and receive. 
An academic evaluation of the RCAC concept found that “Citizen advisory councils are
capable of making important contributions to the production of new knowledge in the policy
process. . . ” and “Research projects . . . have played a central role in allowing the councils to gen-
erate new knowledge in a policy area involving complex questions of science and technology.”12
In an interview regarding the government’s perspective on how the RCAC has shifted
the political environment toward greater transparency, a commander in the U.S. Coast Guard
(having the responsibility to review and recertify the RCAC annually) summed up the PWS
RCAC as follows:
It adds accountability on the part of regulators like me, and the government and the
industry. We have to operate in the open, and talk about things in the open, and take
the time to bring the citizenry along with us in the logical path to the solutions for our
problems. It’s an organized and disciplined way to get citizen involvement in what we
do. I think that’s good, because the system really isn’t worth much unless citizens are
involved with it.
That, of course, is what the concept of transparency and informed public participation is all
about.
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Public Oversight in Developing Democracies
Oversight of activities between public administration and industry occurs not only in advanced
industrial democracies but in emerging ones as well. This section discusses several models of
oversight in privatization of state services in Colombia, Argentina, and Panama. While these
examples are not in the oil sector, they provide important lessons in how providing an over-
sight role for the public can help control corruption, build trust in government, and save
money.
Integrity pacts
In Colombia and Panama, local Transparency International (TI) chapters have helped imple-
ment so-called integrity pacts for certain government contracts by acting either as government
consultants or as monitors providing information to the public. Integrity pacts are signed by
government officials and senior executives from the private firms bidding on public contracts.
The pacts require participants in the bidding process to pledge not to offer or accept bribes
while submitting bids on public projects. By establishing transparent procedures, integrity
pacts build the confidence of civil servants, bidders, and the general public; develop a cul-
turel of voluntary adherence to ethical and legal frameworks; establish common rules for all
parties; and identify the points where corruption is likely to enter the process.
In Panama, Transparency International–Panama (TI–PAN) monitored the bidding
process for privatization of the state telephone company, INTEL. At the government’s request,
TI–PAN took on the role of an observer committed to informing the public about all aspects
of the privatization process. It received invitations to attend all meetings of INTEL’s board of
directors and had access to all relevant documents. Working with an international expert,
TI–PAN closely monitored the bidding process and published weekly bulletins in a leading
newspaper. The two companies bidding for INTEL, Cable & Wireless and GTE, signed an
integrity pact that included a “no bribery” clause. The bidding resulted in a significant gain for
the government: the winning bid for INTEL’s assets was $152 million above the base price, and
$201 million above the other bidder’s offer. Both bidders were satisfied with the process and
there was general consensus that TI–PAN’s participation was crucial to bringing transparency
to the deal and increasing public confidence in the privatization process.13
The use of integrity pacts in Colombia was the result of a 1999 presidential directive
ordering the Ministry of Communications to utilize integrity pacts with the assistance of Trans-
parency International–Colombia (TI–COL) “to the extent that it is possible.” Since then,
TI–COL has overseen the implementation of 51 integrity pacts. The Colombian telephone serv-
ice contract integrity pacts included an agreement by bidders to report violations and penal-
ties for bidders who violated the terms of the pact as well as an agreement establishing an
independent arbitrator to review complaints concerning pact signatories. In addition, other
government officials concerned with the particular procurement were asked to sign an “Ethics
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Proclamation.” As a condition of participating in the process, TI–COL asked for, and received,
the right to review and make suggestions regarding the bidding documents. 
Public hearings
Public hearings are one of the most direct forms of involving citizens in the process of bring-
ing transparency to deals between government and the private sector. Hearings provide the
opportunity for many citizens to play a role in government decision-making processes, which
can be particularly important in communities and countries where this has not been a com-
mon practice. By opening government decisions to citizens, public hearings work to build trust
in government decision making. Hearings can also open up the government procurement,
contracting, and bidding process, resulting in lower costs and greater efficiency. 
In Panama and Argentina, where public procurement has long been associated with
corruption, public hearings fused with integrity pacts resulted in both high approval ratings
from participants and significant savings of public funds. 
In Panama, two public hearings examined government plans to purchase land for a new
clinic. The first hearing was a discussion of the pros and cons of various sites. At the second
hearing, one month later, a technical committee presented a set of recommendations based
on the previous discussion for public comment. A survey of participants indicated that 98 per-
cent of them were satisfied with the hearing process. Seventy percent of the participants agreed
with the final recommendations and decision made by the technical committee. The open pur-
chasing process helped the government locate a site for about half the cost of the original $1
million budget allocation. 
In Argentina, the mayor of the Municipality of Moron took office with a commitment
to eradicating corruption. One of the first challenges was to break the monopoly influence over
public waste collection contracts by a cartel of domestic firms. Once the previous contract
expired, the mayor and the municipal government worked with a local TI chapter, Poder Ciu-
dadano, to organize public hearings about the bidding process for a new contract. Officials
publicized hearings and solicited bids from foreign firms. Experts and the public came
together before bidding started to review and revise documents to maximize competition. The
process also incorporated a clearly defined integrity pact before bidding began. The pact
required all parties to commit to not taking bribes and to report illegal behavior. The pact spec-
ified heavy sanctions for any party that violated these rules. The pact also required officials to
fully disclose how they made the final contract award decision. In the end, the mayor’s com-
mitment to fight corruption, the use of public hearings and an integrity pact, and the solici-
tation of foreign bids broke the domestic cartel’s monopoly: the final contract went to a Spanish
firm with a bid that saved the government $13 million over four years.14
Closer to the Caspian Basin, Georgian NGOs are active in shaping public policy through
the development of draft legislation and provision of expert opinions. The Association of Young
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Economists, for example, frequently helps draft economic laws and also participated in a work-
ing group which drafted the program of economic development under which the country’s
economic reforms are being implemented. The Georgian Young Lawyers Association is fre-
quently asked by parliament for commentary on draft bills. In addition to developing a law
on grant awards that significantly eased registration procedures for NGOs, they were influ-
ential in developing the 1994 Georgian constitution, the law on ordinary courts, and the judi-
cial reform process. The association also assisted in development of a law on a Georgian bar
association and a process of examining Georgian laws.
Challenges and Opportunities for RCACs
in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
The establishment of citizens’ councils or other models of citizen oversight have increased
transparency and public involvement in oil and gas issues in the United States and public
administration in countries such as Argentina, Panama, and Colombia. It is worth exploring
whether the citizens and governments of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan can begin to lay the
groundwork for the establishment of such groups as well. Although there may be initial resist-
ance to the concept within industry, government, and even the public, none of this should
prove insurmountable. The importance of citizens’ councils is paramount—they are not gov-
ernment, they are not industry, but they are established and operated solely by and for the
citizens of the country.
If citizens’ advisory councils are pursued in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, they need not
be limited by the scope of the Alaskan RCACs. Caspian-based citizens’ advisory councils could
be empowered to provide oversight of various aspects of petroleum development—permitting,
exploration, production, transportation, refining, public revenue collection and expenditure,
risk management, or environmental compliance. With regard to the public collection and use
of petroleum revenues, the Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan RCACs could monitor and advise gov-
ernment and the public on the public finance dimension of petroleum development—rev-
enues, costs, taxes, royalties, and other payments. These councils could also have a voice in
the use of oil and gas revenues, including monitoring how the government uses its earnings
to address social and environmental needs. Finally, they could commission annual audits of
both industry and government petroleum revenues.
If citizens’ advisory councils are pursued, they should represent all major constituen-
cies with directors being democratically chosen by their respective interest groups. It is in
the government’s interest to become a cooperative partner with these groups, granting them
access to needed information and deliberations. Such cooperation, as we have seen in the
examples of Argentina and Panama, helps build trust in government and serves as a check
against corruption. Access to information, however, will require strong public access statutes
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similar to the United States FOIA, as well as open meetings acts and other public disclosure
protocols, which do not currently exist in Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan.
The long-term, substantial, and stable funding for such groups will be of immediate
concern. Their budgets should be commensurate with the responsibilities of the new RCACs,
and include sufficient funds to commission research and technical studies as the RCACs deem
appropriate. If there is one thing that distinguishes the RCAC concept from other advisory
structures, it is that the RCACs have sufficient funding to do the work that they feel is nec-
essary. Having the capability to conduct their own research greatly enhances the ability of the
groups to support their policy recommendations. 
There are several possible avenues for securing such financial support: 
 Direct funding by the petroleum industry: Funding could come directly from the oil and
gas companies and/or their consortia (OKIOC, AIOC, etc.). But, as was the case in the
United States prior to the Exxon Valdez disaster, citizens in the Caspian may not have
sufficient political power to persuade the petroleum industry to establish and finance
such groups on their own. Direct industry funding could also lead to suspicions of bias
and lack of independence among the local public, which would make it difficult for the
RCAC to perform its duties effectively. One alternative is for industry establishment of
an endowment, which would limit the possibility of day-to-day interventions in the activ-
ities of the RCACs. 
 Loan institutions requiring the establishment of RCACs as a condition of their loan: Lack-
ing direct support by the oil and gas companies, the international financial institutions
(IFIs) could simply require companies receiving loans to establish and fund such inde-
pendent, credible public participation as a condition of their loan. The IFIs could stip-
ulate what sort of audit, review protocols, representation, and government and industry
cooperation must be put in place to ensure the highest levels of integrity and effective
action of the groups. As discussed in chapter two, the World Bank has pursued such
an approach in Chad.
 Government support: The governments of the region could themselves establish and
finance such citizen participation from public revenues derived from oil and gas proj-
ects. In the long run, this may be the best of all possibilities because it provides a level
of government buy-in necessary for cooperative action and removes industry from any
direct role in the group’s budget.
 Interim, start-up support from outside philanthropic, nongovernmental organizations: If
none of the above financial instruments is attainable in the short-term, then the assis-
tance of an outside, philanthropic NGO should be solicited. This would at best repre-
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sent an interim solution to the issue of developing sustainable, informed public par-
ticipation in the region. If the interim RCACs prove themselves a worthy mechanism
for informed public participation in the region, then their funding should be picked
up directly by government or industry.  This may be a necessary first step in order to
catalyze the formation of these groups.
A concern often voiced regarding establishing RCACs in the emerging democracies of the
Caspian region and other areas is that of corruption. And although the Alaska case is admit-
tedly different in some respects, its structural impediments to corruption are applicable any-
where. The RCACs commission annual financial audits by independent firms and report their
results in their annual reports, which are available to the public. Both the U.S. Coast Guard
(the federal liaison agency) and Alyeska (the contracting oil industry body) have the right to
conduct yearly financial audits of the RCAC—and on occasion avail themselves of this right.
The U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO), in its report to the U.S. Congress on the
Alaska RCACs, concluded the following with regard to financial procedures and integrity:
Regarding their handling of funds, both councils appeared to have adequate policies
and procedures and a system of internal controls for managing their operations and
funds.  Our analysis of key functions, such as travel and contracting, did not disclose
any material weaknesses. . . . A review of several independent audit reports evaluating
the two programs’ financial activities confirmed our findings.  These reports showed
no material internal control weaknesses or improprieties.15
Thus, although financial integrity is a serious concern, there are relatively straightforward
audit and disclosure mechanisms that can be employed to prevent corruption. Providing finan-
cial compensation to council members for work performed should be considered in emerg-
ing democracies in order to attract the best possible people to the job. Careful consideration
should be given to putting in place the proper checks and balances and restrictions on receipt
of gifts to ensure the highest possible level of ethics and integrity.
A related concern regarding the establishment of RCACs is possible co-option of the
group. Civil society in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan is still in its early stages of development,
most NGOs lack grassroots support, many are denied registration, and government-organized
NGOs (GONGOs) are often indistinguishable from other NGOs. While there is clearly no
absolute safeguard against this tendency, the group should be designed to reduce such poten-
tial. RCAC members being accountable to their respective organizations, together with trans-
parent activity, are the foremost safeguards against co-option. As mentioned earlier, this is
an absolutely critical and fundamental concept to the success of any RCAC. If an organization
(e.g., citizens’ interest group) feels its RCAC representative is not working for its interests,
they can correct or replace that representative. Hence, for RCACs to act as credible oversight
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agencies, freedom of association in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan must be improved. The reg-
istration process for Azerbaijani NGOs should be made more transparent and the oppres-
sive environment in which journalists and other government watchdogs in Kazakhstan
currently operate will need to be improved in order for constituencies to develop which the
RCACs would serve. 
Conclusion 
The establishment of RCACs in Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan would provide an unprecedented
level of transparency and informed public participation with regard to oil and gas activities
necessary to fulfill the promise of democratic governance in these countries. They would essen-
tially become the fully engaged “eyes, ears, and voice” for citizens with regard to petroleum
issues that affect their lives, including but not limited to petroleum revenue collection and
use. Limits to access to information and restrictions on freedom of association in Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan are substantial challenges to the establishment of Alaska-style RCACs. Nev-
ertheless, as the examples from Latin America and Georgia show, it is possible for civil soci-
ety to participate in the improvement of public administration and public policy in developing
democracies. Oil companies, international financial institutions, and private donors can help
this process in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan by providing funding, technical assistance, and
access to information for such councils to begin work. 
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5. State Oil Fund 
of the Azerbaijan Republic
Sabit Bagirov, Ingilab Akhmedov, Svetlana Tsalik
Introduction
Petroleum wealth is not a new phenomenon for Azerbaijan. For centuries, oil seepage had
been observed on its territories. Marco Polo reported that in the 13th century, oil from the
Absheron peninsula was exported to the Middle East for its lighting, medicinal, and military
uses. By the end of the 19th century, Russia was the world’s leading oil producer due to its rule
of Azerbaijan, and Baku’s oil deposits figured prominently in the military campaigns of both
World Wars.1 
Production dropped precipitously during World War II, however, when the Soviet Union
shut many wells to keep them from falling into German hands. Although production slowly
recovered in the following two decades, after 1967 it began a gradual but uninterrupted decline
as the Soviet government prioritized its Siberian oil reserves. This deterioration continued
until the mid-1990s when Azerbaijan began what has become known as its “second oil boom.”
“The experience of oil rich countries suggests that oil revenues easily 
gained are not always rationally used. Indeed, excessively high misuse . . .
can be observed in most cases. . . . Preventing such misuse and 
strengthening financial discipline . . . were major reasons 
for establishment of the State Oil Fund.”
—2001 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
STATE OIL FUND OF THE AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC 
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Despite a long history of producing oil, Azerbaijan has little experience managing its
petroleum wealth. Until the country’s independence in 1991, this task was the responsibility
of the Soviet Union.
For Azerbaijan, even more than for Kazakhstan, it is critically important to get hydro-
carbon revenue management “right.” Three reasons stand out: First, Azerbaijan’s economy
is more dependent on oil than Kazakhstan’s. The oil sector comprises two-thirds of indus-
trial production and more than 90 percent of the value of the country’s exports.2 The country
has experienced the inflation, real exchange rate appreciation, and crowding out of the non-
oil sector that is symptomatic of Dutch Disease. Second, Azerbaijan has less oil than Kazakh-
stan, and therefore the risk of missed opportunities is greater. Azerbaijan has about a third
of Kazakhstan’s proven and potential oil reserves, and about a quarter of its proven and pos-
sible gas reserves.3 Whereas Kazakhstan’s production is expected to continue through mid-
century, Azerbaijan’s will peak by 2010 and decline to a quarter of peak production by 2024.4
Finally, as a result of the long war between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the territory of
Nagorno-Karabakh, about 800,000 Azerbaijanis are internally displaced. Thus, in addition to
the already hefty challenge of transition from a planned economy to a resource-based market
economy, Azerbaijan has the added burden of restoring normal lives to this displaced popu-
lation.
This chapter reviews Azerbaijan’s performance in managing its oil revenues to date and
examines the role that the State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOFAZ) can play in
this task. First, the chapter discusses the impact that the oil sector has already had on the coun-
try’s economy. Next, it describes the prospects for Azerbaijan’s oil earnings, reviewing the coun-
try’s reserves, analyzing its production-sharing agreements, and forecasting government
revenues from development of the hydrocarbon sector. Then, it analyzes SOFAZ’s design and
performance. Finally, the chapter concludes with recommendations on how strengthening rev-
enue transparency and improving governance can help Azerbaijan manage its resource rev-
enues and avoid the resource curse. 
Impact of Hydrocarbon Development 
In the early 1990s, Azerbaijan’s already difficult task of dismantling and restructuring its
planned economy was complicated by a succession of leaders, social and economic disruption
from its war with Armenia, a terms-of-trade shock following the collapse of the Soviet trad-
ing system, and a blockade imposed by Russia in response to Azerbaijan’s decision to begin
developing oil offshore without a resolution of the Caspian Sea’s legal status. During this
period every macroeconomic indicator pointed to an economy out of control. 
Industrial production imploded, with GDP falling by over 60 percent between 1991 and
1995. As a result, government revenues collapsed as well, falling from 32.9 percent of GDP
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in 1990 to under 15 percent in 1995. Budget deficits swelled to as high as 10 percent of GDP.5
To cover its budget, the government resorted to monetary emissions—that is, increasing the
amount of money in circulation—thus driving down the value of the currency and, in effect,
taxing its entire population. In 1994 alone, the currency depreciated by 1,300 percent.6 At
the same time, inflation soared, with consumer prices increasing by over 24,000 percent
between 1991 and 1995.7
In 1994, Azerbaijan signed the $10 billion “contract of the century” for the development
of the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) oil fields, located offshore in the Azeri sector of the
Caspian Sea. The signing of this contract, President Aliyev’s consolidation of power in 1995,
and his focus on economic stabilization signaled the transition from the earlier chaos in Azer-
baijan to the beginning of the country’s second oil boom. 
The government pursued a strict monetary and fiscal policy, which combined cutting
spending, increasing borrowing, and reducing monetary emissions, bringing inflation to less
than 2 percent a year. For the last two years, economic growth has averaged 10 percent. Apart
from energy, most prices have been liberalized. The budget deficit has fallen from 15.3 percent
of GDP in 1993 to below 1 percent of GDP in 2000. Azerbaijan has steadily built up its for-
eign reserves, and as of late 2002 had over $1.3 billion in its National Bank and its oil fund. 
These achievements are impressive. However, a worrying trend is the vulnerability of
this fiscal stability to external shocks in the petroleum sector. Plunging world oil prices in
the late 1990s dramatically reduced the country’s export earnings, as well as budget revenues.
Already, Azerbaijan has experienced signs of Dutch Disease, as the currency’s real exchange
rate appreciated considerably between 1997 and 1999, making it easier to import goods and
services rather than produce and procure them domestically. Oil and oil products continue
to dominate Azerbaijan’s exports, while the manufacturing sector has diminished. Azerbai-
jan’s large population of displaced persons, its widespread poverty, and energy shortages cou-
pled with the moderate size of its oil and gas reserves will make management of hydrocarbon
revenues extremely challenging and important for the future prosperity of this country.
GDP and investment in the oil sector 
Although oil exports from the ACG fields did not begin until 1997, the impact on the econ-
omy could be felt as early as 1995, once the ACG production-sharing agreement (PSA) was
concluded. The bonuses that followed the signing of this contract helped the government
reverse the devaluation of its currency and the ensuing inflation. The bonuses also played a
critical role in helping the government control its deficit, as will be discussed below. 
Investment in the oil sector rose to 37 percent of total foreign investment in 1995, as
money streamed in to support oil exploration and development and the construction of an
export pipeline from Baku to the port of Supsa on the Black Sea. Since then, the petroleum
sector has absorbed the lion’s share of foreign investment in Azerbaijan, and currently stands
9 2 S T A T E  O I L  F U N D  O F  T H E  A Z E R B A I J A N  R E P U B L I C
at more than 80 percent of total foreign direct investment.8 Most of this investment has been
concentrated in oilfields offshore Baku, providing little benefit to the countryside. On a cumu-
lative basis, foreign investment in the oil sector since 1994 has been about $4 billion.9 
Much of this investment has gone to the ACG block of fields, which has absorbed $2.3
billion of investment. The next largest project is the Shah-Deniz gas field, offshore Baku, which
has received $474 million. Figure 1 illustrates the role of the oil sector as a share of total for-
eign investment from 1994–2001.
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FIGURE 1. Foreign Investment in the Oil Sector of Azerbaijan, 1994–2002
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan, 2002; Turan News Agency, February 21, 2003.
Note: The data may underestimate the investment in the oil sector because the statistical yearbook does not specify
to what sector financial credits are directed. Hence, some of these may have been invested in the oil industry.
Future investment will be directed toward the implementation of phases 1,2, and 3 of
the ACG field, development of the Shah-Deniz gas field, and construction of the Baku-Tbil-
isi-Ceyhan (BTC) and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipelines. The BTC pipeline will move oil
from the ACG fields to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean. The BTE pipeline
will carry natural gas to markets in Turkey, with some offtake in Georgia. Table 1 demonstrates
the size of the investment and the timelines anticipated for these projects. It should be noted
that not all of these anticipated investments will be made directly in Azerbaijan, as they involve
costs of purchasing equipment from abroad and also construction of the pipeline in Georgia
and Turkey. However, even when the expenditures are incurred abroad, there will be multi-
plier effects in Azerbaijan from the project moving forward.
■ = Investment in the Oil Sector;    ■ = Financial Credits;    ■ = Investment in Other Sectors of the Economy
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TABLE 1. Anticipated Investments in Azerbaijan Oil and Gas, 2005–2009
Project Value, Beginning of Production/
Billion USD Transportation
Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli
Phase-1 3.4 – 3.6 2005
Phase-2 4.5 – 5.0 2007
Phase-3 2.7 – 3.0 2009
Shah-Deniz 1.7 – 1.8 2005
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline 2.7 – 3.2 2005
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline 0.9 – 1.0 2006
Total: 15.9 – 17.6
Source: Compiled based on information collected from press releases from SOCAR, AIOC, and reports of the Trend
Information Agency and Turan Information Agency.
As Figure 2 demonstrates, spurts in GDP growth closely track infusions of foreign
investment. As foreign investment began to flow to Azerbaijan’s oil sector, GDP grew steadily.
The fuel sector as a whole represented 27.3 percent of GDP in 2000, up from 16.4 percent
of GDP in 1995.10 Investment in the petroleum sector, more than any other economic activ-
ity, moves GDP. 
2000
1600
1200
800
400
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
FIGURE 2. Rates of Growth in GDP and Gross Foreign Investment, Azerbaijan
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Economic sectors
The surging output of the oil sector accounted for more than 60 percent of the increase in
GDP between 1995 and 2001. While output in the oil sector increased by over 200 percent
between 1995 and 1999, output in the non-oil sector decreased by about 39 percent in the
same period.11 That petroleum is the primary driver of growth can be seen in the decline of
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almost every other branch of industrial production. In 2001, the oil sector accounted for 67.5
percent of all industrial production.12 The dislocation of industrial production is partly a result
of atrophy following the disruption of the planned economy, but also a sign of Dutch Dis-
ease, as currency volatility, inflation, and a lack of financing have squeezed out non-oil indus-
trial sectors. 
Dutch Disease occurs when large amounts of foreign exchange earned from the sale
of a commodity such as oil are converted into local currency. The effect is to raise the demand
for local currency, leading to appreciation of the exchange rate. As a result, imports become
cheaper and exports more expensive. This decline in price competitiveness weakens the labor-
intensive manufacturing sector.
Most manufacturing has ground to almost a complete halt, even as the economy began
a general recovery. Exports to Russia, Azerbaijan’s largest trading partner, have dropped from
$180.5 million in 1997 to $77 million in 2001.13 Table 2 shows the decline of various repre-
sentative industrial products and the corresponding increase in oil production.
TABLE 2. Output, Selected Items, 1990–1999
Product 1990 1995 1999
Crude oil extraction (including gas condensate), million tons 12.5 9.2 13.8
Aluminum (thousand tons) 238.9 26.1 76.1
Canned food (million cans) 653.5 82 49
Fabrics (million square meters) 150.9 59.5 0.8
Cement (thousand tons) 990 196 171
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan, 2002. 
The construction and service sectors, which are stimulated by oil production, have fared
better. When the Baku-Supsa pipeline was underway, construction represented 13 percent of
GDP. However, after completion of the pipeline, the sector fell back to 6 percent of GDP in
2001. As the BTC and BTE pipelines commence, construction will experience another tem-
porary boost. The service sector, especially housing, food, and transportation, has also been
temporarily helped by the activity of the oil sector.
In an effort to stimulate the non-oil sector, the government passed a law on “State Sup-
port for Small Enterprises” and a decree on “Measures to Accelerate Reforms in the Agricul-
tural Sector,” in 1999. The former provides low interest loans of up to $100,000 through
authorized banks for small and medium-sized enterprises. As of 2002, $2 million in loans
had been distributed through this program to 48 enterprises. The latter exempts agricultural
producers from nine types of taxes for five years. A government proposal to create tax favor-
able geographic areas and economic sectors has drawn concerns from the IMF that such zones
will encourage tax evasion by existing businesses.
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The government also simplified the tax system, and the parliament in 2002 began delib-
erating on a law to stimulate domestic production. Other decrees on removing constraints to
business (1999) and tackling corruption (2000) aim to pave the way for domestic business.
An important contribution to reducing corruption was the Finance Ministry’s move to reduce
the number of tax inspectors by 40 percent and increase the salaries of the remaining inspec-
tors three-fold. Authority to conduct tax inspections has been transferred from the Interior
Ministry to the Tax Ministry. The American Chamber of Commerce in Azerbaijan has reported
that requests for tax prepayments have declined. 
Another positive step is the reduction in the excessive number of licenses required for
a business to register and operate—from 240 to 30. However, there have been some con-
cerns that the number of steps to acquire the 30 licenses have increased. The number of licens-
ing agencies has decreased from 30 to 18 and the tenure of licenses has gone up from 6
months to 5 years.
These have been modest first steps, however, and the effectiveness of their implemen-
tation remains to be seen. A major obstacle for small and medium-sized businesses is the
problem of access to credit. Interest rates of 20 percent and more persist despite inflation
levels of less than 2 percent a year. The banking system remains dominated by the state-owned
International Bank whose privatization has been stalled since 1999. Overall privatization has
been slow relative to neighboring countries. Cumulative receipts from privatization are about
3 percent of GDP in Azerbaijan, compared to about 20 percent in Georgia.14 In the agricul-
tural sector, there is an urgent need for institutional support such as credit and marketing
facilities to those who have benefited from agricultural reform.15
Trade
Just as oil production has overshadowed other sectors of the economy, so it has come to dom-
inate trade. When the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) began to produce
oil in 1997 from the Chirag oil field, one of the three ACG fields, the share of oil and oil prod-
ucts in Azerbaijan’s exports was 61 percent. By 2001, Azerbaijan had become a virtual
“monocrop” economy, with crude oil and oil products comprising 91 percent of the value of
exports.16 This rising share is explained not only by the increase in oil production, but also
by domestic oil requirements holding relatively constant, by the sharp decline in other exports,
and by a relatively high price for oil sold abroad. In the same period, non-oil products fell from
38.6 percent to 8.7 percent of total exports.17
Such a high volume of oil in the country’s trade makes Azerbaijan’s economy highly vul-
nerable to oil price shocks. In 1998 and 1999, when crude oil prices tumbled as low as $10.90
per barrel, Azerbaijan’s balance of payments deficit ballooned to 32.6 percent of GDP.18 The
shortfall in revenues had an immediate toll on the budget, where revenues and expenditures
both contracted sharply from the previous year. Revenues decreased by 9.3 percent and expen-
ditures by 10.3 percent.19
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Exchange rates and inflation
After 1995, with the signing of the ACG contract, the real exchange rate began to appreciate
as a result of the government’s effort to battle inflation. Oil revenues in the form of bonuses,
the government’s stricter fiscal and borrowing policies, and IMF loans helped strengthen the
manat and eliminate inflation. In 1994, the currency had depreciated by 1300 percent and
by 265 percent in 1995. In contrast, between 1996 and 1997, the currency appreciated by 13
percent.20 The higher-valued currency, however, made local goods more expensive than
imports. The authorities are now trying to gradually devalue the manat, to fit the purchasing
power of the population and give domestic industry a boost. In 1999–2000, through numer-
ous bank interventions, they succeeded in devaluing the currency by nearly 8 percent.21
Corruption
Pervasive corruption has hampered development of the non-oil private sector.22 Its presence
is known and recognized, yet corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies continue as obsta-
cles to a balanced economy. Azerbaijan ranked 95th out of 102 countries surveyed by Trans-
parency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in 2002. The Heritage Institute’s Index
of Economic Freedom ranked Azerbaijan “mostly unfree” in 2002 with a ranking of 118 out
of 161 countries studied. A national survey conducted in 2001 found that 77 percent of
respondents felt that the government had not done enough to fight corruption.23 In its assess-
ment of Azerbaijan’s honoring of commitments as a member of the Council of Europe, the
Council urged the country to adopt an anticorruption law as well as a national program for
combating corruption.24
The prevalence of the “corruption tax” undermines the development of the non-oil sec-
tor, the revival of which is essential to Azerbaijan’s long-term economic development. In a sur-
vey of 555 non-oil foreign firms operating in Azerbaijan, the Foreign Investment Advisory
Service found the investment climate in the oil sector was significantly better than in the non-
oil sector. Corruption was cited as a moderate to major problem by 30 percent of respondents.
Perhaps more importantly, the impression of prevalent corruption was the most frequently
cited reason by businesses that chose not to invest in Azerbaijan.25
Employment and poverty
While the petroleum sector has had a great effect on GDP growth and investment, it has had
a much smaller effect on employment and poverty. Hydrocarbon production is not a labor-
intensive activity. Despite accounting for 30 percent of GDP in 2000, the oil sector constituted
only 1 percent of total employment.26 Although employment in the oil sector increased by 31
percent from 1995 to 2001, in real numbers this was an increase of only 9,000 jobs. At the
same time, the 34 percent drop in employment in non-oil industry resulted in a loss of 110,000
jobs.27
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Jobs in sectors that support the oil industry increased during the 1990s. For example,
jobs in the retail and service sectors went up from 9.9 percent in 1990 to 18.9 percent of
total employment in 1998. 
Because of obstacles in registering for unemployment benefits, it is difficult to accu-
rately assess the level of unemployment. However, based on 1999 census data, unemployment
in the economically active section of the population is 15.8 percent nationwide and as high as
23.9 percent in urban areas.28
Many citizens of Azerbaijan have not recovered from the devastation of the Soviet econ-
omy’s collapse and the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan has one of the highest per
capita populations of internally displaced persons in the world, and this situation has not
changed much since 1993. Only recently has the government shifted its assistance from relief
efforts to resettlement. Poverty, disease, and unemployment have grown at alarming rates.
Nearly a million people were made refugees or became internally displaced after the war.
According to a 2001 state survey of household incomes, 49 percent of the population
lives below the poverty line of $25.80 per month.29 Despite having one of the highest rates of
GDP per capita among the former Soviet republics due to its oil wealth, Azerbaijan has the
second highest share of undernourished people among its post-Soviet neighbors. Between
1997 and 1999, 37 percent of the population was undernourished.30
A 2001 World Food Program survey of living conditions among the internally displaced
population indicated that access to food essentials and living conditions had deteriorated since
the survey was last taken in 1998.32 Ninety percent of respondents to a national poverty and
corruption survey in 2001 thought the government had done a poor job of providing assis-
tance to those in need.
Problems of poverty are exacerbated by the country’s environmental problems. Azer-
baijan’s ecology suffers from the legacy of over a century of petroleum development and
decades of chemical and agricultural production, as well as the aftermath of a civil war. The
United Nations’ State of the Environment Report on Azerbaijan found that nearly 30 percent
of the coastal area and more than half the country’s larger rivers are contaminated. The coun-
try’s limited water resources, poor air quality, and deforestation are a serious impediment to
quality of life.33
Azerbaijan’s Program on Poverty Reduction and Economic Development, adopted fol-
lowing public hearings through a Poverty Reduction Strategy Process, provides a candid
assessment of poverty in Azerbaijan and the state’s attempts to combat it. The failure of
increased expenditures to improve the quality of public services was blamed mainly on delays
in restructuring—for example, redirecting social service spending from salaries to infra-
structure.
Combating poverty in Azerbaijan will require raising household incomes for the 99 per-
cent of the population not employed in the oil sector, which will be a challenge given the non-
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oil industry’s state of decline. In its poverty assessment, the World Bank found that eliminat-
ing extreme poverty by 2010 (defined as reducing that portion of the population living on
72,000 manats in 2001 to less than 1 percent of the population) would require an average
annual growth rate of non-oil GDP of 14 percent—more than twice the 6.3 percent non-oil
GDP growth rates predicted for this period.34
Governance and budget accountability
Like Kazakhstan and many of the petro-states discussed in chapter one, Azerbaijan has wit-
nessed an increasing concentration of power in the executive’s hands since the country’s inde-
pendence.35 Not surprisingly, the ruling family plays a prominent role in the country’s energy
sector, with the president’s son and expected successor serving as second in command of the
State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR). 
Because petroleum earnings flow to the central government and because multinational
oil companies prefer to work in any country with a powerful central arbiter, petroleum pro-
duction often coincides with the expansion of executive power and the evisceration of effec-
tive opposition, inside or outside of government. These tendencies are apparent in Azerbaijan,
where a tenacious president has limited the powers of parliament and hindered the develop-
ment of civil society. 
Azerbaijan has been ruled since 1993 by Heidar Aliyev, a Brezhnev-era leader. After sev-
eral predecessors had been forced from power, Aliyev was elected president in 1993 in an
uncontested election with nearly 99 percent of the vote. Aliyev has been accused by election
observers of heavy-handed efforts to stop opponents from running against him in presiden-
tial elections and to keep them out of parliament. 
In 1998, prior to the presidential election, opposition party leaders and members were
denied representation on the electoral commission, were denied permission to hold public
meetings, and were arrested on politically motivated charges. Commenting on the 1998 elec-
tion which it monitored, the National Democratic Institute stated, “it is very disturbing that
the violations [...including ballot box stuffing and intimidation of voters...] appeared to be
systematic and that almost all were committed in favor of Aliyev.”36 The 2000 parliamentary
election was characterized by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR) as a “crash course in the different methodologies of manipulation.”37 
Parliament’s powers are narrowly defined in the constitution, while the president’s are
left open-ended. The parliament—the Mili Majlis—is dominated by the New Azerbaijan Party,
the party formed by Aliyev, and there are only a few representatives from opposition parties.
Although the Mili Majlis reliably passes legislation favored by the president, many new laws,
including the law creating the State Oil Fund, are in the form of presidential decrees.
Neither the Majlis nor the public exercises effective control over public finance. Parlia-
ment can neither draft nor amend the annual budget, but can only approve or reject the budget
submitted to it by the Ministry of Finance, which is directly subordinated to the president
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and works closely with the president’s administration to ensure that fiscal policy supports
the president’s priorities. In its annual assessment, the Council of Europe expressed “deep
concern over the undue interference of the executive in the functioning of institutions” and
noted that “it is to be regretted that parliament exercises no oversight of the government’s
activities, which means that the public at large is similarly excluded from this process.”38
Parliamentary control is further dampened by the lack of detail provided in the draft
budget. The budget is less than 20 pages long and does not provide data below the level of aggre-
gate departments. Members of parliament cannot determine spending on specific programs
because expenditures are reported at such a high level of aggregation. As a result of these lim-
itations, debate over the budget is stymied. In 2001, the budget was approved after only 20 min-
utes of discussion. Neither has the parliament ever exercised its prerogative of rejecting the
budget or sending it back to the Ministry of Finance for revisions. Because its vote on the budget
is one of the only measures by which parliament can check the executive branch, a rejection or
request to resubmit would be perceived as a vote of no confidence in the president. 
Public participation in the budget process is also limited. Since parliament has no abil-
ity to change the budget, there is little incentive for budget advocates to attempt to engage with
parliamentarians. A former chair of the parliamentary committee on the budget confided that
he could remember no more than two or three instances in his five-year tenure when he was
approached by a member of the public to discuss the budget. While the Ministry of Finance
does have control over the budget, it does not provide opportunities for public involvement
in the budget formulation process. Public participation is also limited by a shortage of pub-
licly available data. Although the Ministry of Finance produces detailed monthly reports on
actual revenues and expenditures and maintains information on expenditure commitments,
debt, and loans (including government-backed loans), none of this information is available
to the public. The State Statistics Committee produces monthly reports with details on gov-
ernment finances, but only 100 copies are printed and these are restricted to government use. 
Strengthening budget planning and auditing will be a priority for Azerbaijan as the vol-
ume of oil and gas revenues increases. The practice of medium-term budget planning in Azer-
baijan has been abandoned since the five-year plans that guided the economy when it was part
of the Soviet Union. Such long-term planning is important when an economy has substan-
tial development needs and a volatile stream of income. Oversight of implementation of the
budget is also critical to help monitor receipt of revenues and track the effectiveness of spend-
ing. An effective auditor may prevent situations that occurred in recent years, in which budg-
ets, were planned on the basis of lower oil prices, failed to reflect a surplus when the price of
oil substantially exceeded expectations.
An additional obstacle to public participation in the budgetary process is the constraints
placed on NGOs. Azerbaijan’s constitution guarantees the right of freedom of association, and
this commitment is further backed by Azerbaijan’s membership in the Council of Europe.
While the legal basis for civil society is strong, in practice, the development of civil society has
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been limited by government efforts to control NGO registration and limit opportunities for
obtaining funding grants, tax-exempt status, and the right to convene public meetings.
The 2000 law on NGO activity does not specify registration rights and obligations, and
hence NGO registration decisions are made on the basis of internal documents of the Min-
istry of Justice. Registration is routinely denied, often without a clear explanation, and past the
10-day deadline established by law. Often, the Ministry of Justice does not respond at all, and
without a rejection, applicants cannot appeal in court. The fact that registration can only be
done in Baku puts constraints on the development of civil society outside the capital. Even
on the rare occasions when a district court overturns a registration denial, the Ministry of
Justice does not always comply with the court’s decision.39 Public participation in the budget-
ary process, and more generally the development of civil society in Azerbaijan, will require
overhauling the legal basis and the practice of registering NGOs.
Budget revenues and revenue collection
As a result of the growth of oil production and exports, and a relatively high price for oil, the
budget of Azerbaijan has become highly dependent on oil for its revenues. In 2001, the oil
sector contributed 29.6 percent of budget revenues. In 2003, oil sector revenues will comprise
32 percent of the government’s budget, according to the parliamentary committee on economic
policy.40 Once the oil-related construction and service industries are taken into account, the
impact is even larger. As noted elsewhere, the large share that oil plays in government rev-
enues has dangerous consequences in the event of a downturn in the price of oil. According
to IMF estimates, each $1 drop in the price of oil translates to a loss of $35 million in gov-
ernment revenue, or approximately 5 percent of total government revenues in the year 2000.41
The impact on the budget will be even greater as production ramps up in the next few years.
This risk is aggravated by the absence of a budget stabilization mechanism in the country’s oil
fund, as will be discussed below.
Since their inception, oil bonuses have been used every year to finance the government’s
budget deficit.42 Between 1995 and 2000, oil bonuses financed, on average, 62 percent of
budget deficits and, in one year, 90 percent of the budget deficit. In total, $345 million in
bonuses have already been spent for this purpose. 
Another factor that leaves Azerbaijan’s budget vulnerable to downturns in the price of
oil is the country’s difficulty in collecting tax payments from state enterprises. The tangled web
of arrears by state enterprises, most significantly, SOCAR, undermines the state’s revenue col-
lection. Because of investment incentives granted as part of the negotiated contracts, foreign
oil companies are not the largest contributors of tax revenues. That role is held by SOCAR,
which provides about one-third of the government’s revenues, but is also the largest debtor.
SOCAR’s debt is a result of its having to provide large subsidies, such as supplying fuel to non-
paying state-owned enterprises, paying Iran for energy provided to southern Azerbaijan, and
paying for refugee needs. For example, SOCAR purchases gas from Russia, which it resells
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to households at a significant loss. Even at that discounted price, most households cannot
afford to pay. The IMF estimates that underpricing and nonpayment for supplies of energy
by SOCAR represented about 27 percent of GDP in 2000.43
As of October 2001, SOCAR was responsible for 47 percent of all arrears to the budget,
an amount equal to about 5.1 percent of 2001 GDP.44 Starting in 1996, the government has
issued a series of laws to mitigate the arrears problem. If implemented, a decree on privatiz-
ing enterprises in the fuel and energy sector, which would put about 100 enterprises up for
sale, could improve service and payment collection by these companies. Although the situa-
tion has been improving, state-owned enterprises still accounted for 84 percent of all tax
arrears in 2001.45
One important change that will allow SOCAR to be more profit-oriented is the creation
of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy in April 2001. The new ministry is responsible for devel-
oping a fuel and energy development strategy, for entering into contracts with foreign pro-
ducers on behalf of the government (and taking over SOCAR’s role under existing PSAs), as
well as developing business in the hydrocarbon sector. Another change that will improve
SOCAR’s cash flow is the February 2003 decree of President Aliyev allowing SOCAR to retain
its profits rather than channeling them to the State Oil Fund.46 With the creation of the min-
istry and the change in Oil Fund rules, SOCAR should be better able to focus on pursuing
commercial ends: producing, refining, and marketing oil and gas. 
Oil and Gas Revenue Potential
Azerbaijan has signed over 21 PSAs for development of various onshore and offshore oil fields
(see Appendix 2), but only the contract for the development of the ACG fields, run by the
AIOC, has resulted in significant oil findings.47 New exploration since Azerbaijan’s inde-
pendence has been disappointing, with only one significant find—the Shah-Deniz gas field—
in the Azeri portion of the Caspian Sea. The AIOC agreement is a 30-year, $10 billion contract
with 10 investors. BP, the project operator, estimates that the field contains at least 5.2 bil-
lion barrels of recoverable oil.48 Oil production began in 1997, and this contract is the only off-
shore one currently in the production stage. In early 2003, AIOC was producing 145,000
barrels per day (bpd) and is expected to reach 400,000 bpd by 2004 when phase one of the
contract has been achieved. With the implementation of phases two and three, production is
expected to peak at 1 million bpd by 2009.
Natural gas production in Azerbaijan is comparatively limited and falls short of meet-
ing domestic needs, with the gap between domestic supply covered by imports from Russia.
Azerbaijan’s largest field, the Shah-Deniz, considered its largest natural gas discovery in over
20 years, is estimated to contain between 25 and 39 trillion cubic feet of gas.49 Although the
field is large, Azerbaijan’s total gas reserves are still small, at 0.5 percent of world total. Pro-
duction at Shah-Deniz, which is expected to begin in early 2006, depends on construction of
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the Baku-Erzurum pipeline to deliver the gas and also hinges on whether Turkey, which is
already awash with imported gas, will be able to absorb the additional volume.50 Development
of the first stage of the Shah-Deniz field was sanctioned in February 2003. Other smaller gas
fields include Bakhar, Nakhchivan Bula-Deniz, and Gunashli. 
Production of gas has declined primarily because SOCAR has had to divert almost all prof-
its to social expenditures and has been unable to explore new fields. Appendix 3 summarizes
Azerbaijan’s oil and gas production from 1990 to the present. Appendix 3 demonstrates SOCAR’s
declining production, with total production in Azerbaijan resuscitated by AIOC in 1998.
Given identified reserves and established production schedules, Azerbaijan’s currently
known oil reserves are expected to last for about 30 years. Production is expected to peak
around 2010. After 2012, unless new reserves are discovered, a rapid decline will drop pro-
duction to a quarter of the peak level by 2024.51
Profit oil
Like many PSAs, Azerbaijan’s operate on a profit oil basis, that is, sharing the volumes of oil
produced between the contractor and the host government. This means that contractors are
permitted to recover investment costs (operating and capital costs) before full profit-sharing
begins. For Azerbaijan’s biggest block of fields, the ACG, 50 percent of the profits are used
by the consortium partners for cost recovery up until the time the oil companies have com-
pletely recovered their investments plus interest. Capital recovery for the consortium partners
is projected to rise from $569 million in 2001 to over $3 billion in 2010.52 If the price of oil
remains high, the capital recovery may be completed sooner. 
Once capital recovery is complete, 50 percent of the profits will go to SOCAR, as the rep-
resentative of the government. The other 50 percent is available for profit sharing between the
government and the consortium partners. This 50 percent is shared between the consortium
and the government of Azerbaijan based on an index that takes transport costs and rate of
return into account. Under this index, the government’s share increases as the rate of return
to the investor increases. 
Table 3 shows the production-sharing scheme for the ACG contract:53
TABLE 3. ACG Early Oil Sharing Agreement
Share of Early Oil (Percent of Total)
Rate of Return SOCAR Contractor   
< 16.75 30 70
Between 16.75 & 22.75 55 45
> 22.75 80 20
Source: Agreement on the Joint Development and Production Sharing for the Azeri and Chirag Fields and the Deep
Water Portion of the Gunashli Field in the Azerbaijan Sector of the Caspian Sea, 1994.
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Thus, for example, until capital costs are recovered and assuming that the rate of return
is less than 16.75 percent, the government receives 30 percent of 50 percent of the profits, or
about $15 for every $100 dollars of profit. This is the current rate of profitability for the proj-
ect.54 Assuming the same rate of return, once capital recovery is complete, the government
will receive 50 percent of the profits plus 30 percent of the other half of the profits, or $65
for every $100 of profit. The government will receive additional revenues from SOCAR, which
owns a 10 percent share in the ACG block of fields, after SOCAR has repaid the consortium
partners for helping finance SOCAR’s share in the investment.
For the other Azerbaijani offshore PSAs, production sharing is determined by first cal-
culating a profit factor, R, and then sharing profits based on the profitability of the field.55
In the lowest profitability bracket, Azerbaijan receives 50 percent of the profit, and in the 
highest, 90 percent.
It is important to take cost recovery into account when considering Azerbaijan’s GDP
growth and assessing the revenues that will be available to the government. According to a
World Bank macroeconomic projection for Azerbaijan, oil sector capital repatriation from
2000–2010 will exceed $15 billion, even though these amounts are included in GDP projec-
tions for the country. A more accurate prediction of growth is the adjusted gross national
income (AGNI) projection, which does not include oil sector and other net factor payments in
GDP calculation.56 Under this measure, the country’s AGNI amounts to 68 percent of its GDP
in 2010, when capital recovery for the ACG is slated to end. Hence, although GDP is expected
to increase at an annual rate of 13 percent between 2001–2010, the resources available to Azer-
baijan will increase at a lower annual rate of 5 percent.
Bonuses
As of early 2002, the government of Azerbaijan had received $630 million in bonuses.57
These bonuses have played an important role in bringing the government budget deficit
under control.
All Azerbaijan’s offshore PSAs stipulate payment of bonuses at various stages. Typically,
the first bonus payment is made within 30 days of the contract going into effect. Subsequent
bonuses depend on the achievement of various targets. In 11 of the 15 approved offshore con-
tracts, there are small additional bonuses depending on the volume of production. These
bonuses range from $1 million to $5 million for each 100 million barrels of oil produced. A
final bonus is typically included as well. In eight contracts, the payment of the final bonus is
made within 30 days after either 1) average daily production of 12,000 barrels of oil for 60
days has been reached; or 2) two wells have stable industrial production for 60 days. Four other
contracts require payment of the final bonus (in amounts ranging from $25–40 million) within
30 days after average daily production of 12,000 barrels for 60 days has been achieved.
According to the ACG PSA, the maximum bonus that can be paid by the ACG con-
tractors is set at $300 million and is paid in three stages.58 The first installment, constituting
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50 percent of this amount, was paid 30 days after the contract became effective. The second
payment of 25 percent was paid within 30 days after average daily production of 40,000 bar-
rels of oil was maintained for 60 days. The last 25 percent of the bonus will be paid within
30 days after oil is pumped through the main export pipeline for 60 days.
Taxation
Taxation provisions vary from contract to contract and are typically the most complex part of
the PSA’s revenue provisions. However, certain rules are common across the Azerbaijani
PSAs. Some of these are:
 Recognition of double taxation treaties.
 Profit tax is set at the rate that existed in Azerbaijan at the time of contract signing. (The
first two PSAs are exceptions to this rule. They set the profit tax rate at 25 percent, which
is less than the profit tax rate that existed at the time of signing).
 In case of contradiction between contract terms and legal acts in force in the country,
the contract terms prevail.
 SOCAR is responsible for paying tax on behalf of all consortium members.
 The contractor has the right to ask SOCAR for a document confirming its payment of
the profit tax. The contractor also has the right to retain an auditor to inspect the ful-
fillment of these obligations by SOCAR.
 The Tax Inspectorate deals only with SOCAR. In case of violation of its tax commitments
by SOCAR, the contractor has the right to start paying tax itself.
 The contractor bears responsibility for paying taxes from nonhydrocarbon activities on
its own.
 The VAT is paid at a zero rate.
 Incomes of Azeri national employees and resident foreign employees are taxable.
 The contractor, the operating company, and foreign subcontractors make payments to
social security, employment, and pension funds.
Assignment fees
Another source of government revenues from PSAs comes when contractors sell all or part
of their shares in a project. The government earns income by taxing the profit obtained from
the sale of contract shares or by selling its own SOCAR-held shares. In 1995, unable to meet
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its commitments to finance its participation in the ACG contract, the government sold 10 per-
cent of its share to Exxon and TPAO for $173 million.59
Acreage fees
Acreage fees constitute a smaller portion of government earnings. All PSAs except for the ACG
provide for acreage fees for exploration of oil and gas deposits. These range from $1,200 to
$2,000 per square kilometer. The largest exploratory block, the Alov-Araz-Sarq, at 1,400 square
kilometers yielded acreage fees of $2.8 million in 2001.60 
Right to purchase petroleum
Although not a source of revenue, an additional benefit for the government is the right to pur-
chase on favorable terms up to 10 percent of petroleum produced by the contractor at defined
points of delivery and sale. The PSAs define the terms of purchase, pricing, and tax exemp-
tion. This provision helps the government of Azerbaijan with its enduring problem of domes-
tic energy shortages, and also sustains domestic refineries, which have been operating at half
of capacity for the last 10 years.
Lease payments
Lease payments are made by foreign contractors for the right to use property owned by the
government of Azerbaijan, such as pipelines, tankers, drilling rigs, and offices. The fact that
many of these facilities are owned by SOCAR may create a conflict of interest. Whereas
SOCAR benefits from high lease payments, the additional costs reduce profit oil available to
the state. In 2001, SOCAR earned $479,000 in lease payments. 
Azerbaijan’s earnings from oil and gas development
The ACG represents the largest potential for Azerbaijan’s petroleum revenue. By comparing
AIOC data on production forecasts with the profit petroleum terms of the ACG PSA, it is
possible to determine the government of Azerbaijan’s likely earnings from the sale of its share
of oil from this block of fields. Because of the unavailability of certain data, these figures should
only be seen as estimates. Appendix 4 explains the methodology used for making these cal-
culations, and provides estimated government earnings under two oil price scenarios. At a
high price of $25 per barrel from 2003 through 2010, the government of Azerbaijan’s share
of profit oil from the ACG will amount to about $16 billion. At a lower oil price of $18 per
barrel, Azerbaijan’s total earnings come to $7.2 billion (see Table 6).61 However, if the prices
at the time of publication of more than $30 per barrel persist, both of these scenarios will be
too low. Moreover, these figures do not include the amount that SOCAR will earn as a con-
tractor with 10 percent of the share in ACG.
In addition to its earnings from profit oil on the ACG, the government of Azerbaijan
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is to receive the remaining 25 percent bonus payment amounting to $67.5 million, due in late
2004 or early 2005. Once production begins on the Shah-Deniz in 2006, a bonus of $50 mil-
lion will also be due.
The government also earns revenue from taxes paid by the AIOC during development
of ACG. The largest of these is the profit tax, which is 25 percent. Prediction of these earnings
is complicated by the absence of information about the taxable profit base, which is determined
after expenditures associated with oil sales (transport and others) have been deducted. If one
were to assume that such expenses comprise 10 percent of the taxable base, then at oil prices
of $25 per barrel, profit tax would bring in $2.04 billion between 2003 and 2010. At $18 per
barrel, profit tax would stand at $1.46 billion. Appendix 4 breaks this down on an annual basis
and explains the methodology for calculation. Additional tax revenues will derive from income
taxes levied on the consortium’s local resident employees.
Earnings from acreage fees for the other fields under exploration can also be calculated,
based on the size of the plots and the fees stipulated in the associated PSAs. By the time explo-
ration should be complete in 2007, these fees should amount to $16 million, unless certain
PSAs are terminated prematurely for failure to find oil and gas reserves sufficiently large to
develop.
Table 4 summarizes the anticipated payments, including payments to SOFAZ and
SOFAR, from the ACG PSA based on the analysis of this report. Due to incomplete access to
information about ACG production, certain parameters had to be estimated, and therefore
cannot be relied on for accuracy. According to a regional review produced by project partners
of the ACG, cumulative Azerbaijan government revenues by 2024 from that field alone will
range from $21 billion to $58 billion, depending on oil price assumptions.62
TABLE 4. Forecast of Azerbaijan’s earnings from ACG production-sharing agreement, 2003–2010, million USD
Crude Oil Prices, $/barrel
25 18
Flow to SOFAZ from ACG PSA 14,314.3 6,537.3
Flow to SOCAR from ACG PSA 906.5 647.2
Bonuses from ACG PSA 67.5 67.5
Profit tax from ACG PSA 2,039.6 1,456.2
Total: 17,327.9 8,708.2
Source: Analysis from Appendix 4, based on data provided by AIOC
Between 2003–2010, Azerbaijan will also earn revenues from the development of the
large offshore gas field, the Shah-Deniz. Estimating earnings from the Shah-Deniz gas field
is more difficult. Originally, construction was to begin in 2002, but it only received a green
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light in 2003, with completion now estimated for 2006. According to the AIOC project
partners, development of stage 1 of the Shah-Deniz gas field and earnings from trans-
porting the gas through the BTE pipeline will bring the government of Azerbaijan $3.5
billion by 2031.63 
An additional source of revenue is from sale of oil produced by SOCAR in Soviet-era
fields and shipped via pipeline to the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. In
2001, SOCAR shipped 2.5 million tons of oil to Novorossiysk. The oil is sold by tender to
upstream oil companies. In 2001, sale of this oil brought in $366 million for SOCAR.64
Additionally, SOCAR transports petroleum products by rail to the Georgian port of Batumi
for export to other countries. In 2001, these products amounted to 2.2 million tons. The gov-
ernment also receives tariffs collected by the state railway company, by the port of Baku, and
by SOCAR for use of its oil terminals by foreign companies transporting Kazakh and Turk-
men oil by rail.
Oversight of PSAs
Azerbaijan’s PSAs include provisions for establishment of a steering committee that monitors
oil production and cost calculations. The steering committee consists of an equal number of
SOCAR and contractor representatives. The committee’s responsibilities include: 
 Oversight of oil and gas operations,
 Examination, revision, and approval of annual work programs and budgets,
 Supervision of cost accounting to determine compliance with contract terms,
 Review and approval of abandonment plan and cost of abandonment operations.
While the purview of this supervisory council is broad, the ACG PSA does not specify
what power the steering committee has to obtain access to the information it needs, nor what
becomes of the committee’s recommendations. Since the reports of the steering committee
are confidential, this limits the opportunity for independent oversight to determine whether
the government is receiving its fair share of earnings.
State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ)
The State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) was established in December 1999 by presidential
decree. Even before the decree, a special account had been opened at the National Bank to ster-
ilize payments received as oil bonuses. By keeping the received foreign exchange out of the
monetary system, sterilization helps stabilize the country’s exchange rate. The IMF made
receipt of a loan through its Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) conditional upon
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the creation of a more formal fund, with explicit operating, investment, and expenditure rules.
The Azerbaijani government worked closely with the IMF and the World Bank in designing
its oil fund.65 Government reforms supported by the IMF under its three-year Poverty Reduc-
tion and Growth Facility (PRGF), approved in July 2001, included Oil Fund budget and asset
management rules. 
The Oil Fund’s creation was also motivated by the understanding on the part of Azeri
authorities of the problems encountered by other developing countries in managing their
petroleum wealth. SOFAZ’s annual report explains, “The experience of oil rich countries sug-
gests that oil revenues easily gained are not always rationally used. Indeed, excessively high
misuse and internal dealing can be observed in most cases. . . . Preventing such misuse and
strengthening financial discipline . . . were also major reasons for establishment of the State
Oil Fund.”66
SOFAZ has already had positive effects. Not only has it helped mitigate real exchange
rate appreciation, but it has also improved Azerbaijan’s image among foreign investors. The
international rating agency, Fitch, raised Azerbaijan’s rating to BB- in 2002, and specifically
attributed this upgrade to the creation of the Oil Fund.
The Oil Fund is unusual in that it has neither a clear stabilization or savings function
but its rules are ambiguous enough to allow it to be used for either. A stabilization function would
establish rules by which the Oil Fund could help cushion the budget against oil price shocks. A
savings fund puts aside a portion of resource revenues into a trust so that the interest on the
trust can continue to generate income even when oil or mineral reserves have been depleted. 
SOFAZ’s founding documents suggest that it will be used for human development
and promotion of the non-oil sector. However, criteria on how expenditures are to be cho-
sen have not been adopted, leading to expenditures as diverse as assistance to refugees and
funding the SOCAR participation in construction of the BTC pipeline. Like the Kazakh
National Fund, SOFAZ is subordinated directly to the president and lacks sufficient mech-
anisms for oversight.
Revenue rules
According to the regulations establishing SOFAZ, its mission is to sterilize foreign currency
earned from the country’s oil and gas contracts, and to effectively manage these assets “in
the interest of citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan and their future generations.”67
One thing that distinguishes SOFAZ from other oil funds is that revenues do not
depend on the price of oil or on the state budget. Many natural resource funds, such as Kazakh-
stan’s, Chile’s, and Venezuela’s channel excess export revenues above a certain benchmark to
their fund. In this regard, SOFAZ most resembles the Alaska Permanent Fund, which receives
50 percent of oil proceeds regardless of what is happening with the budget, or the Kuwaiti
Fund, which receives 10 percent of all government revenues. 
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The revenues that flow to the Oil Fund include:68
 Revenues from sale of the state’s share of oil and gas from PSAs, except for the revenues
earned by SOCAR as a contractor to the PSAs;
 Bonus payments;
 Dividends and profit-sharing accorded to the government as stipulated in the PSAs;
 Acreage fees for land use;
 Government earnings from the transport of oil and gas through the BTC and BTE
pipelines;
 Revenues received from the sale of project assets by foreign companies to the govern-
ment of Azerbaijan;
 Revenues from other sources permitted by legislation; 
 Revenues from grants; 
 Earnings generated by SOFAZ’s investment activity, including interest payments, div-
idends, and income from the rebalancing of foreign-exchange portfolios.
While taxes paid by SOCAR and foreign oil companies flow to the budget, the Oil Fund
receives all the proceeds from the state’s share of oil exports through the PSAs, as well as all
other payments stemming from these contracts. In its revenue rules, Azerbaijan has been
aggressive in channeling a large portion of its oil revenues away from the budget. The risk is
that with no stabilization mechanism in place, SOFAZ cannot transfer revenues back to the
budget in times of need. In the case of an oil price shock, the government may end up tak-
ing advantage of the ambiguity surrounding SOFAZ’s expenditure rules (see below) to buy
government securities and thereby cover its budget deficit. Finance Minister Alekbarov has
already proposed such an idea. The risk is that the Ministry of Finance could, for example,
lower the yield on its bonds to reduce its cost of servicing debt, knowing that in a crisis SOFAZ
would step in to buy bonds. One can easily imagine that under such a scenario, SOFAZ would
become the biggest creditor to the government and its resources would dissipate in the gen-
eral flow of government expenditures.
After its 2001 audit of SOFAZ, Ernst & Young found a number of ambiguities in the
revenue rules. Ernst & Young could not conclude whether SOFAZ should have received cer-
tain payments that it did not. These included termination and abandonment payments, rev-
enues earned from the sale of oil from onshore fields, cash proceeds from joint activities with
foreign companies, certain rental fees for the use of state property by foreign companies, and
payments from pipeline transit tariffs in 2000. The auditor could not determine whether the
president’s decrees of December 29, 1999, and of December 29, 2000, which include among
SOFAZ’s revenue streams “other revenues obtained as a result of joint activities with foreign
companies,” applied to these payments. 
SOFAZ’s annual report provides a detailed breakdown of its sources of revenue in 2000
and 2001.69 As Table 5 shows, three-quarters of SOFAZ’s revenues in 2001 came from the
state’s share of profit oil sales. While bonuses made up a large portion of revenues in 2000,
the next sizeable bonuses will not be paid until 2004 or 2005, unless new PSAs are signed
in the interim. No revenues from gas sales appear in the Fund. These will begin after 2006
when the Shah-Deniz field is expected to begin production. By September 2002, an additional
$174 million had accumulated from bonus payments, giving SOFAZ a balance of $627 mil-
lion. As of January 2003, the Fund’s assets stood at $692 million.
TABLE 5. SOFAZ Revenues, 2000–2001, $ million
Sources of Income 2000 2001
Sale of profit oil 162.3 177.8
Bonuses 100 6.4
Per-acre payments — 10.7
Lease payments 0.36 0.48
Sale of assets — —
Placement of funds — 14
Transit fees 8.3 11.8
Total: $271.9 $221.3
Source: State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2001 Annual Report
Forecasted earnings of SOFAZ
With the analysis of production forecasts and the terms of Azerbaijan’s production-sharing
agreements (see Appendix 4), it is possible to forecast revenues to the Oil Fund. Table 6 pro-
vides forecasts of earnings to SOFAZ only from implementation of the ACG PSA between
2003–2010 under two oil price scenarios and net of estimated operating expenses. At $25
per barrel, from 2003 to 2010 SOFAZ can accumulate over $14.3 billion. At $18 per barrel,
earnings will be over $6.5 billion. Revenues from ACG are expected to peak in 2011 and decline
to less than half of that peak by 2017. Since neither ACG project partners nor SOFAZ have
provided estimates of flows to SOFAZ in coming years, these forecasts cannot be confirmed.
1 1 0 S T A T E  O I L  F U N D  O F  T H E  A Z E R B A I J A N  R E P U B L I C
TABLE 6. Forecasted Flows (in $ millions) to SOFAZ from Development of ACG, 2003–2010
Crude
Prices, Total
$/barrel 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2003–2010
Profit Oil 25 165.0 222.3 309.9 484.8 1,419.8 2,227.9 2,747.3 8,327.8 15,904.8
of Azerbaijan
flow to SOFAZ 148.5 200.1 278.9 436.3 1,277.8 2,005.1 2,472.6 7,495.0 14,314.3
Profit Oil 18 115.2 155.2 216.0 337.3 987.7 1,549.8 1,911.1 1,991.4 7,263.7
of Azerbaijan
flow to SOFAZ 103.7 139.7 194.4 303.6 888.9 1,394.8 1,720.0 1,792.3 6,537.3
*Flows to SOFAZ are calculated net of transport, insurance, and other expenses that are estimated at 10 percent of
profit oil. The large jump in expected revenues to SOFAZ between 2009 and 2010 is due to the expected completion
of cost recovery by ACG partners and the subsequent receipt of that share of profits by the government. 
Source: Analysis of Appendix 4, based on data provided by AIOC
Bonuses also flow to SOFAZ. Remaining bonuses are a $67.5 million final bonus for
development of ACG in late 2004/early 2005 and a $50 million bonus when Shah-Deniz
begins production in 2006. If additional PSAs are signed, or if large, new reserves are dis-
covered in the contract areas, bonus payments will be larger.
SOFAZ is also due to receive acreage fees that should come to about:
 $7.2 million between 2002–2004
 $5.6 million in 2005
 $2.8 million between 2006–2007
Acreage fees can be larger if the duration of current agreements is extended or if new
agreements are signed. 
SOFAZ also receives transit fees from the state’s share in the Baku-Supsa pipeline and,
eventually, from the BTC pipeline. Currently, SOFAZ receives $0.26 per barrel of oil shipped
through Baku-Supsa. In the first five months of 2002, this amounted to $321,500 in earn-
ings for SOFAZ, and if the AIOC met its production targets for that year, the budgeted amount
of $500,000 from this source would be exceeded. Revenues from the lease of state property,
which came to less than $500,000 in 2001, are likely to remain small and will not contribute
significantly to SOFAZ’s revenues. Finally, SOFAZ also receives earnings from its investments,
which in 2001 came to $14.25 million. These are described in the section on investment.
Figure 3 demonstrates the relationship forecasted between the size of the Oil Fund and
the government’s budget. By 2005, the Oil Fund will be almost the size of the government’s
budget, and by 2010, as ACG approaches its peak production, the Fund will be more than three
times as large as the budget.
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Source: Know-How Fund, Ministry of Finance, Azerbaijan Republic. Analysis of Trend Information Agency.
Expenditure rules
Rules for spending SOFAZ’s resources are lax. Expenditure guidelines are extremely general
and entirely at the discretion of the president. According to the regulations, the Fund can be
used for the “socio-economic progress of the country,” for “solving the most important national
problems,” and for “construction and reconstruction of strategically significant infrastruc-
ture facilities.”70 The Rules for Preparation and Execution of the Annual Budget for SOFAZ
state that expenditure plans should take into account the “necessity to promote the develop-
ment and increase the competitiveness of the non-oil sector of the national economy.”71 
Given current expenditures, it appears that unless a long-term expenditure strategy is
developed, SOFAZ will serve as a secondary budget—a pot of money to be dipped into when
other means cannot be found. SOFAZ is also vulnerable to raiding by presidents seeking to
boost their popularity prior to an election. Because SOFAZ is primarily a savings fund, not a
stabilization fund, it is critical for it to have an expenditure plan. Already, expenditures have
been directed toward projects ranging from building homes for internally displaced persons
to helping pay the state’s share of pipeline costs. Without an expenditure strategy, spending
will continue to be ad hoc and the subject of dispute. 
Three presidential decrees have authorized SOFAZ spending on the needs of internally
displaced persons after the Red Cross and the World Food Program reduced funding for this
purpose.72 A controversial presidential decree in 2002 allocated SOFAZ expenditures in sup-
port of a commercial project in the oil sector, the BTC pipeline. Faced with liquidity problems,
SOCAR lacked the means to pay for its share of the pipeline, and was reluctant to sell shares
to outside partners. The president’s decree of July 30, 2002 authorizes the Oil Fund to pay
$118 million to cover SOCAR’s obligations. 
Critics of the latter decree objected to the large amount of resources being channeled
back into the oil sector instead of being used to promote the non-oil sector. The absence of
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public discussion or parliamentary involvement in making this decision also raised concerns.
Moreover, the transfer may violate SOFAZ prohibitions against lending to state institutions
or bearing any commitments on behalf of any other entity.73 Supporters of the decree pointed
to the lack of alternative sources of financing and the project’s strategic significance.
The IMF at first objected to using the Oil Fund to finance part of SOFAZ’s share in
the BTC pipeline because it was inconsistent with the Fund’s budget and asset management
rules. “The resources of the State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijani Republic cannot be used to pay
for SOCAR’s share in the project to construct the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, “announced
John Odling-Smee of the IMF.74 In its Article IV Consultation, the IMF elaborated that the
“diversion of oil fund assets to finance oil sector investments would undermine its stated pur-
pose of enhancing the development of the non-energy sector of the economy.”75 
However, recognizing the importance of the project for the future development of the
country, the IMF has since agreed that the use of some government money, including the $118
million in pre-2000 oil bonus money on deposit with the National Bank of Azerbaijan, to
finance SOCAR’s equity stake in BTC would be appropriate, even though it contradicts
SOFAZ’s asset management rules. The government has agreed to transfer the ownership stake
in BTC from the Oil Fund to the Ministry of Economic Development (the owner of govern-
ment equity stakes in other companies) so that the Oil Fund expenditures remain consistent
with the asset management rules. 
Management
SOFAZ is an independent legal entity and an off-budget institution with its own administra-
tive structure. Foreign oil companies deposit payments to SOFAZ into the Oil Fund’s special
account at the National Bank.76 The executive director, who is appointed and can be dismissed
by the president, operates the Fund. 
The director chooses an investment strategy in line with the rules “On Storage, Place-
ment, and Management of the State Oil Fund’s Foreign Currency Resources” (approved by
decree no. 511). The strategy must outline portfolio structure and volumes, asset liquidity,
acceptable credit risks, and portfolio management efficiency requirements. Annually, this
investment strategy and comments to it by the supervisory council must be submitted to the
president for approval. Management of a portion of the Fund’s assets may be contracted out
to external portfolio managers.77 However, the number of managers that can be hired and
other contract conditions have not been elaborated. 
Within SOFAZ, an investment board reviews developments in financial markets and
provides guidance on investment opportunities. The board consists of SOFAZ’s executive
director and senior officials of relevant SOFAZ departments. Local and foreign consultants
may be invited to attend board meetings. 
In addition to managing the Fund’s investments, the director is responsible for prepar-
ing SOFAZ’s budget in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance. They are expected to pre-
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dict the Fund’s earnings based on a medium-term outlook, and to propose expenditures in line
with the Fund’s mandate to promote the nation’s socioeconomic well-being. The budget, along
with comments provided by the supervisory council, must be submitted to the president for
approval by September 20 of the preceding year.
Understaffing is a big challenge for SOFAZ’s management. SOFAZ has only six full-
time staff including the executive director. By contrast, Alaska’s Permanent Fund employs
32, and Alberta’s Heritage Fund has 18 staff.  Moreover, Alaska and Alberta—unlike SOFAZ—
hire external portfolio managers to help with investments. An additional burden for the staff
of SOFAZ is their responsibility for planning how the Fund’s assets are to be spent. Other nat-
ural resource funds, such as Alaska, Nunavut, and Alberta, divide investment and expenditure
divisions among different bodies.
Investments
To date, a detailed investment strategy has not been developed for SOFAZ. The “Rules for
Keeping, Depositing, and Managing SOFAZ’s Hard Currency Resources” outline qualifica-
tions for financial institutions where the Fund’s resources may be kept, but they do not spec-
ify an investment strategy. Pursuant to these rules, Samir Sharifov, SOFAZ’s executive director,
undertook preparation of an investment manual, Instructions for In-house Management of
SOFAZ’s Hard Currency Assets.
According to the rules, the Fund’s foreign exchange assets can be denominated in four
currencies: U.S. dollars, Euros, British pounds, and Japanese yen. The assets can be held in
central and commercial banks in the form of bonds issued by governments or state agencies
with high credit ratings, securities issued by international financial institutions such as the
World Bank, and promissory notes of highly rated commercial banks. There are no territo-
rial restrictions on the Fund’s investments, such as there are in Norway. For placing the Fund’s
resources in banks, only institutions with a long-term credit rating no lower than AA (S&P,
Fitch) or AA3 (Moody’s) may qualify. Since Azerbaijan’s credit rating is BB- (Fitch), SOFAZ’s
reserves may not be kept in Azerbaijan.  
Although not yet exercised, the rules permit giving a portion of the investment portfo-
lio to foreign managers and also allow them to invest in corporate securities.  However, guide-
lines specifying the portion of the portfolio that can be outsourced have not been issued and
this option has not yet been exercised. Beyond this exception, the Oil Fund may not be invested
in corporate securities, corporate equity, corporate debt, precious metals, real estate, or any
currency except the four mentioned above. 
During 2000 and 2001, Sharifov and the SOFAZ staff chose a conservative investment
strategy, placing the holdings entirely in liquid foreign bank accounts. The fact that SOFAZ
was understaffed may have played a part in the choice of such a conservative approach, as
did the downturn in financial markets. As a result, earnings were low. Returns for 2001 were
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3.9 percent, or $14 million. By contrast, Kazakhstan’s National Fund, which invested in equi-
ties and securities, earned a 5.5 percent rate of return, even in the turbulent market of 2001.
If SOFAZ is to serve as a source of renewable wealth, it will have to adopt a more balanced
investment strategy, and should take advantage of professional external portfolio managers for
this purpose.  
The government is developing a more diversified investment policy that, according to
SOFAZ’s annual report, was to be put into effect in 2002. In the last quarter of 2001, a deci-
sion was made to hire external managers but no announcements of open tenders have
appeared on SOFAZ’s website. 
Accountability
Even more than in Kazakhstan, all lines of control over the Oil Fund lead back to the presi-
dent (see Appendix 5). One of the first provisions in the Fund’s regulations states, “The Fund
shall be accountable and responsible to the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” 78 There
are no limitations to the president’s discretion. There are no checks and balances to provide
oversight. All strategic decisions are made by the president, including the decision to liqui-
date the Fund altogether. 
In most oil funds, parliament plays some role in spending decisions. In Norway, for
example, the parliament determines transfers to and from the oil fund by running surpluses
or deficits in its non-oil budget. The parliament may also vote on additional expenditures, as
it did recently in deciding to return a portion of interest earnings to the state budget. In Alaska,
the legislature decides every year on what to do with the Fund’s earnings. In Kazakhstan,
expenditure decisions, although made by the president, have to be approved through the bud-
getary process. By contrast, parliament has no role whatsoever in Azerbaijan. This absence
of a role for parliament does not fit with the Oil Fund’s function of serving to protect “the inter-
ests of citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan and their future generations.”79 Members of par-
liament are elected by Azerbaijan’s citizens and, as such, should have a voice in decisions over
how the country’s wealth is being stored and spent.  
In December 2002, in a surprise to many, the IMF suspended the final $17 million
tranche of its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) loan to Azerbaijan. In explain-
ing its decisions, the IMF stated that the Oil Fund’s “well-designed rules have been repeatedly
ignored. A series of ad hoc decisions have been made regarding the use of Oil Fund assets.
This practice has undermined the consistency and coherence of fiscal policy in Azerbaijan.”80
Among the IMF’s concerns were the absence of a law on the Oil Fund, insufficient expendi-
ture controls on the Oil Fund, the fact that flows to and from SOFAZ did not pass through a
unified budget, and the absence of a long-term strategy for using the country’s oil and gas earn-
ings. The IMF also feared that the preferential enterprise tax zones established by the gov-
ernment would encourage tax evasion. 
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In the ensuing negotiations, the government of Azerbaijan rejected strengthening par-
liamentary oversight through the adoption of a law on SOFAZ. It did, however, agree to intro-
duce changes to the budget law that would require expenditures from the Oil Fund to be
reported in the budget. If the government carries through with these changes, they will be a
modest step in improving expenditure control. The Ministry of Finance would still not be
required to detail how SOFAZ expenditures will be used, nor will the change give parliament
much added control because the legislature does not possess line item amendment power. 
The supervisory council (see Appendix 5) resembles the one overseeing Kazakhstan’s
National Fund. Both are appointed by and subordinated to the president.  Both serve in a con-
sultative capacity and have no power to enforce decisions. Both are also almost entirely com-
prised of representatives of the executive branch. In Azerbaijan, the only members of the
supervisory council not directly subordinated to the president are two parliamentary repre-
sentatives and the president of the Academy of Sciences. The parliamentary members, how-
ever, are from the president’s party and are unlikely to take an independent stand. Similarly,
the Academy of Sciences is financed with government money, and the head of the Academy
cannot be approved without the informal consent of the president.
The stated composition and powers of the supervisory council are extremely general.
According to the regulations, it shall contain “representatives from relevant state bodies and
public organizations, as well as other persons.” However, the relevant state bodies are not
spelled out, and the number of representatives from public organizations is not specified. Pro-
cedural rules were approved in July 2002, but have not been made public. It is therefore
unclear what voting procedures and quorum requirements exist, and also what powers the
council has. While the director of SOFAZ consults with and provides information to the super-
visory council, he is ultimately accountable only to the president, to whom he reports directly
and who approves the annual investment strategy for the Oil Fund.
The council is currently comprised of 10 members, who were approved by presidential
decree no. 855 of December 27, 2001. No representatives of public organizations sit on the
council. At the end of 2002, it was comprised of the following individuals: 
 Prime Minister Artur Rasi-zadeh
 First Deputy Chairman of Parliament Arif Rahim-zadeh
 First Vice President of SOCAR, and son of President Aliyev, Ilham Aliyev
 State Advisor on Economic Policy Vahid Akhundov
 Minister of Finance Avaz Alekperov
 Minister of Economic Development Farhad Aliyev
 Chairman of the State Securities Committee Heydar Babayev
S T A T E  O I L  F U N D  O F  T H E  A Z E R B A I J A N  R E P U B L I C 1 1 7
 Governor of the National Bank Elman Rustamov
 Member of Parliament Ali Abbasov
 President of the Academy of Sciences Makhmud Kerimov
The supervisory council is expected to provide feedback on the annual budget prepared
by SOFAZ’s executive director. To do this, the director must share with the council informa-
tion about SOFAZ’s asset utilization program, including its investment policy and an estimate
of SOFAZ’s operational expenditures. The council is expected to provide recommendations.
However, its capacity for oversight and meaningful commentary was brought into question
during its first meeting on July 16, 2002, when not a single question or comment was made
in response to the presentations about SOFAZ’s earnings and expenditures to date.
There is reason to believe that the supervisory council will play an even weaker role than
envisioned by its rules. The regulations state that the council will meet not less than once a
quarter, yet the council has met only twice since the establishment of the Oil Fund in 1999.
In addition to the supervisory council, outside auditors also provide oversight. In 2001,
Ernst & Young was selected to audit SOFAZ and the results of the audit are included in the
Fund’s annual report. Additionally, the parliament’s Chamber of Accounts is also entitled to
audit SOFAZ at its discretion, but there are no provisions for the disclosure of the results of
such an audit.
Transparency
Azerbaijan’s disclosure policies regarding oil proceeds are fairly transparent. In contrast to
Kazakhstan where no PSAs have been made public, in Azerbaijan, BP, operator of the ACG
and Shah-Deniz projects, has made the projects’ PSAs and environmental and social impact
assessments available in English, Azeri, and Russian.   
SOFAZ’s website (www.oilfund.az), which contains its annual report, is also fairly com-
prehensive. The annual report specifically refers to transparency as a key  objective. “One of
the Oil Fund’s basic operating principles is to ensure transparency in its activities, which are
open to both official and public scrutiny.”81 Accordingly, the website includes the regulations
governing the oil fund, the annual report, and announcements of tenders, such as the tender
for legal services and for an external auditor, posted in February 2002. 
The annual report is a substantial 60-page document. It describes the legal and admin-
istrative framework of SOFAZ, and provides the names of the supervisory council’s members.
The financial data is also thorough, and includes breakdowns of all proceeds from each rev-
enue stream. For example, each bonus payment is detailed, each transfer from profit oil sales
is described, each payment received from acreage fees is reported, and so on for each source
of revenues to SOFAZ. The banks with which SOFAZ has opened settlement and depository
accounts are named. The auditor’s financial statements and their corresponding notes are
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included in the annual report. The report also explains how the price of crude oil, changes 
in foreign interest rates, and the currency and stock markets affected returns. By contrast,
Kazakhstan does not require publication of the annual report of its National Fund nor of the
auditor’s report, and the information that is provided is scant. Appendix 9 contains a table
comparing the information provided on SOFAZ’s website with that available on the websites
of the Alaskan, Norwegian, and Kazakhstani oil funds.
Nonetheless, there is room for improvement in transparency. For example, the rules for
preparing and executing the Fund’s annual budget require that quarterly reports be pub-
lished.82 None are available on SOFAZ’s website even after more than two years of operation.
Public acceptance of SOFAZ
The creation of SOFAZ was greeted with lively discussion in the mass media. Every subsequent
decree on the Oil Fund instigated a spurt of discussion in the press. Prior to the president’s
decree creating SOFAZ, discussion centered on whether an oil fund was needed and, if so,
whether such a fund should be subordinated to the president or parliament. Not surprisingly,
the official and pro-presidential media favored subordinating the Fund to the president.  
Opinion was more divided in the independent and opposition press. Among these
sources, not all favored creation of an oil fund. Those that opposed its creation worried about
the potential for corruption resulting from the existence of an off-budget fund. Among those
that favored an oil fund, many advocated subordinating it to parliament. Arguments for par-
liamentary control included:
 Reference to examples such as Norway, where the parliament exercises control;
 Claims that because the Oil Fund will eventually dwarf the parliament-approved gov-
ernment budget, it should also come under congressional oversight;
 The argument that parliamentary control will make the Oil Fund more transparent and
more difficult to raid.
Others argued that because of the weakness of Azerbaijan’s parliament,  legislative over-
sight would still not weaken the president’s discretion over the Oil Fund. 
A second wave of press attention to the Oil Fund followed the president’s decree direct-
ing spending to build homes for refugees. While many welcomed the appropriation, some
questioned whether spending should be directed at building homes rather than creating
employment opportunities. Others asked why the Oil Fund rather than the state budget was
being used for this purpose. A third spurt of media attention followed the announcement 
that SOFAZ would help finance the state’s share of BTC expenses. The decision launched
discussion of what SOFAZ’s spending priorities should be. Among the arguments was that
Oil Fund resources should be used on those sectors that have trouble attracting financing, such
as agriculture. 
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In a letter to the World Bank and the EBRD, a coalition of international NGOs urged
these institutions to condition their lending for the BTC pipeline on the requirement that
expenditures from the Oil Fund “be demonstrably geared to relieving poverty and improving
social, environmental, and public health conditions.”83 This opposition prompted a large num-
ber of Azerbaijani NGOs to form a coalition in support of the BTC pipeline and for the use
of SOFAZ financing for the pipeline. 
Recommendations
Azerbaijan’s authorities have done an impressive job of restoring growth and macroeconomic
stability. They have also avoided some of the common tendencies of oil-producing states. They
have not launched an oil-financed spending spree and they have not accumulated large
amounts of debt. The challenge in the coming years will be making the best use of Azerbai-
jan’s relatively short oil and gas life span to reduce poverty and create economic opportu-
nity, while mitigating the country’s extreme vulnerability to changes in market prices for oil
and gas. The key question for Azerbaijan is whether the government will commit to needed
structural reforms—in the tax administration, the customs service, the treasury, privatiza-
tion, and improvement of the investment climate—once the incentive to reform is diluted by
the onset of petroleum revenues. Helping the government stay committed to these impor-
tant changes will require urgent adoption of reforms that allow civil society and its chosen
representatives to become more involved in decision making about the country’s economic
development.
Promoting non-oil economic growth
In order for Azerbaijan to pursue economic development and alleviate widespread poverty, it
must revive its moribund non-oil industrial sector. Currently, oil exploration, development,
and exports drive foreign investment and GDP growth.  Promoting non-oil economic growth
will require the following priorities:
 Improve the business climate.
While Azerbaijan has undertaken many reforms to promote growth in the non-oil sec-
tor, impediments remain. A priority should be improving access to credit for small and
medium-sized enterprises. Although inflation has been contained to about 2 percent a
year, interest rates remain close to 20 percent. Administrative impediments to doing
business, particularly in the area of customs and taxes, push entrepreneurs to operate
within the shadow economy. Structural reforms should also be accelerated—the kind of
large-scale privatization program that was undertaken in Kazakhstan has not been
pushed through in Azerbaijan. Greater public discussion of the findings and recom-
mendations offered in the Foreign Investment Advisory Service’s report on how to
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improve the non-oil investment climate in Azerbaijan could help in identifying local
solutions and support for change.84
 Determine how oil revenues will be used to fight poverty.
The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper prepared by the government of Azerbai-
jan and endorsed by the IMF in 2002 defines reduction of poverty and unemployment
as the main challenge for Azerbaijan. It outlines a program for creating an improved
investment environment outside the oil sector, improving public sector and utility serv-
ice provision, and developing a social safety net. A final State Program on Poverty Reduc-
tion and Economic Development (SPPRED) is available on the website of the Ministry
of Economic Development (http://www.economy.gov.az/PRSP/Reports.htm). The pro-
gram is an insightful analysis of shortfalls in current poverty reduction spending and
an ambitious plan for change over the next few years. 
To harness Oil Fund assets to the goals of the SPPRED, Azerbaijan should adopt
a medium-term expenditure framework for SOFAZ that explains how Oil Fund assets
will be used to advance Azerbaijan’s poverty reduction plans. Such a spending frame-
work can help minimize unplanned SOFAZ expenditures and ensure that the Oil Fund
is used in support of long-term policy objectives.
Improving SOFAZ
 Use Fund to demonstrate good stewardship.
Perhaps the most important function an oil fund can serve is to improve accountabil-
ity in the way petroleum revenues are managed. Research into the effectiveness of oil
funds in stabilizing fiscal policy and mitigating Dutch Disease finds almost no rela-
tionship. An IMF study concludes that, in terms of fiscal management, anything that
can be accomplished with an oil fund can also be accomplished without an oil fund.85
An oil fund, however, can signal the government’s commitment to good stewardship
of its hydrocarbon resources. The fund does this by making it harder for the govern-
ment to make unplanned expenditures and paving the way for linking oil revenues to
longer-term development objectives.
If SOFAZ is to provide this function, accountability surrounding the Oil Fund
must be improved. Unless the parliament, the judiciary, or civil society can serve as
counterweights, the president of Azerbaijan can breach the rules of the Oil Fund or liq-
uidate it altogether at any moment. While the current leadership may demonstrate a
commitment to good spending, what guarantee is there that future presidents will do
the same? The current rules, with their absence of checks and balances, leave too much
to chance.
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 Clarify the SOFAZ mission and objectives.
The decree establishing the Oil Fund explains that it can be used for the “socio-eco-
nomic progress of the country” and for “solving the most important national problems.”
A more specific statement of the Oil Fund’s mission would make it possible to deter-
mine what expenditures and investments fall within the Fund’s mandate and which fall
outside it.
 Adopt medium- and long-term expenditures policies.
SOFAZ’s rules require that expenditures be in line with a medium- and long-term
framework, but to date, large expenditures have been authorized without disclosure of
any such plans.  It is hoped that this expenditure policy will be an outgrowth of the pub-
lic hearings and discussions for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the ensuing
State Program on Poverty Reduction and Economic Development. 
Without such a strategy, there is a risk that spending decisions will continue to be
ad hoc. As the IMF warns, there are “risks of having a pool of funds available, without
clear guidelines regarding the legitimate use of those funds....”86
 Develop a budget stabilization strategy.
Unlike natural resource funds such as Norway’s, Kazakhstan’s, or Chile’s, Azerbaijan’s
Oil Fund has no mechanism to direct money back to the budget in case of a crisis like
an external price shock. Such a contingency is needed in order to avoid sporadic changes
to the Oil Fund’s rules, as occurred in Venezuela.
 Develop a long-term, diversified investment strategy. 
With a longer-term spending policy in place, SOFAZ can then shift its investments to
a longer-term horizon and be able to diversify from the highly liquid but low-yield invest-
ments it made in 2001. A longer-term investment strategy should invest in both equity
and securities, and set limits to the various asset classes. The experiences of other nat-
ural resource funds demonstrate that combining stocks and bonds makes it possible
to increase returns while keeping risk relatively low.  The investment strategy should
set benchmark rates of return, and should indicate what portion of the assets may be
given to external managers. The strategy should also set limits to the risk factors for
each type of investment that is permitted.
 Strengthen the legal foundation for SOFAZ. 
Currently, SOFAZ exists only on the basis of presidential decrees. This tenuous for-
mal grounding allows SOFAZ’s rules—and indeed its very existence—to  be altered or
abolished by a simple presidential decree. A parliamentary law on SOFAZ would
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improve its legal foundation and make it more difficult to alter SOFAZ’s rules. Such a
law should also increase parliament’s role in oversight, by requiring parliamentary
approval of spending from the Oil Fund, and also allowing parliament to elect its own
members to the supervisory council without the president’s approval. It should also
require all Oil Fund expenditures to pass through the consolidated budget.
 Give real power to the supervisory council.
For the supervisory council to exercise effective oversight, it should be able to conduct
its own inquiries, to subpoena documents and expert witnesses, and to publish its find-
ings and recommendations. The council should also be given the authority to vote
against spending projects if they are inconsistent with the longer-term spending pol-
icy adopted for the Oil Fund. Moreover, the council should assemble at least on the
schedule stipulated by its rules.  Although it is required to meet at least on a quarterly
basis, the council has met only twice in the six quarters of the Fund’s existence. But,
above all, the independence of the supervisory council must be established and recog-
nized.
 Include civil society representatives on the supervisory council. 
The independence of the supervisory council can be enhanced by including members
from civil society, as SOFAZ’s rules provide. No procedures currently exist for selecting
such representatives, and none currently sit on the supervisory council. Neither do the
rules specify how many members of civil society will serve on the council. Procedures
for selection should be established which guarantee the independence of representa-
tives of civil society. 
Improving transparency of the government budget and SOCAR 
 Improve state budget accountability.
Currently, the budget preparation and approval process provides a limited role to par-
liament and no role for civil society. Opportunities for public comment on the budget
should be made available, with the consultations on the government’s Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Process (PRSP) serving as an example of civil society engagement.  For it
to meaningfully comment on proposed expenditures, the Majlis should be provided with
research capacity and greater time for consideration of the budget. Budget accounta-
bility also suffers from a lack of external audit of budget execution. A Chamber of
Accounting, created in 2001, only began functioning in 2003. 
 Improve budget transparency.
The budget data that are publicly available are insufficient for analyzing budget policy
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issues and monitoring oil-based earnings and expenditures. Several improvements in
the budget should be made. First, the Ministry of Finance should reveal the assump-
tions and methodology it uses in preparing budget estimates, as well as greater line-
item detail about proposed expenditures. Second, the budget should include an explicit
statement of budget priorities and how these are translated into planned expenditures.
To facilitate the tracking of expenditures, the budget should include detailed (program
and line-item) budget classifications. Third, the draft budget, as well as a version that
is easily understood by nonexperts, should be published for public discussion and input
to the budget process prior to the budget’s adoption. Additionally, reports on budget exe-
cution should also be made available. If actual expenditures differ sharply from planned
expenditures, a revised budget should be prepared.
 Disclose oil-backed loans.
In the budget, disclose any-oil backed loans obtained by the government or SOCAR that
will become the obligation of future generations to repay.
 Assess fiscal transparency.
Initiate a new review of the country’s compliance with the IMF’s Code of Good Prac-
tices for Fiscal Transparency, last completed in 2000, and allow publication of the
results.
 Monitor implementation of PRSP and SPPRED priorities.
Establish an agency comprised of ex officio government and civil society representatives
with responsibility for monitoring government expenditures consistent with the prior-
ities established in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Process and the ensuing State Pro-
gram on Poverty Reduction and Economic Development.
 Allow SOCAR public reporting.
Overhaul reporting requirements for SOCAR. The government of Azerbaijan should
require SOCAR to submit to external audits and publish financial information in line
with international accounting standards.
 Volunteer to report oil and gas earnings.
Volunteer to become an early signatory to the templates for reporting oil and gas 
revenue receipts being developed by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-
tive (EITI). The EITI, a British government-led coalition of governments, extractive
companies, and NGOs aims to increase transparency of payments by companies 
to governments as well as transparency over revenues by those host country 
governments.87 
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Engaging civil society in policy discussions about oil revenue use
 Promote public awareness and discussion of oil fund strategy. 
The oil funds that were created in Alberta, Alaska, and Norway were preceded by years
of public discussion about long-term strategies for managing petroleum wealth. In
Alaska, such public discussion was not only tolerated, but facilitated by the government,
which organized seminars and public forums to gauge public opinion about how best
to use its oil fund. This kind of discussion helped build trust among the citizenry that
oil proceeds would be used to benefit the public.  
The absence of such open discussion contributes to public cynicism that revenues
are being diverted for private gain rather than public benefit. Already, many Azerbaija-
nis are cynical about their government’s commitment to combat corruption and serve
the public. Such views can become destabilizing if people fail to see any improvement
in their lives after years of oil production. Currently, SOFAZ’s assets are relatively mod-
est at 11.5 percent of GDP. However, by 2010 SOFAZ will comprise nearly half of GDP
and its assets will be more than triple the size of the state budget, if oil development
and exports proceed as planned and if there is no sustained decline in the market price
of oil.  Unless the population is informed and involved in plans for using this Fund,
pressure for spending could become intense.
 Repeal the secrecy law.
In line with the standards of the Council of Europe and the jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, and to encourage discussion about Azerbaijan’s revenue
management strategy, retract the August 2002 decree on state secrets, which could seri-
ously limit a national dialogue about the country’s hydrocarbon management strategy.
This decree places the burden of responsibility on the press to determine whether any-
thing it publishes violates state secrecy laws. Among the areas defined as state secrets
are “information on the activities of industry, transport, and communications in the
entire Azerbaijani Republic, . . . on state reserves of precious metals and stones in the
Azerbaijani republic, their finances and budget policy except for generalized informa-
tion on the overall situation in the economy and finances.”88
 Improve the environment for civil society.
To foster informed public discussion and engage members of civil society in the process,
Azerbaijan should improve the enabling environment for civil society. The government
of Azerbaijan should make public the nongovernmental organization registration pro-
cedures required by the Ministry of Justice, allow registration to take place in offices out-
side the capital, and consistently implement existing law on procedures of notification
for registration denial. 
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 Adopt a freedom of information law.
Adopt a law on public access to public information held by the government, as recom-
mended by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 2002.
 Adopt legislation to implement the Aarhus Convention.
To improve public engagement in the environmental impacts of hydrocarbon develop-
ment, Azerbaijan should introduce relevant legislation and develop procedures and
infrastructure to implement the Aarhus Convention, which Azerbaijan has ratified and
which came into force in October 2001. The Aarhus Convention guarantees citizens
access to information, public participation in decision making, and access to justice in
environmental matters.  

1 2 7
6. National Fund of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan
Introduction
In April 2002, the weekly Argumenty i Fakti Kazakhstan, citing an anonymous government
source, reported that a new decree would divide the state’s earnings from hydrocarbon devel-
opment equally among Kazakhstan’s adult population. “This means that every citizen of the
country who has come of age at the moment the decree is issued will receive, according to
some calculations, $200,000 with monthly dividends on top!”1
The article, an April Fools’ Day joke, could not have fooled many readers. For years, 
Kazakhstani citizens have expected oil and gas development to transform them from a poverty-
stricken agricultural and mining country to a wealthy oil emirate like Kuwait. Kazakhstan would
enter the 21st century as “one of the top five oil-producing states of the world,” President
Nazarbayev announced on the eve of the millennium.2 Reality has not yet met expectations.
“When the chief executive presides over the hierarchy [of an oil fund],
decisions over uses of the fund’s revenues become political.”
—CHRISTIAN E. PETERSEN AND NINA BUDINA, “GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
OF OIL FUNDS: THE CASE OF AZERBAIJAN AND KAZAKHSTAN,” 
WORLD BANK WORKSHOP ON PETROLEUM REVENUE MANAGEMENT, 2002
This chapter was written with research contributions from Robert Ebel, Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies; Sergey Zlotnikov, Sofia Isenova, and Andrei Chibotarev, Transparency International–Kazakhstan; Tulegen Askarov;
Sergey Kuratov and Sergey Solyanik, Green Salvation; and Irina Stromova and Nadezhda Kotechigova, Rodnik.
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The irony in Kazakhstan is that the government has done a commendable job of stabi-
lizing the macroeconomy and of beginning to convert its nonrenewable wealth into savings
for future generations. Most Kazakhstani citizens, however, are not aware of their govern-
ment’s accomplishments or its strategy for managing the country’s mineral wealth. All they
understand is that they remain mired in poverty. This disparity between reality and expecta-
tions is not yet an acute problem because, as a result of low world oil prices in 1998–99 and
a lack of access to markets, oil and gas revenues have remained relatively small. However,
rising prices are changing this situation as oil and gas accounted for almost a quarter of fis-
cal revenue and about one half of exports in 2001. As hydrocarbon revenues balloon in the
next 5 to 10 years and if oil prices remain high, the unmet aspirations of millions of Kazakh-
stani citizens for improved living conditions and government accountability may become a
destabilizing force.
The challenge for Kazakhstan in the coming years is to use its mineral wealth to estab-
lish a viable basis for long-term economic growth. This will require a commitment to trans-
parency, fairness, and good governance in the oil and gas sector and the creation of favorable
conditions for development of the non-oil sector. In part, success will depend on whether the
government will slow its efforts to centralize power and subdue critics and opponents. 
This chapter aims to stimulate discussion about the choices and challenges Kazakhstan
faces in making the best use of the finite wealth generated by its hydrocarbon resources. It
begins with an overview of Kazakhstan’s oil and gas potential. Next it reviews the impact of
petroleum development on Kazakhstan’s economy and identifies areas where reforms are
needed to help the country create a sustainable basis for growth beyond its hydrocarbon sec-
tor. The chapter analyzes the National Fund created to help manage Kazakhstan’s hydrocar-
bon wealth. It concludes with recommendations on how the government of Kazakhstan can
use the National Fund for economic development and stability while promoting transparency
and public participation in the Fund’s operations. 
Oil and Gas in Kazakhstan
Oil
Now that the initial rhetoric has passed, a more realistic appraisal of the oil and gas future of
Kazakhstan, and of the Caspian region in general, can be made. The Caspian potential can
now be compared with that of the North Sea, not as a replacement for the Persian Gulf, but
nonetheless important at the margin. Moreover, importing countries now have another sup-
plier to choose from, as they seek resource security through diversity of supply.
If present plans are realized, the contribution of Kazakhstan to world oil supply by the
year 2010 will not be much more than 2 percent. Nonetheless, this output does place Kazakh-
stan among the leading oil producers and exporters of the world, and the income from oil exports
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will provide that country with an opportunity to remake itself, if that income is spent wisely. 
Although the northern Caspian has considerable untested potential, the immediate future
of oil and gas in Kazakhstan can be found in just three known fields: Tengiz, Karachaganak, and
Kashagan.3 Tengiz and Karachaganak are operational today, and provide much of the basis for
current and at least near-term growth in domestic production. The immensity of Kashagan,
located offshore in the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea, was confirmed in March 2001, and
reserve estimates of 7 to 9 billion barrels were made public in June 2002. Kashagan will be the
basis for national growth after Tengiz and Karachaganak have reached their peaks. 
Production at Tengiz is expanding incrementally, as new capacity comes on line. In
2002, output increased to 263,900 barrels per day (bpd) from 249,500 bpd in 2001. Pre-
suming that current expansion plans are successfully realized, Tengiz can be expected to pro-
vide about 460,000 bpd in 2006. 
Karachaganak, considered the world’s largest gas condensate field, provided about
108,300 bpd in 2002, and is scheduled to produce 140,000 bpd in 2003. Peak production is
not likely to be reached until 2008, at 240,000 bpd. 
Kashagan, conversely, is not to begin production until 2005, and even then at quite
low rates. Expansion will be slow, comparable to that of Tengiz, with production averaging
around 300,000 bpd by 2010.
Production and consumption of oil in Kazakhstan during the 1990s followed two dis-
tinct trends (Table 1). Oil production declined in the early years, reaching a low of 414,000 bpd
in 1995, then turned the corner in 1996, stimulated by Tengiz, and by 2000 reached 707,000
bpd. Demand for oil, conversely, continued its decline throughout the decade before show-
ing a very modest gain in 2000. That declining trend permitted Kazakhstan to enjoy contin-
uing gains in annual oil exports.
TABLE 1. Kazakhstan: Oil Production and Consumption, 1992–2000
Thousand Barrels Per Day
Year Production Consumption
1992 530 404
1993 490 341
1994 415 304
1995 414 281
1996 457 256
1997 521 210
1998 526 201
1999 604 148
2000 707 155
Note: Production includes condensates.
Source: www.fe.doe.gov/international/kazkover
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Kazakh officials hold a very optimistic view of future oil production levels, as Table 2
underscores, although less so than President Nazarbayev who has pictured his country as an
equal to Saudi Arabia by the year 2015. Yet, is this projected growth pattern realistic and in
Kazakhstan’s national interests? Doubts are emerging about whether the country really needs
to produce that much oil in the coming years. The country risks long-term stagnation by rely-
ing too heavily on easy oil revenues, according to Economy and Budget Planning Minister
Kairat Kelimbetov.4 Hard times are ahead, he added, if the country does not make efforts to
diversify its lopsided economy.
TABLE 2. Kazakhstan: Production of Crude Oil and Condensate, Selected Years, 2001–2015
Barrels Per Day 
Year Crude Oil Condensate Total
2001 717,000 80,000 797,000
2002 840,800 103,800 944,600
2003 plan n.a. n.a. 1,040,000
2004 n.a. n.a. 1,120,000
2005 n.a. n.a. 1,224,000
2010 n.a. n.a. 2,000,000
2015 n.a. n.a. 3,000,000
Note: n.a. = not available. 
Prime Minister Tasmagambetov has observed that annual production might reach 2.4 million bpd but only accord-
ing to “optimistic estimates.” (See “Oilmen in Almaty Upbeat About Region’s Prospects,” RFE/RL, Central Asia
Report, October 3, 2002)
Source: “Kazakhstan Sees 24 percent Output Gain in 2003,” Platt’s Oilgram, February 5, 2003; “Kazakhstan to
Refine 9 Percent More Crude in 2003,” Interfax, Astana, January 31, 2003; “Kazakhstan to Join Major League Oil
Producers,” LatelineNews.com, January 27, 2003.
Nonetheless, timely expansion at Tengiz and then at Kashagan is not neccessarily a
given. Tengiz presents a major technological and environmental challenge due to the recov-
ery and disposal of sulfur found in the associated natural gas. At Kashagan, oil recovery lev-
els may not exceed 20 percent, considerably below the norm for most oil fields, which will
limit both peak production and field life. 
Challenges in the field can eventually be overcome. But other risks are beyond the reach
of technology. TengizChevroil had laid out a $3 billion expansion program for Tengiz, to raise
annual production to 440,000 bpd, with financing to be provided out of oil export profits. This
was unacceptable to the government as it would have reduced the tax take and the disagree-
ment became public knowledge in November 2002. TengizChevroil stood its ground and all
expansion-related work ceased, although the oil continued to flow. The two parties did not
reach an agreement until January 2003 when they concluded that the joint venture will pay
$810 million to the government, of which $600 million represents tax payments to be made
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in installments through 2005.5 Additionally, TengizChevroil will take out a loan to finance
the government share of the expansion.
The government emerged from the standoff in a strengthened position and has become
more confident in dealing with foreign investors and challenging contract terms viewed as too
favorable to the investor. The episode with TengizChevroil represents only one of several efforts
by the Kazakh government to renegotiate foreign contracts that they believe gave overly gen-
erous tax breaks.
Problems and challenges have occurred at Kashagan as well. The project operator, AGIP
KCO, took the position that it would suspend work unless the government stopped trying to
revise agreements unilaterally after they had been signed.6 However, Kazakhstan, emboldened
by its success at Tengiz and using the leverage of its oil potential, is likely to continue press-
ing for changes at Kashagan.
Natural gas
The natural gas sector of Kazakhstan is still in its infancy, production is limited, and the coun-
try remains a net importer. The problem facing Kazakhstan as it works toward more balanced
development of its natural gas industry is simple: natural gas production is concentrated in
the western part of the country, but current and future demand is likely to be centered in the
east. Moreover, because both the supply and demand volumes are comparatively small, con-
struction of a pipeline network to transport supplies eastward cannot be justified. As a result,
demand in the east is covered through imports.
TABLE 3. Kazakhstan: Natural Gas Production and Consumption, 1992–2000
Billion Cubic Meters
Year Production Consumption
1992 8.1 20.1
1993 6.7 14.8
1994 4.5 15.0
1995 4.8 10.8
1996 4.2 14.4
1997 6.1 14.0
1998 5.5 13.4
1999 4.6 13.6
2000 8.9 13.9
Source: www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kazak.
At the same time, local consumption is holding constant and is not expected to rise
to more than 15 to 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) by the year 2015.7
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The statistics in Table 3 underscore the continuing reliance on imports to cover demand,
ranging from an import requirement of 12 bcm or 424 billion cubic feet (bcf) in 1992 to only
5 bcm or 177 bcf in 2000, as natural gas from Karachaganak began to add to supply, cutting
sharply into these requirements. Nonetheless, the reduction in imports for most of the 1990s
can be attributed to consumption falling at a more rapid rate than production.
Most of the gas imports originate with Uzbekistan, and are transported to eastern 
Kazakhstan via the Taskkent-Bishkek-Almaty pipeline. There is potential for the development
of gas production from several new discoveries in southern Kazakhsan, and reliance on
imports will end if these discoveries meet expectations.  
Future gas consumption, much like oil consumption, is not expected to increase sig-
nificantly, which could allow Kazakhstan to quickly become a net exporter. KazMunaiGaz,
the state oil and gas company, has recognized this possibility and has agreed with ExxonMo-
bil Kazakhstan Ventures Ltd. to draft a long-term plan for development of Kazakhstan’s natu-
ral gas deposits.8 KazRosGaz, a Russian-Kazakh joint venture established in June 2002, exports
gas to Europe via Russia. Transit volumes are expected to reach 7 bcm in 2004.9 Exports to
Europe and to CIS countries could total 35 to 40 bcm by 2015.10
Continued development of Tengiz and Karachaganak, and future development of
Kashagan, is likely to result in comparable increases in the extraction of natural gas produced
in association with crude oil. By 2015, Karachaganak should be producing 25 bcm annually
and Tengiz 8 to 10 bcm annually. Kashagan should also be a major supplier by that time, inas-
much as its recoverable gas reserves are placed at 1 trillion cubic meters.11 The volumes antic-
ipated, as shown in Table 4, could be increased if reinjection of the sulfurous gas can be
accomplished successfully, or if the gas, once the sulfur has been recovered, is reinjected, again
for the purposes of maintaining formation pressure.
Questions remain about where this growing supply of exportable gas will go. Russia is
the most likely immediate recipient. Imports from Kazakhstan would be consumed locally,
freeing up Russian gas for export to Europe and obviating the need for Russia to develop costly
gas fields in the Arctic. A variety of options await, but all are dependent on arrangements to
be worked out with Russia.
The Central Asia-Center gas pipeline carries Turkmen and Uzbek gas across Kazakhstan
for sale in Russia and Ukraine. Its carrying capacity increased to 50 bcm in 2002, and oper-
ators hope to expand capacity to 63 bcm by 2010. Yet much of the Central Asia-Center line is
“physically and morally worn out,” according to KazMunaiGaz.12 The pipeline will need fur-
ther renovation and expansion to handle the increasing volumes transiting Kazakhstan, espe-
cially if Kazakhstan wants access to the pipeline as well.13
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TABLE 4. Kazakhstan: Production of Natural Gas, Selected Years, 2001–2015
Billion 
Year Cubic Meters
2001 11.57
2002 13.14
2005 20.5
2010 35
2015 70
Source: Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty, February 7, 2003
Oil exports and pipelines
Satisfying domestic oil requirements has continued to take a small percentage of supply, which
allowed Kazakhstan to increase exports and enjoy considerable oil-related income during the
1990s (Table 5). In 1992, consumption of oil in Kazakhstan was 404,000 bpd, not too far
below domestic production of 530,000 bpd. Just nine years later, consumption had held steady
since 1996 at 245,000 bpd. Production, however, had risen to 811,000 bpd. By 2001, this
steady consumption and increasing production made Kazakhstan an exporter of emerging
importance, with net exports of 631,000 bpd. 
TABLE 5. Kazakhstan: Net Oil Exports, 1992–2001
Thousand Barrels
Year Per Day
1992 125.9
1993 148.6
1994 111.4
1995 132.8
1996 200.5
1997 311.5
1998 324.9
1999 455.4
2000 551.6
2001 631.0
Note: Net exports differ from gross imports in that imports from Russia are taken into account.
Source: www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kazaexpo
Growth in production is expected to far outstrip increases in demand during the com-
ing years, as it is projected that Kazakhstan will only need about 180,000 to 200,000 barrels
daily to cover domestic requirements.14 This low demand will free up increasingly higher per-
centages of oil for export (Table 6). 
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TABLE 6. Kazakhstan: Net Oil Exports as a Probable Share of Domestic Production Selected Years, 2001–2010
Exports as 
Year Percent of Production
2001 71
2002 83
2005 75
2010 80
Source: “Kazakh Oil Exports Up 21 Percent in 2003,” Interfax, Almaty, February 12, 2003, and preceding tables.
Given its weak domestic market, the challenge for Kazakhstan is to find a way to take
advantage of its oil-producing potential by moving its incremental production increases to
export markets. Geographic isolation has always stood in the way. Currently, the easiest and
least expensive approach would be to take advantage of existing export infrastructure that fol-
lows a route through Russia, to the Mediterranean Sea port of Ceyhan. An alternative to the
port of Ceyhan (Table 7) is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline, linking Tengiz
with the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.15 The carrying capacity of this line will soon
increase to 560,000 bpd. The ultimate capacity is 1.34 million bpd, to be attained in stages,
through the construction of pumping stations in coordination with the growth in production
at Tengiz. But Tengiz oil, even at its peak, will fall short of filling the line. There may be some
room for Kashagan oil when it becomes available,16 but Kazakh planners believe a second
export pipeline will be needed at some point.
TABLE 7. Kazakhstan: Oil Export Pipelines
Origin Terminus Length (miles) Capacity (mmb/d)
Tengiz Novorossiysk 990 0.560
Atyrau Samara 450 0.340
Note: The pipeline to Novorossiysk is commonly referred to as the CPC (Caspian Pipeline Consortium) line. The
maximum carrying capacity of this line will be 1.34 million bpd, when all pumping stations are in place. The capac-
ity of the Atyrau-Samara is to be increased to 0.5 million bpd.
The CPC line is not without its problems. Russia wants to include the CPC line in the
natural monopoly register,17 meaning that the government would control a number of impor-
tant functions, including setting tariff rates.
Russia also has a valid 15-year agreement signed by Kazakhstan in 2002 to move Kazakh
oil by pipeline to Samara where it is placed into the Druzhba pipeline for export to Europe.18
At least 340,000 bpd of Kazakh oil can move through this system annually. Kazakh oil tran-
siting Russia during 2003 will total about 390,000 bpd. Of that, about 320,000 bpd will pass
through the Atyrau-Samara pipeline.19 In addition, the Karachaganak gas condensate deposit
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has now been linked by pipeline with the CPC line, thus allowing condensates to be exported
via that route.20
Kazakh oil is also delivered to the Caspian port of Aqtau and barged across the Caspian
to Makhachkala, where it is fed into the Makhkachkala-Tikhoretsk-Novorossiysk pipeline.
Crude oil from the Aktyubinsk fields is moved by pipeline to the Orsk refinery in Russia. Small
volumes are also swapped with Russia, with Kazakh crude supplying Orsk and a comparable
volume of Russian oil delivered to the Kazakh refinery at Pavlodar.
Impact and Challenges of Petroleum Development
Although the country is rich in many raw materials—oil, gas, coal, and metals—oil and gas
exploration and development will undoubtedly remain Kazakhstan’s largest source of foreign
direct investment (FDI). How much revenue might the export of oil and gas bring in? Much
depends on the price of oil. Using the budget revenue model it developed with the World Bank,
the IMF estimated in late 2001 that by 2005, with oil at $19 a barrel, the government would
receive $1.5 billion from the development and sale of oil—10 times what it earned in 1999.
Other analyses have put this income at several times that amount.21 Under these assumptions,
annual transfers to Kazakhstan’s National Fund will average $125 million and its assets will be
over 8 percent of GDP by 2006.22
As oil development comes to dominate the economy of Kazakhstan, GDP and gov-
ernment revenues become increasingly sensitive to changes in the price of oil (see Figure
1).23 The budget crisis of 1998, when oil prices collapsed on the heels of the Asian crisis,
demonstrates how vulnerable the economy of Kazakhstan is to changes in the price of oil.
In 2002, for example, every dollar change in the per barrel price of oil translated to $96 mil-
lion in budget revenues.24
FIGURE 1. Kazakhstan’s GDP Growth and Oil Prices, 1996–2001
Source: U.S. Energy Information Agency; IMF Staff Report for 2001 Article IV Consultation, Kazakhstan.
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From 1993 to 2000, the oil sector absorbed over 80 percent of cumulative FDI, and oil
and metals comprised close to four-fifths of total exports.25 Earnings from export of oil have risen
from 5 percent of government revenues in 1999 to over 20 percent in 2002, and will continue
to grow. According to government forecasts, petroleum and minerals will account for nearly
60 percent of the value of all exports from 2002 to 2004, and government revenues from oil
and gas will increase on average by 11 percent a year between 2001 and 2005.26 The over-reliance
on hydrocarbon revenues, tied to fluctuating world prices, underscores the importance of devel-
oping a tax base that includes a strong non-oil sector. In addition to reducing reliance on oil for
its budget revenues, a broad tax base also improves government accountability by giving tax-
payers an incentive to demand good governance, and authorities an incentive to provide it.
Deft macroeconomic management and rebounding world oil prices beginning in 1999
have helped make Kazakhstan one of the strongest performing economies among the coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union. The government has been aggressive in controlling inflation,
liberalizing prices, reforming the banking sector and the pension system, and minimizing
budget deficits. Privatization has proceeded apace, with almost all small and medium-sized
enterprises in private hands, albeit among widespread allegations of corruption. These achieve-
ments are particularly noteworthy given the depth of Kazakhstan’s immediate economic con-
traction following its independence. GDP halved between 1990 and 1995, and inflation peaked
at 1880 percent in 1994.27
With rising oil prices, GDP grew by 13.2 percent in 2001, and by over 9 percent in 2002.
According to the IMF, Kazakhstan should easily be able to maintain a GDP growth rate of 
7 to 8 percent in 2003.28 Inflation was successfully brought down to about 6 percent in 2002.
The increase in petroleum revenues allowed the government to end 2001 with a budget sur-
plus.29 Reflecting these tendencies, its credit rating was raised to investment grade by Moody’s
in September 2002, making Kazakhstan the first country among the former Soviet states to reach
this status since the Russian crisis of 1998. Kazakhstan is expected to continue to post strong
growth as it expands capacity for oil production amid expectations of continuing high oil prices.30
Despite these positive macroeconomic indicators, wealth has not trickled down to most
of the country’s citizens. The economic crisis of the mid-1990s resulted in a rise in poverty,
unemployment, increasing income disparities, and declining social service provision. The
country’s strong GDP per capita rates disguise the fact that these problems persist. 
Poverty continues to affect 40 percent of the population, and a quarter of the nation lives
on less than $4 a day.31 In 2001, about a third of rural citizens and a fifth of urban citizens
lived below the subsistence level.32 According to the World Bank, wages fell by more than 75
percent between 1990 and 1997.33 Official unemployment in 2001 was 10.4 percent.34 Poverty
is highest in rural Kazakhstan, where lack of access to credit, environmental factors, out-migra-
tion, skewed resource distribution, and a development policy that prioritized hydrocarbon devel-
opment have taken their toll. For example, despite being one of the centers of Kazakhstan’s oil
production, parts of Mangistau oblast have poverty levels as high as 87 percent.35
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Declines in government spending on health and education have had an impact on these
sectors. Between 1990 and 1995, government spending on health and education as a percent
of the state budget declined by about half. While expenditures have since increased, they are
still low in comparison to other transitioning economies (see Table 8). Consequently, between
1995 and 2001, the number of doctors fell from 60,100 to 51,300, and the number of hospi-
tals dwindled by one-third from 1,518 to 981.36 Outbreaks of infectious diseases such as tuber-
culosis occur frequently, especially in the rural south where poverty is concentrated. Since
1990, birth rates and life expectancy have fallen while mortality has risen. Education too has
suffered. Spending on education declined from 19.8 percent to 17.6 percent of government
expenditures between 1987 and 1997.37
TABLE 8: Government Expenditures on Health and Education, 1999, USD per capita
Other Social 
Country Education Health Pensions Expenditures
Kazakhstan 40 29 87 10
Hungary 183 337 394 240
Poland 68 181 534 189
Source: Millennium Development Goals in Kazakhstan, 2002. United Nations
The country’s transport and communications infrastructure is also in disrepair. Kazakh-
stan is highly dependent on good transportation links because it lacks access to an open water
port. Yet, roads and railway lines are in need of both expansion and repair, and their services
are expensive. Only 11 percent of the population has telephone mainlines.
The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI), which ranks 162 countries on a
broad mix of indicators, testifies to Kazakhstan’s deteriorating social infrastructure. Between 1990
and 2002, Kazakhstan dropped from 54th to 79th place in the Human Development Index. A sta-
tistical analysis of the fall in its HDI score concluded that 84 percent of the drop could be explained
by the country’s economic decline.38 Many former Soviet countries suffer from similar declines,
but proper use of Kazakhstan’s oil and mineral resources should halt or reverse this trend. 
Although Kazakhstan’s macroeconomic indicators look good, the country nevertheless
shows some of the proclivities of resource-rich states: namely the tendency to allow copious
oil-fed fiscal resources to dampen the incentive for needed structural reforms. The govern-
ment should promulgate reforms that permit small and medium-sized enterprises in the non-
oil sector to thrive. A vibrant non-oil sector provides needed employment to raise living
standards, reduces the country’s sensitivity to external shocks, and continues to generate
wealth once oil proceeds diminish by the middle of this century. Improving the nation’s health,
education, and social protection infrastructure should be an equal priority.
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Governance and budget accountability
Like the petro-states discussed in chapter one, Kazakhstan has demonstrated the same drive
toward centralization, concentration of executive power, and persecution of opponents that
has had such a damaging effect in countries like Venezuela, Mexico, Nigeria, and others. This
concentration of power creates a symbiosis between oil companies and government leaders.39
The multinationals benefit from having a single point of contact able to approve and enforce
contracts, and government officials, as gatekeepers to lucrative contracts, find opportunities
for personal enrichment. This relationship comes at a grave cost, however. Absent a mandate
from citizens, these governments rely on a combination of military force and profligate spend-
ing to remain in power. Democracy falls by the wayside as increasingly unpopular govern-
ments continue to waste windfalls and accumulate debt. While Kazakhstan has not yet
embarked on the spending sprees that occurred in other petro-states, the centralization of
power in Kazakhstan increases the likelihood that such spending could occur in the future.
Since becoming independent in 1991, Kazakhstan has had the same ruler, Nursultan
Nazarbayev, who also headed the republic under Soviet rule. The president has steadily
increased his control over Kazakhstan’s political life, appointing family members to important
government positions and granting himself lifetime immunity from prosecution. A series of
elections that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) deemed flawed
gave the president and his draft of the constitution an easy victory and gave his supporters firm
control of the bicameral parliament. All regional level executives are appointed by the president
and are frequently replaced, allegedly to prevent them from developing independent bases of
support. The most effective opposition candidates have been jailed or driven into exile.
Parliament is controlled by threat of dissolution, a threat that has been invoked by Pres-
ident Nazarbayev on several occasions. Parliament is often marginalized because the presi-
dent may issue decrees that have the power of law. Parliament’s ability to function
independently is also undermined by its limited research and administrative capability. Par-
liamentary committees have no independent research staff and only recently were permitted
to hire a single administrative assistant.
Budget accountability is undermined by an absence of opportunities for public partic-
ipation in the budget process and a variety of factors that limit the legislature’s ability to con-
trol the budget. According to the Constitution and the budgetary system law, the republican
budget plan for the coming year should be submitted to the parliament by September 15 of the
current year. While this gives the parliament three months to consider the draft budget, the
parliamentary budget process affords legislators insufficient time for preparation because they
have to adjust to a weekly, unpredictable agenda set by the pro-government presidium (akin
to the parliamentary process planning committee). Before 2002, legislators had a monthly
rather than a weekly schedule of the parliament’s agenda.40
The draft budget is intensively discussed in the lower house and sometimes encounters
strong opposition. In theory, the lower house is free to amend the budget and can alter total
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expenditures and/or those for individual departments. In practice, however, the lower house
faces dissolution if the cabinet initiates a no-confidence motion. The upper house does not
have powers of amendment but can pass the budget back to the lower house to reconsider par-
ticular issues. 
Kazakhstan ranks high in fiscal transparency, with an established treasury system and
an international classification and reporting system. Detailed information on actual revenues
and expenditures is available online (http://mf.minfin.kz/) on a quarterly basis from the Min-
istry of Finance, which is responsible for implementing the budget. This information, which
has yet to be fully used by civil society, is an extremely valuable asset that enables sophisticated
tracking of budget implementation.
Unlike Kazakhstan’s reporting mechanisms, its monitoring and evaluation mechanisms
remain weak. Although budget audit institutions have been created, they are understaffed,
lack formal procedures and policies, and do not yet meet internationally accepted standards.
In addition, audit activities focus mostly on compliance with laws and regulations; there is
little attention to financial and accounting practices and almost no consideration of value-
for-money auditing.41
Furthermore, Kazakhstan lacks a solid, independent external audit to verify budget exe-
cution. Recently an Accounting Committee was formed, consisting of equal numbers of leg-
islative and executive branch members. However, the committee does not report to the
parliament, as best practices recommend. Rather, the president directly controls its staffing,
funding, and accountability. The president also appoints the committee chairman, whose vote
is double weighted. The committee has very limited powers and can only undertake selective
audits of state-owned enterprises. According to Transparency International’s legal analyst Sofia
Issenova, “the Committee has neither the technical resources, the methodology, the staff, or
the institutional capacity to conduct an effective independent audit. It functions less as an inde-
pendent auditor and more as a consultative-deliberative organ under the president’s com-
mand.”42 Parlimentary deputies have indicated the need for improvement in the Accounting
Committee’s reports as a basis for parlimentary analysis of program effectiveness.43
The recently established Office of the Ombudsman is also unlikely to provide effective
oversight of government. Since 1997, the government of Kazakhstan, in collaboration with the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the OSCE, has worked on establishing a
human rights ombudsman position in order to bring the country into line with Council of
Europe requirements and also respond to accusations by the international community of
human rights violations. After years of deliberation, the team produced a draft law that would
ensure the independence of the ombudsman through separation of powers, protect the
ombudsman from political retribution, give the office the power and resources to launch its
own investigations, and allow it to keep its files confidential. 
The draft was submitted to the president’s administration in 2002. What emerged, how-
ever, was hardly recognizable. The draft law had turned into a presidential decree. The com-
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plex process for appointing the ombudsman, designed to ensure the office’s independence,
had been replaced by rules giving the president the sole authority to appoint and remove the
ombudsman. The decree compromises the ombudsman’s effectiveness by leaving unanswered
how the office will be funded, how independence will be protected, what powers the office has
or how they can be realized. 
The 2003 review of fiscal transparency in Kazakhstan by the IMF identified a number
of other priority areas for improvement, including consolidated reporting in the Republic's
budget of the assets accumulated in various development and social protection funds, includ-
ing the National Fund; that the capacity of audit institutions be improved; that the oversight
of government procurement operations be strengthened; that annual budget documents
include more detailed information about budget policy background, tax expenditures, and
fiscal risks; and that the discretion afforded tax collectors be reduced.44
Environmental challenges
In addition to its problems of enduring poverty and low living standards, Kazakhstan also faces
environmental challenges. Kazakhstan inherited a despoiled environment resulting from its
use as a nuclear testing ground and intense agricultural and industrial zone during Soviet
times. The country perpetuated this legacy through acts of omission and commission. Despite
the existence of draft legislation since the mid-1990s, neither the government nor the parlia-
ment has adopted any kind of environmental policy, aggravating frequent conflicts between
groups concerned about property rights and others interested in the protection of natural
resources. New owners of privatized mining and oil companies have refused—understand-
ably—to take responsibility for environmental destruction committed by these enterprises
when they belonged to the state. No studies have been done to assess the economic cost of
environmental damage from oil and gas development. One Russian scholar informally esti-
mated the cost of the damage at 10 to 15 percent of GDP.45
Water and air pollution and deforestation have compromised quality of life for citizens
of Kazakhstan, and a shortage of water is an impediment to agricultural production. Indus-
trial pollution, especially in the urban areas of northern Kazakhstan, is damaging the air, rivers,
and public health. A shortage of energy has encouraged illegal logging, contributing to deser-
tification.46 The rising levels of the Caspian Sea create the risk of flooding and oil film cover-
ing the water poses a threat to marine life.47 It is estimated that nearly 20 million acres have
been contaminated by over 36 million barrels of oil spills both before and after Kazakhstan’s
independence.48
The role of petroleum development in aggravating the country’s environmental prob-
lems is a subject of local debate and concern. The sudden death of 30,000 Caspian seals in
2000 prompted questions about the possible role of offshore oil development in the tragedy.
Although the World Bank’s Caspian Environment Program concluded that the deaths were the
result of canine distemper virus, environmentalists question these results.49 Russian biolo-
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gists attribute the deaths of the seals, as well as the deaths of several hundred tons of sprats,
a small fish, to the discharge of hydrogen sulfides from cracks in oil deposits. The scientists
found concentrations of heavy metals in the bodies of dead sprats as well as in the muscle
tissue of the seals.50
Local environmentalists also wonder whether the machinery employed for petroleum
development meets Best Available Technology (BAT) standards.51 The lack of information avail-
able about oil company operations in Kazakhstan makes it difficult to evaluate these concerns.
A mounting concern is what to do with the byproducts of oil extraction. Storage of sul-
fur at Tengiz presently exceeds 6 million tons, and volumes are increasing at a rate of 4,000
tons daily.52 When Tengiz is at its peak, the recovery of sulfur will amount to 10,000 tons daily.
Little of the sulfur can be sold abroad because of a glut on the world market. A very small
portion is to be processed into flakes, largely for the Chinese fertilizer market, but these sales
will be made at a loss. The sulfurous gas could be reinjected, but the technology is not yet
workable. TengizChevroil, the joint venture developing Tengiz, is taking up the remaining
option, which is to store the sulfur in former uranium quarries in the Mangistau region.
Currently, the sulfur is stored outside in blocks open to the elements and the winds of
the steppe. Local authorities view the sulfur not as byproduct but as an environmental hazard,
and have fined the joint venture $71 million, a fine levied at a time when Kazakhstan and Ten-
gizChevroil were contesting just how future expansion at Tengiz would be financed. That
fine was later reduced by Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court to $7 million. Others view the fine as
a maneuver to make up for a loss in tax income.53
There are other challenges as well, but especially so at Kashagan, located offshore in
the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea, where the associated natural gas is also high in sul-
fur. Plans are already being made to store the sulfur in underground caverns. The well
depths at Kashagan are characterized by high pressures and temperatures. Drilling is being
conducted from an artificial island. The water at Kashagan is only about 12 feet deep and
in winter a thick layer of ice forms and stays solid for at least three months. Strong cur-
rents and winds constantly shift the ice floe, presenting a serious hazard for drilling rigs,
equipment, and people.54 Sturgeon, the source of much-valued caviar, make their home in
the shallow waters around Kashagan and an oil spill would have disastrous consequences
for their survival. The French firm Total has described Kashagan as one of the most difficult
fields in the world to develop.55
Despite the proliferation of official programs, projects, plans, and conferences and the
statements of government officials in support of the Rio Declaration of 1992, Kazakhstan still
lacks a state policy on sustainable development and a long-term strategy for managing envi-
ronmental problems. A policy drafted by the Ministry of Ecology in 1994, “On the Basis for a
Government Environmental Policy,” did not make it out of the prime minister’s office. Nei-
ther the parliament nor the president’s administration have yet approved a national plan for
the protection of the environment.
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That absence is aggravated by the easing of environmental protections in recent years
to encourage economic development. As a result of the many changes, parliament’s role in
decision making about natural resources and environmental protection was reduced, off-
budget funds for nature protection were eliminated and their assets diluted in the general
budget, and fees for environmental protection were eliminated.56 
Funding for environmental protection is becoming a growing problem. In 1993, Kazakh-
stan established Nature Protection Funds, which received pollution payments, penalties for
poaching, and other fees. In 1999, the national Nature Protection Fund was eliminated and
its assets directed to the state budget. This money, which was supposed to be used for envi-
ronmental purposes, was used for general budget expenditures. The same has been occurring
in regional budgets. One study finds that in 1998, only 25 percent of payments collected for
environmental protection were actually used for this purpose.57 At the same time, pollution
payments to the state have increased significantly in recent years and have become a signifi-
cant source of income (about $130 million in 1999). The study warns that, “The process of
raising pollution payments and at the same time using the collected funds for fiscal purposes
is an alarming one. . . . This situation carries the risk that enterprises’ willingness to comply
with environmental regulations and/or to make environmental payments is reduced.”58
Environmentalists charge that Kazakhstan is not complying with international con-
ventions it has ratified. Although a signatory to the UNESCO World Heritage Convention for
eight years, Kazakhstan has not yet designated any world heritage sites. Kazakhstan is also a
signatory to the Aarhus Convention, which guarantees the right of public access to informa-
tion and decision making in environmental matters. Environmentalists claim that access to
information has not improved and is most visible in the failed attempt of local residents to
stop the construction of a high-voltage power line through the settlement of Ust-Kamengorsk,
despite a Constitutional Court ruling supporting the residents’ claims.59 Accessing reliable
information about the environment is equally difficult. In 2001, the Ministry for Environ-
mental Protection ended its monthly bulletins. Information provided by foreign oil compa-
nies about their environmental impacts are highly general. Without more detailed information,
it is difficult for independent analysts to assess the gravity of environmental problems, and
their potential impact on human health.
Structural reforms
The buildup of oil windfalls has increased pressure on the state to spend these earnings on
Kazakhstan’s struggling enterprises. As chapter one shows, the record of states’ efforts to use
oil profits to prop up domestic industries has been spotty. Such spending tends to attract cor-
ruption and diverts capital from enterprises that might otherwise survive in an open com-
petitive economy. A more sensible approach is to create a basis for sustained economic growth
by enhancing corporate governance, removing constraints to private sector development, and
strengthening the capacity of the public sector.
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While Kazakhstan has made significant progress in “first tier” structural reform—com-
mercial law reform, macroeconomic liberalization, and providing tax incentives for foreign
investors—significant efforts must be made to help these reforms filter down to the local
level.60 Increasing the transparency and simplicity of government regulations for new busi-
nesses can have a tremendous impact on drawing investment beyond the oil sector, on creat-
ing employment opportunities, and on improving the competitiveness of domestic enterprises. 
As with many other resource-rich economies, Kazakhstan has slowed the pace of struc-
tural reforms since oil prices rebounded from the lows of the late 1990s.61 Instead, the gov-
ernment has taken measures that create the impression—if not the reality—of favoritism and
corruption. These measures have worsened the overall investment climate, keeping the non-
oil sector at only 10 percent of FDI.62
Structural reform should be a priority because it lays the foundation for sustaining
growth in the non-oil sector. And by reforming the public sector, the government increases its
capacity to raise money through channels other than oil contracts.63 The aim of structural
reforms should be to “reduce public sector constraints to private sector development.”64
Since his appointment in January 2002, Prime Minister Imangaly Tasmagambetov has
moved to renegotiate contracts with foreign oil companies and exert control over their pro-
curement practices. Pressure began with an informal requirement that foreign oil compa-
nies source 25 percent of their content locally.65 Pressure increased with new rules on
procurement that give the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources the right to sit on com-
pany tender committees and to approve the terms and results of tenders.66 The unprecedented
authority of these government representatives increases the possibility that corruption or
favoritism will determine the awarding of contracts. 
In 2001, Transparency International ranked Kazakhstan 71st out of 91 countries listed
in its Corruption Perceptions Index. The Economist recently ranked Kazakhstan one of the
riskiest places to do business: “Vested domestic interests are increasingly powerful and pose
a challenge to the position of foreign investors. Cronyism is common, and personal connec-
tions and the local industrial lobby are having a greater effect on policy.”67 The annual Index
of Economic Freedom ranked Kazakhstan 125th out of 161 countries, emphasizing the need
to improve the country’s investment climate through increased transparency of the tender
process, as well as addressing corruption in the judicial system.68
The call for improved transparency in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas sector is a recurring one
by investors, international lending agencies, foreign governments, and local NGOs.69 The
absence of transparency makes it difficult to understand Kazakhstan’s oil picture and creates
a permissive environment for the diversion of oil and ensuing revenue away from the budget.
The need for improved transparency applies not only to the government, but also to foreign
and domestic oil companies. The fact that Kazakhstan’s largest export market after Russia is
a series of tax havens in the Caribbean suggests that money laundering and more complex
operations are perhaps being used to divert state resources. Transfer pricing operations, which
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are legal, deprive the government of revenue by reporting sales to subsidiaries at below mar-
ket prices. This procedure helps companies postpone the onset of profit sharing with the gov-
ernment, and lowers the companies’ tax burden. The IMF estimated that such practices may
have cost $690 million in export revenues and close to 1 percent of GDP in tax revenue
losses.70
Reducing the high cost of doing business in Kazakhstan will be an imperative for devel-
opment of the non-oil sector. A study conducted by the World Bank found that there are 26
government bodies that oversee authorization for establishing a business and that businesses
can be subject to 20 inspections a month.71 Information about authorization requirements is
often hard to come by, and businesses find themselves faced with the option of paying penal-
ties or paying bribes to pass inspections. Because of the burdens imposed on entrepreneurs,
many choose to operate in the informal economy, thus depriving the state of revenue, under-
mining their own competitiveness, and contributing to corruption. The World Bank estimates
that 42 percent of all business activity in Kazakhstan occurs in the informal sector and that,
if the size of the informal economy were brought to Eastern European levels, it would result
in a 26.8 percent increase in GDP.72
Small and medium-sized foreign investors find Kazakhstan’s investment environment
equally burdensome. Surveys of foreign investors conducted by the International Tax and
Investment Center and by a mission led by several international donors found the following
problems cited most often: excessive bureaucracy and corruption, a complex and arbitrary
tax regime, the lack of a well-functioning legal system, a weak regulatory system with frequent
changes in rules and personnel, and ad hoc interventions by regional governors.73
Lowering transaction costs for doing business will require a revamped legal and regu-
latory framework that addresses the endemic corruption that hinders setting up new busi-
nesses. Weak legal enforcement gives new entrepreneurs little recourse other than bribes for
navigating the overly complex licensing and regulatory process. An improved legal structure
for acquiring real estate would facilitate the process of acquiring premises for business.
Another priority should be revitalizing the stalled privatization process so that it
becomes transparent, competitive, and valuable to the state budget. Over 300 of Kazakhstan’s
largest enterprises, including a number in the oil and gas sector, remain state-owned.74 Rather
than cutting off credit to bankrupt state-owned enterprises, the government has kept them
afloat and diverted credit from small and medium-sized enterprises outside the petroleum sec-
tor.75 Streamlining the bankruptcy and liquidation process will also be required, because the
current process is prolonged and complex, allowing insolvent companies to continue to waste
resources indefinitely. 
To stimulate the non-oil sector, the government is developing an industrial policy that
will provide state funding and tax abatements to sectors of the economy that the government
wishes to promote.76 The IMF and other lenders have expressed concern over this approach.
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Noting the failure of protectionism and import-substitution in stimulating production in other
countries, the IMF warned, “The government must not create a greenhouse, in which the ‘del-
icate’ branches could be developed and kept afloat only thanks to protectionism. We believe
that the government must restrict itself to creating boundaries within which the private sec-
tor can develop and grow.”77
Instead of seeking to promote particular sectors of the economy, the government should
create the conditions by which businesses in every sector can operate. By creating the condi-
tions for entry into and exit from the marketplace, the government can go a long way toward
helping resources find their way to their most productive uses. Such progress would reduce
barriers to doing business in Kazakhstan and establish a basis for job creation and non-oil
growth. 
Kazakhstan’s National Fund
Creation of the Fund
In August 2000, a presidential decree officially created the National Fund of the Republic of
Kazakhstan. Regulations governing or impacting the National Fund are listed under Appen-
dix 6. The idea for creating some sort of oil fund surfaced in public discussions in 1997 when
the director of the Agency for Control of Strategic Resources, Galimzhan Zhakiyanov, pro-
posed the Budget for Development of Kazakhstan (BDK). Responsible to the president and
managed by the National Bank, the Agency for Control of Strategic Resources, the Agency
for Strategic Planning, and the state oil company (now known as KazMunaiGaz), the BDK
would have sterilized income from oil exports, invested these earnings to generate a return,
and provided credit for private sector development. 
The creation of the BDK became moot when state revenues dropped precipitously fol-
lowing the East Asian financial crisis that led to a sharp decline in oil prices, and the ruble
devaluation in the late 1990s. Nevertheless, oil money was set aside in a secret Swiss bank
account tied to President Nazarbayev.78 The account was opened in 1996 with about $1 bil-
lion in proceeds from the sale of 20 percent of the Tengiz oil field to Mobil. In his revelation
to parliament in April 2002 about the existence of this account, Prime Minister Tasmagam-
betov reported that its purpose was to prevent inflation and that in 1997 it paid pension arrears
and helped stabilize the currency after the devaluation of the Russian ruble. He also admit-
ted that other foreign bank accounts in the president’s name existed.79
In 2000, when oil prices surged to $28 a barrel (bbl), the problem of what to do with
this sudden windfall became urgent. Additionally, investigations by the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment into the role of an American, James Giffen, in transferring payments from oil compa-
nies to Swiss bank accounts tied to senior officials in the Kazakh government created an
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incentive to move this money back into Kazakhstan. Finance Minister Oraz Jandosov, fear-
ing that the sudden earnings would get whittled away on various spending projects, drafted
the concept for the creation of an oil fund.80 The president issued his decree in August 2000
and regulations specifying the fund’s functions followed in January 2001. 
Flows to and from the National Fund
Kazakhstan’s National Fund (NF) is both a savings and stabilization fund. Its founding docu-
ment describes its mission as “stabilizing the socio-economic development of the country,
accumulating savings for future generations, and reducing the country’s vulnerability to exter-
nal factors.”81
Revenues into the National Fund come from tax payments made by the nine largest
petroleum companies and the three largest mining companies. The 12 companies are Aktobe-
munaigas Corporation, JSC Don Mining and Enrichment Complex, Kazakhoil-Emba Corpo-
ration, Tengizchevroil Joint Venture, L.L.P., Kazzinc Corporation, Karachaganak Petroleum
Operating B.V., Kazakhmys Corporation, Hurricane Kumkol Munai Corporation, Turgai Petro-
leum Limited Partnership, Mangistaumunaigas Corporation, Uzenmunaigas Corporation, and
OJSC Karazhanbasmunai.
The government can change the list of companies whose payments are channeled to the
NF. Additional revenues to the NF come from its investment earnings and from discretionary
payments approved by the president, such as proceeds from the sale of the government’s share
in hydrocarbon projects. 
The savings portfolio of the NF receives 10 percent of the taxes paid by these compa-
nies. The savings portfolio holds 75 percent of NF assets, as a minimum. Interest earned from
investing the Fund’s assets also accrues to the NF’s savings portfolio. The amount budgeted
to flow into the savings component in 2002 was $81 million.82 The stabilization component
is triggered by a reference price for oil, which is set for five years. For example, in 2000, the
reference price had been set at $19/bbl. If the price of oil exceeded $19/bbl, the excess income
would flow to the NF. Conversely, if the price of oil were to fall below $19/bbl, the NF would
provide the difference, that is, a dollar amount equal to the loss in income, to the budget.
Stabilization flows from the NF to the budget occur on a quarterly basis. Mining companies
operate under comparable guidelines but of course under a separate reference price. 
In its assessment of Kazakhstan’s fiscal transparency, the IMF recommended a simpli-
fication of the NF’s complex funding rules, warning that the roles could lead to unpre-
dictable and contradictory outcomes that do not reflect policy choices. “The resulting process
is unpredictable and unclear to all participants, from NF administrators to republican and
oblast budget authorities.”83 The report recommended a simpler funding rule on the model of
the Norwegian State Petroleum Fund, where the NF would be used to finance the non-oil
budget deficit.
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Because the NF’s injections are based on tax payments made by the major petroleum
producing companies, it became increasingly important for the government to be able to accu-
rately predict earnings from the development and export of oil and gas. To assist the govern-
ment, the IMF and the World Bank developed a complex petroleum revenue model that takes
into account the cost structure for each individual oil field as well as transportation costs.84
In late 2001, the IMF projected that, at the reference price of $19/bbl, flows to the NF in 2002
would be $245 million. If oil prices dipped to $15/bbl, the NF would transfer $69 million to
the budget. A further estimate was provided by National Bank chairman Grigoriy Marchenko,
who manages the National Fund. Marchenko estimated that the Fund would accumulate $4
billion by 2005 (an amount roughly equal to the 2003 government budget).85
The NF received its first deposit of $660 million from the sale of a 5 percent share in
the TengizChevroil consortium and a related bonus payment. As of January 1, 2002, an addi-
tional $576 million had accrued to the NF through its stabilization and savings components,
including $65.7 million earned through investing the NF.86 At the same time, the NF disbursed
$49 million in 2001 through its stabilization function (an amount equal to about 1 percent
of the government budget). Operational expenses are deducted from the NF’s investment earn-
ings, and in 2001 these expenses came to $242,000.87 The president did not exercise his dis-
cretion to authorize additional transfers from the NF. By the end of 2001 funds available to
the NF stood at $1.2 billion. According to the National Bank, by July 2002, the NF had accu-
mulated $1.66 billion ($1.24 billion in the savings portfolio and $420 million in the stabi-
lization portfolio).88
Total contributions from the 12 oil and mineral companies came to $1.1 billion in 2001,
according to the Ministry of Finance’s annual report on the budget.89 Of this, $576 million had
been directed to the NF, and $500 million went to national and local budgets. According to
the same report, the oil, gas, and mining sector contributed 40 percent of budget revenues
in 2001. In 2002, total government revenues from petroleum and mining were $976 million.
Of this amount, $275 million was transferred to the NF.90
No detailed projections on the size of the NF in coming years under various price sce-
narios have been made public.91 In principle, the size of the Fund could be estimated with
available information about expected increases in production, the revenue rules for the NF,
and expected investment returns based on the performance of other oil funds. However, sev-
eral key pieces of information about the government take are not publicly available—namely,
the terms of profit sharing before and after cost recovery for the major contracts, progress
toward completion of cost recovery, as well as information about the tax payments made by
the major producers. The absence of this information also makes it impossible to verify
whether the amounts transferred to the NF are correct. 
Other than the outflows for stabilization purposes, additional expenditures from the NF
are at the discretion of the president. The NF’s regulations do not specify when and for what
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the savings portfolio can be drawn down. For example, spending could be directed to lavish
projects, such as moving the capital to Astana, rather than economic reforms to stimulate
job creation and alleviate poverty. There are no caps on how much the Fund can be drawn
down in a given year.
Investments
Kazakhstan received substantial technical advice on investment strategy from managers of the
Norwegian State Petroleum Fund.92 “We fully borrowed the Norwegian fund’s investment strat-
egy,” National Fund Chairman Grigory Marchenko said. “All the technical aspects—all the stan-
dard portfolios, their duration, and principles for selection of external managers.”93
Diversification and risk minimization guide the investment strategy. The Fund has
retained six Western portfolio managers, each of whom has managed over $100 billion, to pro-
vide diversity in investment styles.94 No investment manager is given more than $150 mil-
lion in assets to manage. One of the obligations of the external managers is to provide four
to five weeks of training to the National Bank’s personnel. Eventually, the National Bank plans
to have about 100 of these trained employees carrying out in-house investment management.
ABN Amro serves as the custodian of the NF, keeping a consolidated financial state-
ment on the various portfolios, representing the Fund as a shareholder of companies in which
it holds equity, collecting dividends, and paying taxes due foreign governments on the basis
of its investments. 
The NF’s investment strategy foresees investment of 75 percent of NF assets in the sav-
ings portfolio and 25 percent in the stabilization portfolio. The stabilization portfolio has no
equity investments. Its assets are invested in liquid short-term instruments so that they may
quickly become available for stabilization purposes. The savings portfolio holds about half
its investments in bonds and about 40 percent in stocks rated A or higher (see Table 9). The
savings portfolio securities have a maturity period of 1–3 years. 
Both portfolios are invested entirely abroad, thus sterilizing the foreign exchange and
protecting against an appreciation of the real exchange rate. About 60 percent of investment
is in the United States with the rest distributed among European countries, Japan, and Canada. 
The Ministry of Finance sets percentage benchmarks for the returns to the savings and
stabilization portfolios, and the Central Bank reports to the Finance Ministry on the NF’s per-
formance relative to the benchmarks. In its first year, the NF surpassed the Finance Ministry’s
benchmark of 4.8 percent, reaching 5.5 percent returns. Unlike the Norwegian Fund on which
it is modeled, the NF has not disclosed the precise geographical distribution of its invest-
ment portfolio nor has it disclosed what companies it holds equity in and the market value
of those holdings.
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TABLE 9. Asset Allocation of the National Fund, 2002
Stabilization Portfolio Savings Portfolio
Bonds
Central Bank bonds 20.7% 53.9%
Finance Ministry bonds 8.8% —
Agency bonds 55.7% —
Corporate bonds — 1.4%
Total bonds 85.1% 55.3%
Stocks — 39.48%
Money reserves 14.86% 5.26%
Total 100% 100%
Source: Quarterly Report of the National Fund, June 30, 2002. Available at http://www.nationalfund.kz/
Administration
As in Norway, management of the National Fund’s assets rests with the central bank—in this
case, the National Bank of Kazakhstan. The schedule of deadlines for the National Bank to
report on the NF to the Kazakhstan government is set out in Appendix 8. By placing the NF
within the National Bank, rather than creating a separate entity such as the Alaska Permanent
Fund Corporation, Kazakhstan is able to lower operational expenses. The National Bank is cur-
rently training staff from its department of monetary operations on portfolio investing. The
Ministry of Finance is responsible for receipt and transfer of funds to the NF, while the
National Bank oversees their investment.
Accountability
Considerable room exists for improving accountability mechanisms of the Kazakhstan
National Fund. Compared to funds in Norway, Alberta, and Alaska (see chapter two), the
National Fund has fewer channels of accountability, and all of them lead to the president, as
illustrated in Figure 2.
The NF lacks checks and balances. In Norway, various oversight bodies are account-
able to the parliament; in Kazakhstan, parliament’s role is peripheral. In Norway and Alberta,
the legislature established the oil funds, while in Alaska, the oil fund was established through
a public referendum. In Kazakhstan, neither parliament nor the public participated in the cre-
ation of the National Fund. 
In June 2000, Deputy Prime Minister Utembayev told parliament that the government
would be submitting a bill establishing the National Fund.95 A week later, parliament was
presented with a fait accompli: the news that the first injection into the NF would be the pro-
ceeds from the sale of government shares in TengizChevroil.96 Less than two months later, the
NF came into existence by presidential decree. Parliament was ordered to amend existing
legislation to remove inconsistencies with this new decree.
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FIGURE 2. Lines of Accountability in Oversight of the National Fund of Kazakhstan
Parliament President of Kazakhstan
Ministry of Finance
 Established the NF and its 
rules by decree
 Exclusive power to make and
change rules of the NF
 Exclusive power to authorize
purpose expenditures from 
the NF
 Approves annual report of
Finance Ministry
 Determines composition of 
the Oversight Council and 
serves as its chairman
 Can issue binding 
instructions on the 
Oversight Council, the 
Finance Ministry, and the
National Bank regarding 
the NF
 Develops rules for compilation of reporting
documents
 Prepares list of mineral sector companies
whose payments will flow to NF
 Handles flow of revenues into the NF and
oversees stabilization outflows
 Establishes benchmarks for investment return
and evaluates performance of investments
 Prepares annual report of the NF to submit to
president
 Approves procedures for selecting external
auditor
 Reports to 
Finance Ministry
Oversight Council
External Auditor
National Fund: National Bank,
Department of Monetary Operations
 Votes on purpose expenditures
proposed by president
 Receives report of NF’s activities
after it has been approved by
president
 “When necessary,” may be consulted
on changing sources of revenue 
to NF
 Speakers of both houses of
parliament are members of the
oversight council
 A “consultative-
deliberative” council
which “implements
the powers of the
president with regard
to management of the
Fund”
 Chaired by president
and is almost entirely
comprised of
presidential
appointees
 President has tie-
breaking vote
 Converts transfers from tenge to hard currency
 Oversees asset managers and custodian
 Performs own investments
 Provides regular reports to Ministry of Finance
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Only the president may approve changes to the NF, although the parliament may par-
ticipate in the preparation of proposals on the Fund’s management organs. While the parlia-
ment receives reports about the NF’s activities, there are no rules specifying the content of
these reports or the dates for their submission. More importantly, parliament has no author-
ity to approve, reject, or amend these reports. 
Only the president may propose spending from the NF. No guidelines exist on what
constitutes permissible expenditures and what limits exist on spending. Although expendi-
tures must be approved by parliament, this is no guarantee that lavish and politically moti-
vated expenditures benefiting few people—such as the government’s decision to move the
capital to Astana—will not be repeated. A World Bank analysis of the National Fund noted this
risk: “When the chief executive presides over the hierarchy [of an oil fund], decisions over uses
of the fund’s revenues become political.”97
In its report on Fiscal transparency in Kazakhstan, the IMF singled out the need to fully
integrate the NF in the budgetary process. Namely, it suggested that the republic’s budget
should provide a consolidated account incorporating flows to and from the NF, and that such
information should be reflected in the annual audit report of the Accounting Committee and
in the report on the execution of the budget, which would facilitate a review of the effective-
ness of the stabilization and savings functions of the NF.
Other powers enjoyed by the president include:
 Exclusive rule-making authority over the NF;
 Authority to designate purpose transfers from the NF;
 Authority to issue binding instructions to the government, the oversight council, and
the National Bank on issues relating to the NF;
 Authority to approve the annual report submitted by the Ministry of Finance and to
approve the external audit;
 The power to exercise control over activities involving management of the NF.
Perhaps the greatest authority that rests with the president is the ability to scrap the
NF altogether. Since a presidential decree created the Fund, all it takes is another presiden-
tial decree to radically alter or abolish it.
In establishing the Fund, President Nazarbayev promised to establish a board of trustees
comprised of governmental and nongovernmental representatives,98 but instead created an
oversight council that lacks independence, authority, and nongovernmental representatives.
The council is unlikely to provide effective oversight. 
The council, chaired by the president (who also enjoys the tie-breaking vote), is made
up almost entirely of presidential appointees, including the prime minister, the head of the
presidential administration, the chairman of the National Bank, the deputy prime minister,
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the finance minister, the two speakers of parliament, and the chairman of the State Budget
Control Committee. The chairman of the National Bank and the finance minister sit on the
oversight council even though they are both responsible for managing the Fund. Only the two
speakers of parliament are not directly subordinate to the president. However, even they are
unlikely to offer independent oversight. Parliamentary elections have been heavily managed
by the government, and as a result there are only about four opposition representatives among
the 77 members of the lower house and only a couple in the senate.
The oversight council lacks the independence and capacity required to function effec-
tively. The council exists to “implement the powers of the President of the Republic of Kazakh-
stan with regard to management of the Fund” and it “provides assistance and develops
recommendations” for the president.99 The rules do not define the scope of the council’s
reviews, do not give it binding authority, or any power to subpoena information or initiate
meetings to discuss matters of concern. To be effective, the oversight council must have a reg-
ular schedule of meetings, and its powers should be spelled out. As of early 2003, the coun-
cil had only met once, in May 2002, to hear the NF annual report. 
To improve its credibility and accountability, the oversight council should include rep-
resentatives from civil society and independent finance professionals. The Alaska Permanent
Fund’s Board of Trustees has two ex officio representatives of the governor, but not the gover-
nor. The other four trustees may not hold public office and must have recognized competence
and wide experience in finance and investment. Strict financial disclosure requirements
remove the risk of conflicts of interest. Other models include Chad, where an oil revenue over-
sight committee of nine members includes four representatives of civil society, and large pen-
sion funds, such as the New York State Teachers Retirement System, where eight of the ten
members of the board of trustees represent the beneficiaries of the fund.
Disclosure
The NF itself operates with relative transparency, but with opportunities for improvement. The
National Bank produces daily, monthly, quarterly, and annual reports for the Finance Ministry
on the National Fund’s investments, but none of these reports are made public. Instead, peri-
odic statements about how much has accumulated in the NF are published in the press. Rather
than publishing the annual report and the audit, a truncated summary of the two is made avail-
able. Appendix 9 compares the disclosure policies of the NF in comparison to those of Alaska,
Norway, and Azerbaijan, and the last section of this chapter provides recommendations on
improving of transparency of the NF. 
Of greater concern are the oil revenues that may have been diverted before reaching the
Fund. Oil swaps with neighboring countries, the export of crude to Russia below market prices,
transfer pricing operations, the sale of oil through tax havens in the Caribbean, and other sim-
ilar activities generate net revenues that never make it into the NF. Kazakhstan’s national oil
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and gas company, KazMunaiGaz, holds a 20 percent stake in the giant Tengiz oil field. Because
it is not subject to the accountability and reporting requirements expected of publicly traded
companies or elected officials, the company operates behind a veil of secrecy, with no public
disclosure requirements. Such arrangements make an independent assessment of the prof-
its generated by hydrocarbon production impossible. 
The secrecy of key documents contributes to the lack of transparency. None of the pro-
duction-sharing agreements (PSAs) or the joint-venture agreements (JVAs) that determine the
government’s take have been made public. Although KazMunaiGaz is a partner in several JVAs,
including TengizChevroil, the terms of these JVAs have not been made public. While certain
contract provisions must be held confidential, general terms of the contracts can still be made
available, with commercially sensitive clauses excised. Kazakhstan need look no further than
Azerbaijan for an example of how to disclose PSA terms and conditions. Additionally, the model
developed by the IMF and World Bank for Kazakhstan to predict government oil revenues could
help redress this informational muddle, but it has not been made available to the public.
The need for improved transparency of budget revenues is perhaps best highlighted
by the government’s admission that it maintained a secret Swiss bank account holding more
than $1 billion for six years and used $880 million to pay pensions and cover the budget deficit.
That such large expenditures could occur without the parliament or the public knowing the
source of the money reinforces the need for dramatic improvement of transparency in the gov-
ernment’s budget operations. The recent arrest of oil consultant James Giffen on charges of
channeling millions of dollars into bank accounts linked to senior Kazakh officials to seal an
oil deal further underscores the need for improved transparency of payments and earnings
from Kazakhstan’s oil and gas development.
Beyond improving disclosure, the government should improve the environment for
media freedom. Journalists who report on government corruption and the oil sector are espe-
cially vulnerable to intimidation and prosecution. Media outlets that reported on the presi-
dent’s secret Swiss bank account were raided or closed and some publishers were beaten,
prompting concern from Western governments. In its 2002 report, the UNDP named Kazakh-
stan among several countries that are slipping into authoritarian rule.100
Civil society’s response to the Fund
The constitution of Kazakhstan says that land and its subsoil resources belong to the state, but
that the people are the only source of state authority.101 However, according to legal analyst
Sofia Issenova, “The people have no access through their representatives in parliament or
through referenda to influence decisions regarding sub-soil use, nor do they have sufficient
access to information to make informed decisions.”102
Parliament is defined in the constitution as “the highest representative body” and as the
body that is “entitled to act on behalf of the people.” Yet, increasingly, rules governing hydro-
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carbon development and its impact on the environment are promulgated by presidential decree
rather than legislative act. Despite the state’s role in the development of its hydrocarbon
resources, none of the government’s PSAs or JVAs have been approved by parliament. Even
where parliament has the authority to monitor oil revenues more closely, it has not always cho-
sen to do so. According to the constitution, the president’s decrees carry force until parliament
adopts a new law. Yet, nearly two years after the creation of the NF, parliament has not pre-
pared a draft law on the oil fund.
In fact, members of parliament struggle to obtain any information about the terms of
oil and gas production agreements, and the public receives even less information. Many Ka-
zakhs believe that contracts were awarded to foreign companies that gained the patronage of
an influential sponsor within the government. This impression is reinforced by the arrest in
April 2003 of James Giffen, who, as stated earlier, allegedly diverted millions of dollars from
Mobil into bank accounts linked to senior Kazakh officials. ExxonMobil holds a 25 percent
stake in the Tengiz oil field. 
The secrecy of the PSAs and JVAs is seen as evidence supporting the allegation made in
the press and often heard among environmental groups in Kazakhstan that the government has
agreed to unfavorable contract terms. For example, one newspaper reports that the country has
forfeited close to $15 billion in revenue from production at Tengiz.103 Another reports that the
government could “realistically receive just one quarter of the value of extracted reserves” at
Kashagan and Karachaganak.104 Disclosure of these agreements, as has been done in Azerbai-
jan, could help dispel the impression that the government has sold out the national interest. 
Secrecy has also prevailed over the proceeds of hydrocarbon development. For years, the
government kept secret the existence of the $1.2 billion Swiss bank account holding proceeds
from the sale of state shares in the Tengiz oil field. Even after revealing its existence, the gov-
ernment has not provided evidence to parliament that the account has been closed nor has it
provided a full accounting and independent audit of how the money was used. 
Opposition to the government’s policies on the NF has been growing. Members of par-
liament in particular object to their lack of involvement in the development and oversight of
the Fund.105
Critics in the parliament and the press offer three basic arguments:
The Fund should not exist in its present form. This view argues that oil funds in Norway and
Alaska were created when these territories had already attained a high standard of living and
had resolved many of their most pressing social needs. By contrast, Kazakhstan suffers from
dire poverty and crises in education, health, and the environment. At current spending lev-
els, the critics argue, the NF’s stabilization function serves to institutionalize poverty because
it cannot be used to subsidize increased government spending. These critics call on the gov-
ernment to address pressing social needs first, and only then to establish an oil fund focused
on savings and stabilization.106
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The Fund should invest in domestic enterprises. Proponents of this view see the NF policy of
investing exclusively in foreign assets as a means of subsidizing the West, and particularly,
the United States. They argue that Western companies are exploiting Kazakhstan by refus-
ing to invest in anything but the hydrocarbon sector, and that the Fund should not compound
the exploitation by investing in Western equities and bonds. Instead, it should invest in domes-
tic enterprises that can boost the non-oil sector of the economy.107
The NF is an attempt to sanitize tainted money. This criticism holds that the impetus to estab-
lish the NF came from the investigation by Swiss and U.S. authorities into accounts held by
President Nazarbayev in Swiss banks. To defuse the scandal, the president allegedly estab-
lished the Fund and, in April 2002, transferred about $300 million into its accounts from
the Swiss account for ostensibly public purposes.108
In March 2002, a coalition of members of parliament from western Kazakhstan’s oil-
producing region, journalists, and opposition figures organized a “People’s Oil Fund” initia-
tive with an open letter to Ernst & Young published in the Wall Street Journal. The letter urged
the auditor to disclose the results of its audit of the Fund and to push for the inclusion of inde-
pendent monitors on the oversight council.109 The group’s recommendations included: return-
ing a portion of oil revenues to a fund for regions where development takes place, transparency
of oil and gas contracts, a liquidation of all secret foreign accounts, and greater parliamen-
tary control over the oil fund.110
As the NF grows, opposition to the Fund is also likely to increase unless citizens are
given a stake in its future. At a World Economic Forum panel on revenue transparency, Hans
Jochum Horn, managing partner for Ernst & Young’s CIS division, reflected on Norway’s expe-
rience and concluded that public support is the linchpin for sustaining a national oil fund.111
Recommendations
If Kazakhstan is to use its finite natural resources as a springboard for long-term economic
growth, it must demonstrate a commitment to transparency, fairness, and good governance
in the management of its oil and natural gas wealth. It must also create favorable conditions
for development of the economy beyond these industries.
Kazakhstan’s leaders should initiate and nurture public discussion about the govern-
ment’s strategy for using its oil and natural gas earnings to promote long-term economic growth
and improvement of the nation’s health, education, and social protection infrastructure. 
Recommendations concerning the National Fund
 Make independent audits of companies paying the Fund available to the public.
Since many of the 12 companies whose payments feed the NF are not audited and do
not produce public annual reports, it is impossible for independent observers to deter-
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mine whether the Fund receives what it is entitled to. Currently, even those companies
disclosing annual reports do not provide the detail necessary to determine what pay-
ments qualify for transfer to the oil fund. For the Fund to operate transparently, infor-
mation about its receipts should extend to their point of origin with the petroleum and
mining companies. To do this, the government should hire independent auditors to
review individual company operations and financial statements to determine whether
the correct amounts are being transferred to the NF. 
In particular, the transparency and accountability of the state energy company,
KazMunaiGaz, should be improved. Although the company is state owned and involved
in developing and selling public resources, it is not obligated to report its earnings to par-
liament. The company should be required to undergo external audits and to publish
financial information in line with generally accepted international accounting standards. 
 Provide more detailed and regular reporting of the National Fund.
Information about the Fund should be made more detailed and provided in a more timely
fashion. Currently, only “information about” the annual report is required to be reported.
By contrast, Norway’s State Petroleum Fund, Alaska’s Permanent Fund, and the Azer-
baijani State Oil Fund publish annual reports and audits in their entirety. Most quarterly
reports have not been made public. Although an outside auditor has reviewed the NF,
no audited financial statements have been disclosed. Full quarterly and annual reports
should be made available, providing information about payments made by each company,
revenue and expenditure projections, the market value and composition of individual port-
folios, and the investment methodology, as well as audited financial statements.
The Fund’s website should serve as a vehicle for providing the public with infor-
mation about the NF. Two models for website content are those maintained by the oil
funds of Alaska and Norway. Alaska makes public a full annual report written in “eas-
ily understandable language” and including the financial statements produced by out-
side auditors.112 Statutes of the Alaska Permanent Fund (APF) establish that all
information possessed by the APF is a public record, with the exception of confiden-
tial information about private enterprises in which it holds equity.113 Appendix 9 com-
pares the type of information provided on the Norwegian, Alaskan, and Kazakh oil fund
websites and highlights areas where Kazakhstan’s website content could be improved.
 Make oil revenue projections available to the public.
The predictions of the IMF/WB oil revenue model under various oil price assumptions
should be made widely accessible so that citizens can form expectations about the rev-
enues their government might earn. Since the model was constructed without knowl-
edge of the details of individual contracts, claims to secrecy of commercial data should
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not apply. Moreover, because the model is used to devise annual budgets, its assump-
tions and its outputs should become public knowledge. The Ministry of Finance should
also make public its projections for the Fund.
 Improve accountability through greater parliamentary oversight.
The presidential decree creating the NF gives the president complete control over the
Fund. To improve accountability, parliament should start by passing a law establishing
the NF. A fund based on a legislative act is more difficult to change than a fund backed
by presidential decree. Such a law should build in greater checks and balances over the
activities of the Fund. For example, it should adopt a medium- and long-term expendi-
ture policy for the NF that would create guidelines for permissible expenditures and
would set limits to the amounts of these transfers in a given year. 
A law on the NF should also make the oversight council a credible agency by giv-
ing it the authority to set investment benchmarks, determine its own meeting schedule,
conduct its own inquiries, subpoena documents and experts, and publish its conclusions.
Finally, the law should also draw on examples provided by other funds such as the Alaska
Permanent Fund, the Nunavut Trust, the New York State Teachers Retirement Fund, and
the California Public Employees’ Retirement System on how to assemble oversight boards
that incorporate representatives of the beneficiaries of the Fund. Credibility of the over-
sight council will come only with the inclusion of members of civil society.
Recommendations concerning spending of the NF 
and stimulating the non-oil sector
The National Fund lacks a clear development objective. The stabilization component is inde-
pendent of budget spending, and therefore cannot fill gaps that develop as a result of increased
budgetary expenditures. The savings function aims to “generate accumulations for the state,”
but does not clarify how, when, and for what the savings will be used. 
Recommendations on spending begin with two strictures:
 Do not invest oil fund assets in the domestic economy.
Calls for investment in the languishing economy instead of in foreign equities and secu-
rities have a number of drawbacks. Venezuela and Alberta’s Heritage Fund, each fol-
lowing a strategy of investing in local enterprises, made too many nonperforming loans
to enterprises unable to attract private financing. Moreover, an oil fund that has to sell
its share of equity in domestic enterprises to counter a drop in oil prices only worsens
the economic impact on domestic industry. Rather than insulating the economy from
oil price volatility, the oil fund transmits that volatility to domestic enterprises.
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 Use the earnings from foreign investments for human development.
A more sensible approach is to continue to invest in foreign equity and securities to gen-
erate returns, but use the earnings from the savings portfolio for a public investment
program to improve infrastructure, access to health care and education, and the invest-
ment climate for small and medium-sized enterprises. Such spending, however, must
be incremental and predicated on the achievement of observable improvements in out-
come. It is important that prior to initiating a public expenditure program, the govern-
ment of Kazakhstan have in place adequate project planning and evaluation capacity, with
agencies capable of tracking and auditing expenditures. To prevent overheating of the
economy and to ensure that expenditures do not exceed receipts, a cap should be set on
how much can be withdrawn in a given year. 
 Remove constraints on non-oil businesses.
Although many structural reforms have been adopted nationally, business development
continues to be stifled by the failure to communicate and implement rule changes at
the local level. A shortage of financing, excessive licensing requirements, frequently
changing rules and administrative personnel, an absence of information about regula-
tions, an oppressive and corrupt inspection regime, and a corrupt judicial system make
Kazakhstan an extremely unfriendly place to do business. The expanding informal econ-
omy results in lost opportunities for budget revenue generation and job creation. Pres-
sure to spend down the NF will only grow if these constraints to the development of the
non-oil sector are not removed.
 Ensure that environmental penalties are used to pay for environmental protection.
The government of Kazakhstan’s increased collection of penalties and other payments
for damage to the environment have not translated into use of those monies for the
environment. The government should ensure that environmental problems get ade-
quate funding either by reinstating the national Fund for Protection of Nature or ensur-
ing that the majority of environmental payments into the budget are used for the
environment. 
Recommendations concerning the state budget 
 Strengthen institutions capable of conducting budget oversight.
Strengthen parliamentary engagement with the budget by bolstering the research capac-
ity of the parliamentary committee on budget and the audit committees. If actual expen-
ditures differ sharply from planned expenditures, a revised budget should be prepared.
Strengthen the capacity of the external auditor and introduce an annual published audit
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of budget execution. Provide opportunities for public comment on the budget. In the
budget, disclose any oil-backed loans obtained by the government or by KazMunaiGaz,
which will become the obligation of future generations to repay.
 Disclose terms of Kazakhstan’s production-sharing and joint-venture agreements and require
parliamentary approval of future contracts.
Disclose terms of the production-sharing and joint-venture agreements for oil and gas
development that the government has entered into, as is currently done in Azerbaijan.
Since these contracts often over-ride existing and future legislation, have any new con-
tracts approved by parliament. Commit to eliminating, where possible, confidentiality
clauses, which prevent contracts from being a public record, in new contracts the coun-
try enters into. Have new production-sharing or joint-venture agreements ratified in par-
liament, as is done in Azerbaijan.
 Volunteer to disclose petroleum revenues.
Kazakhstan should volunteer to become an early signatory to the templates for report-
ing oil and gas revenue receipts being developed by the Extractive Industries Trans-
parency Initiative (EITI). The initiative aims to increase transparency of payments made
by extractive companies and received by host governments by creating templates for
companies and governments to report what they pay and earn. Participation in this ini-
tiative would send a strong signal about the government’s commitment to transparency
in its petroleum sector.
Recommendations on engaging civil society
 Implement the Aarhus Convention.
To improve public engagement in the environmental impacts of hydrocarbon develop-
ment, Kazakhstan should introduce relevant legislation and develop procedures and
infrastructure to implement the Aarhus Convention, which Kazakhstan has ratified and
which came into force in October 2001. The Aarhus Convention guarantees citizens
access to information, public participation in decision making, and access to justice in
environmental matters.
 Encourage public discussion of revenue strategy by protecting free speech.
It is important to initiate public discussion about the government’s strategy for apply-
ing its oil rents to promote human development and economic growth. Greater public
engagement can help the government overcome the public relations problem that is
feeding criticism of the government’s oil revenue management. 
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An environment for public discussion of the government’s revenue management
strategy can be created by curbing the persecution of journalists, which has intensified
in recent years. To strengthen its commitment to essential human rights and effective
citizen oversight, Kazakhstan should ratify the two fundamental conventions on human
rights: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which have been ratified by over
140 countries.
 Adopt a freedom of information law.
Adopt a law on public access to public information held by the government which com-
plies with international standards, and ensure that laws on freedom of expression and
information, including on the media, comply with international and comparative stan-
dards, in particular with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These recognize
the right to freedom of opinion and expression through any media.
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7. A Road Map for Promoting 
Revenue Accountability 
in the Caspian Basin 
and Beyond
Conclusions
Chapter one discussed why good management of oil and gas windfalls is important to the
countries of the Caspian. The question remains: Why should foreign governments care about
these outcomes?
For the United States, since September 11, a greater reluctance to promote democracy
has permeated U.S. foreign policy toward the Caucasus and Central Asia. Concern over secur-
ing the cooperation of these countries in the war against terrorism seemingly has eclipsed
efforts to encourage good governance and respect for human rights. Governments in Europe
and elsewhere, concerned about their need for Caspian oil, have also limited their activities
to promote good governance in these countries. Governments in the region have taken advan-
tage of the West’s turning a blind eye toward clampdowns on media freedom and the perse-
cution of opponents under the guise of battling terrorism.
“We would come a long way if all—and I emphasize all—natural resource
companies would make their transfers of royalties, fee payments, and other
revenues to host governments fully transparent.”
—PETER WOICKE, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, WORLD BANK
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The reluctance of Western governments to acknowledge problems of governance in the
Caspian region is shortsighted for two reasons. First, good management of oil and gas revenues
by the resource-abundant countries of the Caspian serves the long-term interests of those that
will increasingly rely on Caspian oil. In the United States, the National Energy Policy report of
the National Energy Policy Development Group, headed by Vice President Dick Cheney, out-
lines a plan for encouraging diversity of oil production to minimize the potential for market
instability and identifies the Caspian as an important new source of supply.1 Similarly, the Euro-
pean Union Energy Policy anticipates increased reliance on Caspian oil.2
Therefore, it is in the interests of Europe and the United States that stable regimes
emerge in the Caspian. As history has shown with Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela, allies
that are unable to navigate the resource curse are unreliable friends. The most effective way
to guarantee reliable allies and reliable exports from the Caspian is to encourage the forma-
tion of governments that derive their legitimacy from elections and are able to translate “black
gold” into economic prosperity and popular support. The prudent management of resource
revenues is a challenge even for states that are already prosperous and democratic. It is an
even greater challenge for states in the process of transformation and lacking these qualities.
Unfortunately, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have already demonstrated a tendency, typical of
petro-states, to rely on excessive centralization, ultra-presidentialism, and force rather than
elections to maintain current leaders in power.
Second, the leverage held by the United States and its allies in the war against terror-
ism in the region is underestimated. Cooperation is mutually beneficial. While the United
States and its allies benefit from the use of bases and fly-over rights, governments in the
region acquire an ally in their efforts to establish greater independence from neighboring
powers. Increased pressure by the United States and its allies for improved government
accountability in the Caspian is unlikely to sever the ties that have developed since these coun-
tries’ independence. 
Promoting good governance in the region also advances the war against terrorism. The
autocratic and repressive practices of rulers in the Caspian region create a fertile ground for
breeding terrorism by giving dissidents no other alternative for expressing their views. The
alliance of the United States with such regimes creates a perception of U.S. complicity and
hypocrisy that undermines its mission in the region. Outrage over such complicity contributed
to the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, eventually turning one of America’s closest allies in the
Persian Gulf into one of its enduring enemies. 
Chapters five and six highlighted the fragility of the natural resource funds in Azer-
baijan and Kazakhstan, given the absence of checks and balances in their governance and their
political systems. Rather than repeating the recommendations made in chapters five and six
to the governments of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, this chapter will focus on what the inter-
national community—governments, oil companies, international organizations and donors—
can do to promote good revenue management in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and beyond.
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Empower citizens through transparency and public participation
Much attention has shifted in recent years to the responsibility of petroleum and mining
companies to promote sustainable development in countries where they extract resources.
Not only are they expected to behave responsibly, but increasingly they are expected to per-
form services normally provided by government, while pressuring host governments to
improve their own behavior. For example, the British mining company Rio Tinto has cre-
ated foundations to serve as development agencies in countries ranging from Indonesia to
Namibia. In Papua New Guinea, mining companies receive tax offsets in exchange for the
construction of roads and the delivery of health and education services. In Sudan, Talis-
man Energy came under pressure by the Canadian government to help mediate an end to
the country’s civil war. Continuing civil rights pressure on Talisman was in part responsible
for Talisman selling its position in Sudan to an Indian company in 2002. While these impor-
tant efforts should be encouraged, they should not come at the expense of ignoring those
who have the primary responsibility of pressuring governments for responsible revenue
management: the citizenry. 
A key component of efforts by oil and mining companies to encourage good revenue
management should be the empowerment of local citizens to hold their own governments to
account. The first step toward such empowerment is the disclosure of information by com-
panies about how much host governments receive from their petroleum or mining operations,
and the terms on which those payments are determined. Mining, gas, and oil companies can-
not control how governments spend taxes, royalties, and fees. But they do have a responsibility
to disclose the terms they reach and the payments they make to governments so that citizens
can monitor and influence how that income is spent. Companies that fail to do so are com-
plicit in the disempowerment of the people of the countries to which the resources belong.
Lack of accountability for expenditures facilitates embezzlement, corruption, and revenue mis-
appropriation. If the revenue flow is known, then the expenditure flow can be tracked more
easily and mismanagement or diversion for illicit purposes will be more difficult to hide.
The disclosure of this kind of information is in the interest of multinational companies.
When companies operate in corrupt and autocratic environments where contracts have little
legal force and revenues are shrouded in secrecy, they are vulnerable to accusations of under-
payment and revision of contract terms when political actors or circumstances change. And
if petroleum development or mining fails to alleviate the deprivation of the country’s people,
the multinationals are often the first ones blamed. The best protection for the multinationals
is a public record detailing the terms of their payment obligations to the government, how
much was paid, and when. Such disclosure shifts attention away from the companies and
toward the government departments and individuals responsible for receiving and allocating
revenues. Payment disclosure also shifts some of the responsibility for encouraging govern-
ments to manage their revenues effectively from multinationals to civil society.
Some companies have already taken the lead in reporting their payments to host gov-
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ernments. Newmont Mining discloses its royalty payments to the government of Indonesia
on a quarterly and cumulative basis. Until it left Sudan in 2002, Talisman Energy published
a corporate responsibility report on its production and the benefits accruing to the govern-
ment, which was audited by PriceWaterhouseCoopers. However, BP’s experience in Angola
demonstrates the limitations of these voluntary approaches. The government of Angola, which
has been accused of siphoning away at least $1 billion per year in oil revenues, threatened
BP with a lawsuit when the oil company promised to disclose how much it pays to the gov-
ernment. Governments with the most to hide are the ones least likely to tolerate disclosure
of payments by multinationals.
To help companies circumvent the problems inherent to voluntary disclosure, a coali-
tion of NGOs launched the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign in 2002, calling for
reforms that would require companies to make public the taxes, royalties, production-shar-
ing fees, bonuses, and all other forms of payment to the governments in countries where they
operate. Such a requirement could come as a condition of being listed on major stock
exchanges, as a condition of lending by international financial institutions and credit and
donor agencies, or as an addition to the International Accounting Standards.3 A regulatory
rather than an voluntary approach creates a level playing field among major companies, and
protects these companies against retaliation by host governments.
The need for improved transparency is increasingly recognized by both industry and
governments. At the Johannesburg sustainable development world summit, British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, under pressure by PWYP campaigners, announced plans to form an
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative uniting governments, businesses, and NGOs to
develop a framework for ensuring that all payments by companies in the extractive industry
are published openly. The UNDP and International Finance Corporation (IFC) have added
their support for the PWYP appeal for financial transparency. The G-8 have also announced
they would be working to ensure better accountability and greater transparency with respect
to those involved in the import or export of Africa’s natural resources from areas of conflict.
Industry is also increasingly recognizing the need for greater transparency surround-
ing payments. The International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) includes in its char-
ter the commitment to “adhere to ethical business practices and, in so doing, contribute to the
elimination of corruption and bribery, to increased transparency in government-business rela-
tions, and to the promotion of respect for human rights internationally.” The ICMM reports
that about half of its members have codes of conduct on transparency. In an effort to stan-
dardize the reporting of information about the impact of companies on environmental, social,
and economic development, the Global Reporting Initiative brings together corporations,
NGOs, accountancy organizations, business associations, and other stakeholders from around
the world to design a standardized set of sustainability reporting principles.4 Individual com-
panies, such as BP, Talisman, and Newmont Mining have voluntarily begun providing infor-
mation about payments to host governments. 
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Good revenue management goes beyond oil funds
The creation of an institution such as an oil fund is an important first step toward good petro-
leum revenue management. However, the appearance of good institutions or good laws should
not detract attention from the importance of democracy in making these institutions work. In
many countries, expertly written laws co-exist side by side with their flagrant violation. When
there are no mechanisms for citizens to hold their public servants to account over violation
of the country’s laws or international conventions that the country has entered, then even the
best laws or institutions carry little force.
It is no coincidence that the oil funds commonly thought to represent best practices—
such as in Norway, Alaska, or Alberta—exist in established democracies. In Norway’s case,
the rules on channeling money to and from the fund are lax, and it is only a tradition of trans-
parency, accountability to voters, and interagency checks and balances that have made the
fund so robust. As chapter two shows, those aspects that make oil funds successful—trans-
parency, tight fiscal controls, accountability—are less likely to exist in the absence of democ-
racy. Conversely, the experiences discussed in chapter two suggest that the greatest threat to
an oil fund is a lack of checks and balances. Oil funds are in greatest danger when a single
individual can rewrite the rules in response to failures of fiscal policy or whimsical spend-
ing priorities.
Those international institutions and foreign governments that advise Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan on the management of their petroleum wealth should not be satisfied with the
adoption of oil funds in these countries. While the oil funds are a positive first step, they exist
in a context where free and fair elections have not yet occurred, where parliaments have little
power, where presidents rule by decree, and where civil society is restricted and persecuted.
For these oil funds to endure they must be embedded in a democratic system that gives the
various branches of government oversight of one another, a system that is transparent in its
handling of public monies, and that allows citizens to hold public servants accountable. In
their advice to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan about how best to manage the countries’ resource
wealth, international institutions and foreign governments should not skirt the sensitive but
critical role that democracy plays in sound revenue management.
Reporting of payments made to Caspian governments by petroleum companies should
go hand in hand with improved budget transparency. The problem is particularly acute in Azer-
baijan where the budget is unclear and parliamentary procedures undefined. The parliament
receives a short budget, typically less than 20 pages, in which expenditures are aggregated
by department and not by program or line item. The budget does not report the basis for its
revenue and expenditure estimates, leaving the reliability of these estimates to be questioned.
Parliament can return the budget along with suggestions to the executive branch, but it has
no authority to amend the budget on its own. Parliament’s weakness was demonstrated by the
fact that the 12-page 2002 budget was approved following just 20 minutes of discussion. Infor-
mation on actual expenditures is extremely difficult for the public to obtain. It is available only
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from state statistics reports, which have a very limited circulation and are for government
use only.
In Kazakhstan, where there is an established treasury system and a more detailed inter-
nal classification and reporting system, more information is available about the budget.
Detailed information on actual revenues and expenditures is available online on a quarterly
basis. However, improvement is needed in the monitoring and evaluation of the budget, which
currently includes only a cursory internal audit and no external independent evaluation.
Improvements are also needed in integrating off-budget accounts, such as the National Fund,
into a consolidated budget. In Kazakhstan, the greater challenge is achieving parliamentary
independence. One impediment is the parliament’s low research and administrative capac-
ity. Only recently has each parliamentary commission been able to hire a single administra-
tive assistant, but they still lack an independent research staff. 
Given the size of the oil and gas sectors in the budgets of these two countries, improved
budget transparency should specifically address how to improve transparency of oil and gas
revenues. One model of good resource revenue reporting is Botswana, which obtains about
three-quarters of its export revenues from the sale of diamonds. In Botswana, a chain of
accountability exists between government, parliament, and the public. Line ministers project
and later transfer revenue from sale of natural resources into a central bank account. An
accountant general and later an auditor general analyze actual against estimated deposits, not-
ing any discrepancies, and submit a summary report to the parliamentary Public Accounts
Committee. The committee conducts hearings with the relevant line ministers and publishes
regular reports on government accounts and the outcomes of these hearings.5
There are many ways to establish fiscal transparency. The IMF’s Code of Good Practice
on Fiscal Transparency and the OECD’s Best Practices for Budget Transparency provide numer-
ous suggestions. The key to implementation, however, will be linkage by the international com-
munity between fiscal transparency and continued investment in the Caspian countries’ oil
and gas sectors. 
Revenue watchdogs should learn from one another
NGOs have had a significant influence on shaping the development of extractive projects and
holding governments and multinationals to account. For example, in Chad, NGOs participated
throughout the development of the revenue management plan and negotiations over con-
struction of a pipeline to move oil to a port of export. The plan and negotiation process helped
create additional layers of oversight into the pipeline’s construction and to increase compen-
sation to communities along the right of way. Burmese NGOs are holding Unocal to account
in U.S. federal court through the Alien Tort Claims Act for the company’s complicity in human
rights abuses committed by the military on behalf of the company. Following the public out-
cry of the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa for his opposition to Royal Dutch/Shell’s activity in
the Niger Delta, the company has cooperated extensively with local NGOs. Activism by local,
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national, and international NGOs has frequently led to changes in individual projects or poli-
cies at the World Bank.6
Unfortunately, NGOs active in oversight of extractive projects have little information
about what their counterparts are doing. Without such information, NGOs have been unable
to demand that multinationals or international financial institutions replicate “best practices”
initiated elsewhere. For example, few in the Caspian region likely know about BP’s innova-
tive partnership with local government and NGOs inthe province of  Papua, Indonesia, to help
build government capacity to absorb the increased revenues from petroleum development and
improve service delivery and good governance in the region. Few Caspian NGOs probably
know how activists in India helped communities displaced by construction of the Narmada
Dam successfully pressure the World Bank for its first-ever independent review of a project,
as well as the creation of an information disclosure policy and an independent inspection
panel. 
It is important that NGOs be able to share views and advice about their experiences
in oversight of the extractive industry and revenues stemming from it. Donors can facilitate
this exchange by providing grants to organizations to create websites and roundtables, and
to support study trips allowing budget activists from different countries to meet and exchange
ideas.
Recommendations
Recommendations for foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations 
It is in the interest of the home governments of the major investors in Azerbaijan and Kazakh-
stan—the United States, Britain, Italy, France, Norway, and Russia—to increase accountabil-
ity in the use of public revenues derived from oil and gas exports. Because many of these
countries’ oil companies will be in the Caspian Basin for many years to come, their position
will be more secure if it can be demonstrated that their presence has contributed to improve-
ments in the economic and human development of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
 Home governments of the major oil and gas companies operating in Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan should use their domestic regulatory powers to require oil and natural gas
companies to make public the taxes, royalties, production-sharing fees, bonuses, and
other forms of payment to the governments of the countries in which they operate.
 The European Union should use the implementation of its Partnership and Coopera-
tion Agreements with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to emphasize the importance of rev-
enue transparency and fiscal accountability. These agreements are 10-year treaties that
use respect for democratic principles and human rights to define the political, economic,
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and trade relationships between the partner and the European Union. The issue of rev-
enue transparency should also be part of the regular agenda at the annual Ministerial
Cooperation Councils between the EU and its partners. 
 The European Parliament should include the issue of revenue transparency and budget
accountability on the agenda of its Parliamentary Cooperation Committees with Azer-
baijan and Kazakhstan, and press the European Commission to address these issues
in its programming.
 The United States and the European Union should provide leadership for the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) by pressing for full disclosure of payments
by companies and receipts by governments, and by holding open the option for a reg-
ulated approach if voluntary disclosure fails. 
 The OSCE should make public participation in government revenue management a pro-
grammatic priority through its efforts to further member compliance with OSCE
Human Dimension Committments.
 The Council of Europe should encourage greater transparency and open discussion
about Azerbaijan’s revenue management strategies by pressuring the government to
adhere to its obligations under the Council of Europe. In particular, the Council should
maintain pressure on Azerbaijan to adhere to its commitment to amend the rules for
registration of nongovernmental organizations and the appeals procedures, to guaran-
tee freedom of expression and independence of print and broadcast media, and
strengthen the independence of the legislature vis-à-vis the executive.
 Governments whose energy companies operate in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan should
encourage the Caspian states to have their parliaments ratify future production-sharing
and jointventure agreements. They should also encourage these governments to dis-
close the terms of existing agreements with oil companies. 
In order to protect the companies from postcontractual efforts by governments to get
a better deal, these contracts often contain a clause that makes the contract supersede
existing and future legislation. Such exemptions, however, deprive the populations of
these countries of the right to legislate environmental or other improvements that con-
tradict contract terms. For example, the intergovernmental agreements for the BTC
pipeline, which are in force for 60 years, will supersede laws in the areas of land acqui-
sition, tax codes, environmental regulation, human rights protections, indemnification
against liabilities, and military security in Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.7 Because
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these agreements place limits on the ability of governments to act on behalf of their pub-
lic in the aforementioned areas, approval of these contracts should be preceded by wide-
spread public discussion, parliamentary ratification, and ready availability of the relevant
documents.
 The diplomatic community should promote citizen oversight by facilitating the grant-
ing of refugee status and by speaking out against persecution of watchdogs, whistle-
blowers, and journalists who report on mismanagement and corruption. Foreign aid
should be embargoed when governments are directly responsible for cracking down
on investigative journalists. When governments deny responsibility for attacks against
journalists, the diplomatic community should maintain attention and publicity around
the government’s criminal investigations to arrest and bring the attackers to justice.
 Governments and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations or the
OSCE should emphasize the importance of revenue transparency in the course of diplo-
matic dealings with the governments of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Governments and
intergovernmental bodies that dispense foreign aid to these two countries should fund
training and other programs that aim to build the capacity of civil society to monitor
oil revenues and budgets.
 Governments and intergovernmental organizations should encourage the governments
of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to adopt freedom of information laws which would pro-
vide a legal grounding for the public to hold these governments to account over rev-
enues and expenditures. To monitor and influence government decisions that affect
their lives, citizens require access to official information held by government and other
public authorities. With access to information increasingly recognized as a fundamen-
tal right, freedom of information laws now exist in most European countries and
throughout North America. Increasingly, they are also being adopted in the develop-
ing world. Both Georgia and Uzbekistan possess freedom of information laws. Min-
eral rich countries such as Mexico, Chile, South Africa, and Indonesia have adopted,
or are in the process of adopting, such laws. Even where rule of law is absent, such laws
provide a foundation for a more democratic future. 
 Foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations should press Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan to improve their enabling environment for civil society. In Azerbaijan, the
absence of information about registration procedures for NGOs as well as lack of oppor-
tunities to appeal registration denial have prevented many civil society groups from
being able to operate in the open. In Kazakhstan, lawsuits and arbitrary arrests have had
a similarly chilling effect. 
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Recommendations for international financial institutions and donors
To fulfill their mission of reducing poverty and promoting stable economic development, the
IMF, the World Bank Group, and other multilateral development banks, as well as officially
supported export credit agencies, should use their leverage to promote accountability and
transparency of revenue management in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Although Kazakhstan
has paid off most of its assistance loans, it will continue to depend on multilateral donors for
project financing, which creates opportunities for conditionality. The European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the International Finance Corporation have
funded several projects in the energy sectors in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and are now poised
to help finance the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The Asian Development Bank is likely to
increase its involvement in energy sector projects in Kazakhstan.
The World Bank and the IMF have accumulated a body of case studies showing how lack
of transparency and accountability with regard to management of natural resource wealth has
contributed to the misallocation of this wealth. As Peter Woicke, executive vice president of
the World Bank’s private sector lending arm, the International Finance Corporation, has said,
“We would come a long way if all—and I emphasize all—natural resource companies would
make their transfers of royalties, fee payments, and other revenues to host governments fully
transparent.”8
The international financial institutions (IFIs) should themselves promote that kind of
transparency by tying lending to disclosure by governments of all earnings they have received
from the sale of oil, gas, and minerals, and to improved reporting about how those revenues
are being spent. In Chad, the World Bank helped design an aggressive revenue management
law tied to spending to reduce poverty. In Ecuador, the IMF tied receipt of a $240 million loan
to passage of a fiscal reform law that would assign pipeline profits to debt reduction and to
education and health spending. Such efforts should be made more systematic. In countries
such as Angola, the amount of oil revenue that disappears each year far exceeds the amount
received from international lending agencies. For the IFIs, tying lending to revenue trans-
parency requirements is not only good policy, but sound investment practice.
The IFIs should also press the governments of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to disclose
any oil-backed loans they have received. One of the greatest dangers of abundant resource
wealth is the easy accumulation of debt that such wealth permits. Governments that initiate
ambitious spending programs borrow liberally when oil prices fall, often leaving these coun-
tries with more debt than they would have had if there were no natural resources at all. In par-
ticular, the easy ability of state-owned oil companies to borrow on the international market has
endowed these companies with tremendous budgetary resources but without the accompa-
nying demands for transparency and accountability expected of governments. In Indonesia,
for example, Pertimina, the state oil company of Indonesia, borrowed heavily to finance an
industrial development policy, to provide funding for the military, and to build public works
P R O M O T I N G  R E V E N U E A C C O U N T A B I L I T Y    1 7 1
projects. According to Ascher, “the development strategy pursued directly through Pertimina
operations was a remarkably broad industrialization and infrastructure expansion, unfettered
by government oversight or careful analysis of profitability.”9 By 1973, Pertimina’s debt
exceeded that of the Indonesian government and when oil prices fell several years later, the
company was forced into bankruptcy. 
Because loan servicing becomes the obligation of future generations, it is imperative that
citizens know what obligations the state is incurring on their behalf. International finance insti-
tutions, such as the IFC, EBRD, and export credit agencies that invest heavily in oil and gas proj-
ects in the Caspian, should, as a condition of lending, require regional governments to disclose
all oil-backed loans that they or their state-owned natural resource companies obtain.
Additional aid provided by multilateral donors such as the World Ban, IMF, Asian
Development Bank, or EBRD should require the governments of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
to:
 disclose all revenues received from the exploitation of oil, natural gas, and minerals;
 produce and make public financial reporting by the state oil and gas companies, with
that reporting meeting the requirements of generally accepted international accounting
standards; 
 introduce improved accountability mechanisms in the oversight of their oil funds;
 commit to use petroleum revenues toward implementation of a poverty alleviation plan;
 disclose all oil-backed loans obtained;
 for Kazakhstan, encourage the government to disclose, to the extent possible, details
of production-sharing and joint-venture agreements entered into. Require parliamen-
tary ratification and disclosure of any new contracts for oil and gas development that
receive funding from these donors.
There are other measures that international financial institutions and private donors can take
to promote transparency and public oversight of government revenue management.
 The IMF’s Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency and its survey to assess com-
pliance with these standards should include an assessment of how transparent and
accessible the budgetary process is to the public. It should assess the extent to which
government budget documents are readily available to the public in a timely manner
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and whether there has been an open discussion of the budget. The IMF’s annual Arti-
cle IV consultations, the country-specific assessments which guide IMF lending, should
include an assessment of the transparency of the government budget.
 The IMF and the World Bank Group should facilitate payments disclosure by govern-
ments and companies by creating templates for such reporting, as advocated by the Pub-
lish What You Pay campaign and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. The
campaign and initiative aim to increase transparency of payments made by extractive
companies and received by host governments by providing templates for companies and
governments to report what they pay and earn.
 Donors should make training and education of civil society budget watchdogs and par-
liamentarians in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan a priority. Local groups are woefully under-
prepared to conduct independent analysis and oversight. Training in budget monitoring,
fiscal policy, and in the economics of petroleum-led development should be provided.
Such capacity building should become a priority for the OSCE through its Economic
and Environmental Dimension, which seeks to promote economic prosperity among
member states to reinforce international security. Training could also be integrated into
the World Bank’s Global Development Learning Network. The IMF already provides fis-
cal training to government officials through the IMF Institute and should expand such
training to civil society budget watchdogs. Additionally, through its TACIS Institution
Building and Partnership Programme, the European Union should provide training to
local groups in budget analysis and oversight. 
 In addition to providing technical training in fiscal analysis, donors should also help
provide training to local watchdogs in methods of investigative journalism. Several
Western NGOs have developed a reputation as “watchdog journalists” whose ground-
breaking reports have created a better-informed public armed with the appropriate back-
ground information to justify a demand for greater accountability from their elected
leaders. Groups such as the Center for Public Integrity, Global Witness, the Institute for
War and Peace Reporting, and the National Security News Service have developed meth-
ods of investigative journalism that could be shared with Caspian-based journalists.
Such exchanges should not only focus on training, but on creating project-specific part-
nerships teaming Western and local investigative journalists to pursue stories that might
be too big and too dangerous for local journalists to pursue on their own.
 Donors should promote establishment of citizens’ advisory councils in Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan. Such councils should operate with adequate financing and with the impri-
matur and cooperation of both the government and the companies involved. To ensure
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that the councils remain independent of government or industry pressure, funding
should come from multiple sources such as oil companies, the World Bank Group, for-
eign donor agencies, the governments of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and others with
an interest in promoting public oversight. The first step might be to arrange a study tour
for a task force of Azerbaijani and Kazakh budget watchdogs and government repre-
sentatives to visit Alaska, to become acquainted with the governance, operational pro-
cedures, and financing of the Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils. The task force could
then be charged with drafting a concept for creation of similar councils in Kazakhstan
and Azerbaijan.
 Donors should promote coordination and an exchange of experiences between revenue
watchdogs throughout the world by providing grants to organizations to organize infor-
mation exchange, training, roundtables, and joint advocacy for budget activists from dif-
ferent countries.
Recommendations for foreign oil and natural gas companies 
It is in the interest of foreign oil and natural gas companies to help the citizens of Azerbai-
jan and Kazakhstan monitor their governments’ use of oil and gas revenues. These companies
can begin by disclosing their production-sharing and joint-venture agreements with Azerbai-
jan and Kazakhstan and by revealing how much they pay the governments of these countries.
BP and project partners for the largest oil and natural gas fields in Azerbaijan have already
revealed their production-sharing agreements as well as the agreements for construction of
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, AGIP, TotalFinaElf, Royal
Dutch/Shell, and Lukoil should also disclose their contracts for producing oil in Kazakhstan
and their payments to the government of Kazakhstan.
To help citizens hold their governments to account over receipts from natural resource devel-
opment, oil and gas companies operating in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan should:
 Disclose the terms of production-sharing and joint-venture agreements entered into
with state or state energy companies, as has already been done in Azerbaijan. Access
to information about the government take contained in these agreements, when com-
bined with reporting about company earnings and costs such as that found in normal
profit and loss statements, could help independent analysts assess whether the amounts
flowing into the oil funds and into the budget are correct. Moreover, since in their legal
force these contracts override existing and future legislation in areas such as human
rights, environmental policy, and fiscal policy, companies should insist that they be rat-
ified by parliaments and available to the public. 
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 Companies should also be encouraged to report their social development spending.
Such spending is becoming an increasingly large component of companies’ obligations.
Yet such investment usually takes place at the local level where there is an absence of
budget transparency. Reporting of payments or investments made in social development
would help minimize the opportunity for abuse at that level.
 Additionally, payments made to third parties should be disclosed. Such parties may per-
form consulting services in connection with negotiations with governments or perform
contract services associated with exploration and production operations. The details of
such payments are almost never disclosed, creating opportunities for corruption. For
example, in April 2003, American oil consultant James Giffen was arrested on charges
of funneling millions of dollars paid by Mobil to the accounts of Kazakh senior gov-
ernment officials. Given the possible relationships between third parties and govern-
ment representatives, an effective transparency regime would require disclosure of such
payments when they exceed certain levels, along with identification of recipients. 
 Establish an endowment for the creation of citizens’ advisory councils to monitor and
report on the social and environmental impacts of petroleum development. A first step
might be to arrange a study tour to Alaska for a task force of budget watchdogs and gov-
ernment representatives to learn how Alaska’s Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils
operate. That visit and the information gained would provide the basis for drafting a
blueprint for creating such councils in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
 Empower citizen advocates with the tools to advocate for good governance with regard
to revenue management. Provide training on budget analysis, project monitoring, and
the economics of petroleum-led development for NGOs and journalists.
Addressing these challenges is urgent. Development of oil and gas fields in Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan and construction of the pipelines that will bring these resources to market will
proceed faster than the development of capacity to handle these revenues prudently. Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan still have a long way to go in improving the budgetary process, developing
long-term policy planning, improving service delivery, and removing public sector constraints
to private sector development. The weakness of democracy and rule of law in these countries
hinders the development of policies and practices for good revenue management. Yet, the abil-
ity of the donor community to encourage governments to address these problems will dimin-
ish as their presence and influence in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan adjusts to the countries’
increasing revenues. For those who wish to help Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan avoid the resource
curse, the time to act is now.
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Appendix 1
Lines of Accountability in Oversight of Norway’s State Petroleum Fund
 Accountable to Ministry of 
Finance
 Establishes investment 
benchmark and risk limits
 Reviews reports and audits
 Maintains close watch over 
SPF and measures 
performance
 Manages the SPF
 Hires portfolio managers
 Conducts internal audits
 Reports to Ministry of 
Finance
Storting (Parliament)
Ministry of Finance
Economic Policy
Department of the
Ministry of Finance
Norges Bank (Central Bank)
Norges Bank 
(Central Bank)
Management
Norges Bank 
Supervisory Council
Auditor General
External Auditor
 Oversees Central Bank’s 
management of the Fund
 Accountable to parliament. 
Approves and submits to 
parliament the reports of 
the Economic Policy 
Department
 Passed Act establishing 
State Petroleum Fund
 Appointed by 
parliament to oversee 
SPF
 Oversees 
investments
 Provides protection 
against decline in 
portfolio
 Conducts annual 
external audit
 Submits audit to 
Norges Bank 
Supervisory 
Council
Government 
Petroleum 
Insurance Fund
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Appendix 2
Azerbaijan’s PSA Offshore Oil Contracts with Foreign Companies 
Date of
Contract
Completion and 
Date of
Parliamentary Interest Stakes of SOCAR and Foreign Companies 
Ratification Offshore Fields (percent of total)
9-20-94 Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli SOCAR(10); BP (34.1);
12-20-94 Unocal(10.3); Lukoil(10.0); Statoil(8.6);
ExxonMobil(8.0); TPAO(6.7); Devon Energy(5.6);
Itochu(3.9);  Amerada Hess(1.0); Delta(1.7)*
11-10-95 Karabakh SOCAR(7.5); Lukoil(12.5); Devon Energy(30.0); 
2-13-96 Agip-Lukoil(45); Agip(5)
6-4-96 Shah-Deniz SOCAR(10); BP(25.5); Statoil((25.5); Lukoil(10); 
10-4-96 Totalfinaelf(10); OIEC(10); TPAO(9)
12-14-96 Dan-Ulduzu, Ashrafi SOCAR(20); BP(30); Unocal(25.5); Itochu(20); 
2-25-97 Delta(4.5)
1-13-97 Lenkoran-Deniz, SOCAR(25); Elf(25); Totalfinaelf(35);
6-13-97 Talish-Deniz Wintershall(30); OIEC(10)
7-3-97 Yalama SOCAR(40); Lukoil(60)
12-5-97
8-1-97 Absheron SOCAR(50); Chevron(30); Totalfinaelf(20)
12-5-97
8-1-97 Nakhchivan SOCAR(50); ExxonMobil(50)
12-5-97
8-1-97 Oguz SOCAR(50); ExxonMobil(50)
12-5-97
6-2-98 Kurdashi, Araz-Deniz, SOCAR(50); Agip(25); Mitsui(15); 
7-7-98 Kirgani-Deniz TPAO(5); Repsol(5)
7-20-98 Inam SOCAR(50); Shell(25); BP(25)
12-1-98
7-20-98 Araz, Alov, Sharg SOCAR(40); BP(15); Statoil((15); 
12-18-98 TPAO(10); Alberta Energy(5); ExxonMobil(15) 
12-25-98 Ateshgakh, Yanan-Tava, SOCAR(50); JAPEX(22.5); INPEX(12.5); 
6-11-99 Mugan-Deniz It0chu(7.5); Telkoku(7.5)
4-27-99 Savalan, Dalga, SOCAR(50); ExxonMobil(30); NA(20)
Lerik-Deniz, Janub
4-27-99 Zafar, Mashal SOCAR(50); ExxonMobil(30); Conoco(20)
Source: Turan Information Agency
* At the time of publication Lukoil was in the process of selling its share in the project to INPEX.
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Azerbaijan’s Onshore Oil Contracts with Foreign Companies
Date
Signed
Contract and
Type Date Ratified Field Partners
JV* 1993 Neftchala SOCAR (51%)
Khilli
Babazan Atilla Dogan (31.8%)
Durovdag Land & General Berxard (17.2%)
JV 1994 Romani SOCAR (51%)
Grunnewald (49%)
PSA 2000 Kelameddin SOCAR (15%)
Mishovdag Moncrief Oil (49.3%)
Petholding (35.7%)
JV 1997 Kurovdag SOCAR (49%)
Whitehall (51%)
PSA 1998 Gobustan SOCAR (20%)
Commonwealth Oil & Gas (80%)
PSA 1998 Muradxanli SOCAR (50%)
Zardob Ramco (50%)
Jafarli
PSA 1998 Kursangi SOCAR (50%)
1999 Garabagli CNPC (50%)
PSA 1999 Padar SOCAR (20%)
2000 B.Huramin Moncrief Oil (64%) ISR(16%)
S.Huramin
PSA 2001 Zikh, Hovsan SOCAR (50%)
2002 Lukoil (50%)
Source: Turan Information Agency; SOCAR. 
JV = Joint Venture; PSA = Production Sharing Agreement
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Appendix 3
Oil Production (Thousand Tons):
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total Oil Production 12,501 11,703 11,084 10,295 9,563 9,161 9,300 9,071 11,423 13,806 14,086 14,897 15,330
Including:
— SOCAR 12,501 11,703 11,084 10,295 9,563 9,161 9,300 8,556 8,585 8,328 8,376 8,254 8,181
— JV and PSA 
(onshore) 465 467 664 637 746 763
— AIOC 50 2,371 4,814 5,073 5,897 6,386
Source: SOCAR, AIOC, Turan News Agency
Gas Production (Million Cubic Meters):
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total 9,926 8,621 7,872 6,805 6,379 6,644 6,305 5,964 5,590 5,999 5,658 5,547 5,151
Including:
— SOCAR 9,926 8,621 7,872 6,805 6,379 6,644 6,305 5,913 5,192 5,264 4,936 4,563 4,097
— JV and PSA 
(onshore) 51 47 92 78 84 95
— AIOC 351 643 643 899 959
Source: SOCAR, AIOC, Turan News Agency
Appendix 4
Azerbaijan’s Expected Revenues from the Sale of Profit Oil Under the PSA for 
Development of the Offshore Block, Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli
Table A-1 below contains anticipated (2003-2010) oil production data from the Azeri-Chirag-
Gunashli block of fields. 
TABLE A-1: Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli Oil Production, 1997–2010, million barrels
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Production 0.4 17.3 35.1 37.0 43.0 47.5 47.5 63.9 89.0 140.5 224.5 352.5 434.4 452.6
Source: “AIOC Azeri, Chirag and Deep Water Gunashli Full Field Development. Environmental and Socio-Eco-
nomic Overview. BP, 2000”; Presentation by BP during the annual oil and gas show, Baku, June 5, 2002.  
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Table A-2, below, contains calculations of predicted earnings from profit oil from the ACG.
TABLE A-2: ACG Profit Oil Calculations, 1997–2010
1997–2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Production in Year, mln. barrels
A 47.4 63.9 89.4 140.5 224.5 352.2 434.4 452.6
Cumulative Production, mln. barrels
180.2 227.6 291.5 380.9 521.4 745.9 1098.2 1532.5 1985.1
Price of Crude Oil, $/b
high B 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
low C 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0
Value of Annual Production, mln USD
high D 1185.0 1597.0 2235.8 3513.3 5612.0 8805.8 10858.8 11315.0
low E 853.2 1149.8 1609.7 2529.5 4040.6 6340.1 7818.3 8146.8
Operating Cost, $/barrel
F 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Cumulative Oper. Cost, mln. USD
G 85.3 115.0 169.9 281.1 449.0 704.5 868.7 905.2
Value of Production after Operating Cost, mln USD
high H 1099.7 1482.0 2065.8 3232.2 5163.0 8101.3 9990.1 10409.8
low I 767.9 1034.9 1439.8 2248.5 3591.7 5635.7 6949.6 7241.6
To Recover Capital Cost, mln USD
high J 549.8 741.0 1032.9 1616.1 2581.5 4050.6 4995.0
low K 383.9 517.4 719.9 1124.2 1795.8 2817.8 3474.8 3620.8
cumulative 
high L 1893.5 2443.3 3184.3 4217.3 5833.4 8414.9 12465.5 17460.5
cumulative 
low M 1893.5 2277.4 2794.9 3514.8 4639.0 6434.9 9252.7 12727.5 16348.3
Profit Oil $ mln
high N 549.8 741.0 1032.9 1616.1 2581.5 4050.6 4995.0 10409.8
low O 383.9 517.4 719.9 1124.2 1795.8 2817.8 3474.8 3620.8
Cummul. Profit Oil mln USD
high P 1893.5 2443.3 3184.3 4217.3 5833.4 8414.9 12465.5 17460.5 27870.3
low Q 1893.5 2277.4 2794.9 3514.8 4639.0 6434.9 9252.7 12727.5 16348.3
Profit Oil of Azerbaijan, $ mln
high R 165.0 222.3 309.9 484.8 1419.8 2227.9 2747.3 8327.8
low S 115.2 155.2 216.0 337.3 987.7 1549.8 1911.1 1991.4
Cummul. Profit Oil of Azerbaijan, mln USD
high T 568.1 733.1 955.4 1265.2 1750.1 3169.9 5397.7 8145.0 16472.9
low U 568.1 683.3 838.5 1054.5 1391.8 2379.5 3929.3 5840.4 7831.9
Profit Oil of Contractor, $ mln
high R 384.9 518.7 723.0 1131.3 1161.7 1822.8 2247.8 2082.0
low S 268.8 362.2 503.9 787.0 808.1 1268.0 1563.7 1629.4
Cummulative Profit Oil of Contractor, mln USD
high V 1325.4 1710.3 2229.0 2952.0 4083.3 5245.0 7067.8 9315.5 11397.5
low W 1325.4 1594.2 1956.4 2460.3 3247.3 4055.4 5323.4 6887.1 8516.4
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Notes to Table A-2:
1. Lines B and C contain optimistic and pessimistic scenarios of crude oil prices in world markets. The estimated
value of oil production by the year has been calculated on this basis. The estimated value is provided in lines D
and E.
2. Line F displays estimated operating cost per barrel of oil produced from the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli contract ter-
ritory. The data for 1997-2002 have been taken from AIOC and SOCAR reports, while the data for 2003-2010 are
a forecast based on an assumption of gradual increase in cost as later stages of development present greater geo-
logical challenges. 
3. Line G displays annual operating costs, which are found by multiplying Line A by Line F.
4. Lines H and I indicate the value of annual production net of transportation and operating costs. Lines H and
I subtract operating costs (line G) and transportation costs ($3/barrel) from the value of annual production (line
D). Thus, we subtract the quantity of oil necessary to cover operating cost from the revenue derived from yearly
oil output.
5. Then in Lines J and K, under the terms of the production sharing agreement, 50 percent of the amounts in lines
H and I is calculated for payment to reimburse capital costs at high and low forecast oil prices. The remaining
50 percent is the profit petroleum to be shared between Azerbaijan and the contractor. Lines J and K contain the
anticipated yearly volume of crude oil covering the capital costs, depending on high and low oil prices.
6. Lines L and M contain cumulative amounts of crude oil directed to covering the capital cost. Note that the
cumulative amounts used for covering capital costs under the high price scenario will amount to about $17.5
billion by 2009, which exceeds the forecasted investment for all phases of the project with inflation and cost of
capital figured in.
7. Since the total volume of capital expenses on the development of the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli contract territory
is forecast at the level of $13 billion (including expenses on financing, i.e. interest stakes on credits), the process
of reimbursing the capital cost ends in 2009 or 2010 depending on crude oil prices.
8. In lines N and O, we calculate profit oil to be shared between the government of Azerbaijan and the contrac-
tor. Before 2009 (or 2010 in the event of low crude oil prices) the profit oil in Lines N and O is half of the amounts
in Lines H and I, respectively. After all capital costs have been recovered, (starting in 2010 in the high price sce-
nario and 2011 in the event of low crude oil prices) all revenue net of operating costs is available for distribution
as profit oil.
9. Lines P and Q contain cumulative data on profit oil.
10. The profit-sharing mechanism of the ACG PSA allows us to calculate earnings for Azerbaijan and for the con-
tractor from their split of profit oil. At Lines R and S, Azerbaijan’s profit oil revenue is calculated for the high
and low crude oil price scenarios. These lines cover three periods: 1997-2006, 2007-2009 and 2010, which dif-
fer from each other by the percentage of profit oil. According to the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli PSA, depending on the
rate of return on capital costs (see Table 4, Section 1), Azerbaijan will receive 30 percent, 55 percent or 80 per-
cent of the proceeds from profit oil. From 1997 through 2006, profit oil was calculated on the assumption of a
30 percent share for Azerbaijan. Data for 2007-2009 was calculated on the assumption of a 55 percent share for
the government. Finally, the data for 2010 was calculated on the assumption of an 80 percent share for Azerbai-
jan. These predictions have been based on expert assessments because exact information about the sale of crude
oil (volume and price), and operational and capital expenses for every calendar quarter are not publicly avail-
able. According to the relevant PSAs, all production sharing calculations are made on a quarterly basis.
11. Lines T and U contain cumulative Azerbaijan profit oil totals for both high and low pricing scenarios. If the
high price scenario materializes, then Azerbaijan’s total receipts from ACG profit oil from 2003 to 2010 will exceed
$15.9 billion, as Table A-2 indicates. Under the low price scenario, Azerbaijan’s total earnings for that same period
amount to $7.2 billion.
12. It is indicative that profit oil constitutes a considerable portion of Azerbaijan’s oil revenues from PSAs, though,
there are other revenue items in PSAs. It is also worth noting that all the calculations have been performed in
the present value of money without inflation-related discounting.
TABLE A-3: Profit Tax Government Earnings from ACG, 2003-2010, in $ million USD
Crude 
Prices, Total
$/barrel 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2003-2010
Profit Oil 25 384.9 518.7 723.0 1131.3 1161.7 1822.8 2247.8 2082.0 10072.2
of Contractor
Net Profit    346.4 466.8 650.7 1018.2 1045.5 1640.5 2023.0 1873.8 9065.0
including:
to SOCAR 34.6 46.7 65.1 101.8 104.6 164.1 202.3 187.4 906.5
to Foreign 
Investor 311.8 420.1 585.6 916.4 941.0 1476.5 1820.7 1686.4 8158.5
Profit Tax 77.9 105.0 146.4 229.1 235.2 369.1 455.2 421.6 2039.6
from Foreign 
Investor
Profit Oil 18 268.8 362.2 503.9 787.0 808.1 1268.0 1563.7 1629.4 7191.1
of Contractor
Net Profit    241.9 326.0 453.5 708.3 727.3 1141.2 1407.3 1466.5 6472.0
Including:
to SOCAR 24.2 32.6 45.4 70.8 72.7 114.1 140.7 146.6 647.2
to Foreign 
Investor 217.7 293.4 408.2 637.5 654.6 1027.1 1266.6 1319.8 5824.8
Profit Tax 54.4 73.3 102.0 159.4 163.6 256.8 316.6 330.0 1456.2
from Foreign 
Investor
To calculate government profit tax earnings, we began with the calculation of contractor profit
oil derived from Table A-2 above. We estimated transport, insurance, and other expenses at 10
percent of profit oil and deducted this amount. Hence, the taxable base was 90 percent of profit
oil. The profit tax was calculated at the rate of 25 percent.
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Appendix 5
Lines of Accountability in the State Oil Fund of Azerbajan
President
Supervisory Council
Executive Director of SOFAZ
 Can establish and dissolve the oil fund
 Issues decrees approving all rules of the Oil Fund
 Appoints and can dismiss the Oil Fund’s executive director
 Chooses and/or approves Oil Fund’s auditor
 Appoints members to supervisory council
 Defines the rules for compilation of reports on use of SOFAZ’s assets
 Reviews and comments on SOFAZ’s annual report and auditor’s report, 
and proposed budgets for SOFAZ
 Meetings are supposed to be held quarterly but have only met twice
 Is to be composed of representatives of government and community-
based organizations. None of the latter are currently represented
 Off schedule meetings can be called at request of half the members or
SOFAZ’s executive director
 Executive Director exercises operational management; hires staff;
develops annual investment strategy
 Responsible for investment and management of SOFAZ’s assets
 Together with Ministry of Economic Development, executive director
of SOFAZ prepares program for expenditures from the Oil Fund
 Submits quarterly and annual reports, estimates of operational
expenses to the president
 Cooperates with auditor selected by president, publishes results of
audit and annual report
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Appendix 6
Regulations Governing or Impacting the National Fund
Decrees
 “On the National Fund of the RK,” Presidential Decree no. 402, August 23, 2000.
 “Several Questions on the NF,” Presidential Decree no. 543, January 29, 2001.
 “Confirming the Audit on the Formation and Use of the National Fund of the Republic of
Kazakhstan in 2001,” Decree no. 867, May 7, 2002.
Laws
 “Introducing Changes and Additions to Several Legal Acts Concerning the NF-Changes to
National Bank and Banking Laws and Budget System,” Law no. 182-II, 2RK, May 3, 2001.
 “On the Republic Budget for Year 2002,” Law  no. 273-II 3RK, December 15, 2001.
 “Report on the Republic of Kazakhstan’s National Fund Formation and Utilization in 2001,”
adopted by parliament on June 27, 2002.
Government Resolutions
 “On First Measures to Create a National Fund,” Government Resolution  no. 1303, August
24, 2000.
 “Measures to Implement Decree of President 543,” Government Resolution no. 212, Febru-
ary 8, 2001.
 “Parameters of Indicative Plan 2001-2005,” Government Resolution  no. 368, March 19, 2001
(later revoked).
 “Confirming Lists of Organizations of the Mineral Sector Whose Excess Tax Payments Flow
to the NF,” Government Resolution  no. 369A, March 19, 2001.
 “Confirming Quarterly Plans of Receipts for the National Fund,” Government Resolution no.
627, May 11, 2001.
 “Rules for Crediting Money to the National Fund and Use,” Government Resolution no. 631,
May 14, 2001.
 “Agreement of Fiduciary Management of the NF,” Government Resolution no. 655, May 18,
2001.
 “Rules of the Investment Operations of the NF,” Government Resolution no. 787, June 9,
2001.
 “Rules on Selection of Independent Auditor and Annual Audit,” Government Resolution no.
1011, July 26, 2001.
 “A Timetable for the National Bank to Submit Information and Financial Reports on the Man-
agement of the National Fund,” Government Resolution no. 1045, August 9, 2001.
 “On Forecast Targets for the State Budget for 2002-2004,” Government Resolution no. 1197,
September 13, 2001.
 “On Forming a Committee to Select External Auditors to Conduct an Annual Audit of the
National Fund,” Government Resolution no. 1413, November 7, 2001 (amended by resolu-
tion no. 1651 on December 15, 2001).
 “On the Agreement for Conducting an External Audit of the National Fund,” Government
Resolution no. 296, March 11, 2002.
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 “On the Approval of Rules for Preparation of the Republic and Local Budgets Drafts,” Gov-
ernment Resolution no. 592, May 29, 2002.
 Amendment to “Rules on the Investment Operations of the National Fund (Government Res-
olution no. 787)” adopted by Board of Directors of the National Bank, May 13, 2002. The
amendment decreased the share of the savings portfolio that can be invested in equity in for-
eign companies from 40 percent to 25 percent.
 “On the Approval of Rules for Financial Procedures for Fulfilling the Budget and Introduc-
ing Forms of Accountability (periodical and annual) for Government Institutions. Procedures
for Transferring Money to the National Fund.” Government Resolution no. 832, July 25, 2002.
National Bank Resolutions
 “Confirmation of Rules on Investment Operations of the National Fund of the Republic of
Kazakhstan,” no. 237, June 20, 2001.
 “On approval of the report on the results of investment operations by the National Fund in
2001,” no. 56, February 16, 2002.
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Appendix 7
State Budget Forecast for 2002–2004
Supplement to Resolution no. 784 of June 9, 2001 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Supplement 1 to Resolution no. 368 of March 19, 2001 of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan
The Parameters of the Indicative Plan of the Socioeconomic Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan for
the Years 2002–2004
Year 2000 Year 2001 Forecast
Report Assessment 2002 2003 2004
GDP, in billions of tenge 2,596 2,957 3,230 3,473 3,704
In % of the previous year 109.6 107 104.9 104.2 103.6
Consumer price index, in % 
At year-end 109.8 106.8 106.5 105.9 105.8
On average for the year 113.2 109 105.9 106.3 105.9
Exchange Rate of the tenge 
to the US dollar at year-end 145.4 150.5 157.7 164.4 168.9
On average for the year 142.4 148 154.1 161.1 166.6
Volume of industrial production, 
in % of the previous year 114.6 109.2 106.4 105.9 103
Volume of gross agricultural  
product, in % of the previous year 96.7 100.8 102.8 102.9 103
Investments in fixed capital, 
in % of the previous year 129.4 124 120 118 112
State budget receipts, in % of GDP 23.1 23.9 21.5 21.6 21.6
Revenues, in % of GDP 22.6 23.5 21.1 21.2 21.2
Tax Receipts, in % of GDP 20.2 21.0 19.4 19.5 19.6
Including:
National Fund receipts, in % of  GDP — 2.7 0.6 0.7 —
Non-tax receipts, in % of GDP 1.5 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.2
Revenues from capital 
transactions, in % of GDP 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4
Exports, in millions of U.S. dollars 9,615 9,740 9,440 9,360 9,720
Imports, in millions of U.S. dollars 6,849.8 7,590 8,730 9,000 9,405
World price for oil (Brent blend), 
U.S. dollars per barrel 28.2 25 21.5 20 19
World price for oil (Urals blend), 
U.S. dollars per barrel 26 23.4 20 18.5 18.2
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Appendix 8
Schedule of Deadlines for the National Bank to Report on the National Fund to the
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Approved by Resolution of the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan of August 9, 2001, no. 1045
Schedule of Deadlines for the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan to Submit Financial Statements and
Other Information on the Activities Associated with the Trustee Governance of the National Fund of the Repub-
lic of Kazakhstan
Name of Document/ Intervals for Deadline for Name of Agency
Contents of the Report Submission Submission to Report to Notes
1. Distribution of assets Quarterly Within 30 Government Appendix 1 to 
in the National Fund of (thirty) of the RK  Investment Rules
the RK by currencies calendar and Procedures
and currency categories days following involving the
as of the end of each the report period National Fund
quarter of the RK
2. The portfolio of the Quarterly Within 30 Government Appendix 2 to 
National Fund of the RK (thirty) of the RK  Investment  Rules 
as of the end of each calendar and Procedures
quarter days following involving the
the report period National Fund
of the RK
3. Report on all transactions Quarterly Within 30 Government Appendix 3 to 
involving the assets of the (thirty) of the RK Investment Rules 
National Fund of the RK calendar and Procedures
over the report interval days following the report period
involving the 
National Fund of 
the RK
4. Results of activities Quarterly Within 30 Government Appendix 4 to 
involving the portfolio (thirty) of the RK  Investment Rules 
of the National Fund calendar and Procedures
of the RK over the involving the
report interval National Fund of 
the RK
5. Verification sheet of Monthly Upon receipt The Treasury Appendix 7 to 
the money flow in the of the report from Committee Book-Keeping 
National Fund of the RK the Treasury of the Ministry and Accounting
as of the 1st day of Committee of of Finances of Rules for
the month the Ministry of the RK accumulation and
Finances of use of the National
the RK Fund of the 
Republic
of Kazakhstan
6. Report on the results Monthly As of the 1st Government Appendix 12 to 
of trustee governance and yearly day of the of the Republic  Book-Keeping 
ofthe National Fund of  month of Kazakhstan and Accounting
theRK as of the 1st day Rules for
of the month accumulation and
use of the National 
Fund of the RK
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Name of Document/ Intervals for Deadline for Name of Agency
Contents of the Report Submission Submission to Report to Notes
7. Report on the results Quarterly Within 30 Government
of trustee governance of and annually (thirty) of the RK  
the National Fund of the calendar
RK approved by the days following
resolutionof the Board the report period
of Directors of the 
National Bank of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan
8. Written analysis of Annually Within 30 Government
current situation in  (thirty) of the RK
appropriate markets and calendar
implications for the  days following
portfolio, and economic the report period
review
9. Strategy review and Annually Within 30 Government
explanation of the most (thirty) of the RK
important changes in the calendar
structure of the portfolio, days following
current investment the report period
strategy
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Appendix 9 
Comparison of Four Oil Funds’ Websites 
Type of 
information provided Norway Alaska Azerbaijan Kazakhstan
Annual report published in entirety YES YES YES NO
Report of external auditor YES YES YES NO
Companies/indexes in which the 
fund holds assets YES YES YES*5 NO
Market value of holdings 
in each company YES YES NO*5 NO
Earnings benchmarks YES YES NO NO
Methodology of investment 
and risk management YES YES NO NO
Announcement of tenders YES NO YES NO*2
Resolutions, laws, regulations 
governing the oil fund YES YES YES PARTLY*3
Return on portfolio YES YES YES YES
Forecasts for fund size YES YES NO NO
Inflows YES YES YES YES
Inflows, breakdown by source NO YES YES YES*4
Expenditures YES YES YES YES
Expenditures, breakdown 
by type of expenditure NO*1 YES YES YES
Statement of disclosure policies YES YES YES NO
Chosen external asset managers YES YES N/A NO
Reports and recommendations 
submitted to the government 
by the managers of the oil fund YES NO NO NO
Daily Fund position NO YES NO NO
The four websites can be found at the following URL’s: 
Norway:  http://odin.dep.no/fin/engelsk/p10001617/index-b-na.html
Alaska:  http://www.apfc.org/apfc/index.cfm
Azerbaijan:  http://www.oilfund.az/
Kazakhstan:  http://www.nationalfund.kz/
*1 Breakdown of “Management Cost” of the Fund, however, is available from the annual report. 
*2 Tenders not announced on website. However, tenders for external auditor are required to be published in the
print media.
*3 The government has begun to place the National Fund’s legal documents on its website. However, inexplica-
bly, numerous legal documents have not been posted, including government resolution  no. 1197, which forecasts
targets for the state budget and the Oil Fund for 2002-2004 (and which has been reproduced in Annex 2); gov-
ernment resolution no. 1651, which specifies the procedure for forming a selection committee to hire external
auditors; and the investment rules approved by a resolution of the National Bank on June 20, 2001.
*4 The breakdown provided is by type of payment (i.e. VAT, royalty) but not by company which made the payment.
*5 SOFAZ has not yet invested equities.  However, it names the banks in which it has opened deposit and set-
tlement accounts, but does not say how much is deposited in each bank.
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Chapter 3
1. In this chapter the term “industry” refers to petroleum producers, their contractors, investors, and other
associated companies and governments operating as project developers. These parties are typically identified in
PSAs as “contractors.” 
2. The term “super-giant” is usually reserved for oil fields estimated to contain at least 5.0 billion barrels of
recoverable oil.  In 1993 there were only 42 such fields in the world.  See L.F. Ivanhoe and G.G. Leckie, “Global
Oil, Gas Fields, Sizes, Tallied, Analyzed,” Oil & Gas Journal (February 1993): 87-91. Alaska and the Caspian Basin
are among the relatively few regions outside the Persian Gulf that possess super-giant oil reservoirs.
3. This figure understates the total share of public revenue obtained through litigation because it does not include
amounts secured by the federal government of the United States through Internal Revenue Service challenges to
producer payments. 
4. It should be noted that the conduct of state-run oil companies can have significant impact on environmental
issues beyond the purview of this chapter.
5. The Publish What You Pay campaign was launched June 13, 2002, by financier George Soros with Global
Witness and a coalition of more than 70 other non-government organizations. See Nicholas Shaxson, “Soros
Aims to Stop Graft in Mining and Oil Projects: Developing Countries Campaign to Make Companies Break Down
Payments to Governments,” The Financial Times, June 13, 2002, p. 6.
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6. In the oil patch, early industry payments to a host government for purposes other than investment recovery
(for example, bonus and royalty payments) are sometimes identified as front-loaded. In recognition of the
importance of cash flow considerations to oil field development, in this chapter the term front-loading refers
specifically to industry investment recovery.  
7. Terms that front-load industry cost recovery are often used to induce development in provinces where
prospects might not attract investment otherwise.  For discussion of cash flow under various contracts, see
Daniel Johnston, “International Petroleum Fiscal Systems,” workshop workbook, Empire Hotel and Country Club,
Brunei, January 16-18, 2002, p. 9-18.  
8. Kazakhstan’s Kashagan PSA is an example of a super-giant field whose investment recovery is heavily front-
loaded.  See Daniel Johnston and David Johnston, “Kashagan and Tengiz — Castor and Pollux,” Petroleum
Accounting and Financial Management Journal (fall-winter 2001): Figures 4 and 5.
9. See, for example, Pedro Van Meurs, Suggestions for New Terms for the Alaska North Slope LNG Project:
Background Report, report prepared for the Alaska Department of Revenue, February 12, 1997, 75.
10. Under the terms of the PSA between the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan and the investors in the Azeri-
Chirag-Gunashli Caspian production area, when the after-tax rate of return on investment rises above 16.75
percent, the government share of net revenue take jumps from 30 percent to 55 percent; the producer take
therefore declines from 70 percent to 45 percent.  See “Contractor’s Recovery of Petroleum Costs and Production
Sharing,” Agreement on the Joint Development and Production Sharing for the Azeri and Chirag Fields and the Deep
Water Portion of the Gunashli Field in the Azerbaijan Sector of the Caspian Sea (November 1994): art. XI. These
terms are typical of Azeri PSAs.  See Table 3 of Chapter 5.  In the following simplified example, peripheral aspects
of the PSA have been removed to demonstrate the essential economic effects of a potential investment when (1)
the project operates for five years, (2) net revenue without additional investment is $100 million per year, (3) the
rate of return is approaching the 16.75 percent threshold.  For an investment of $100 million to increase net
revenue to $150 million per year over five years, the annual rate of return on the new investment would be
approximately 20 percent per year—significantly higher than the rate of return without the investment.  But when
the higher rate of return on the new investment raises the overall rate of return above the 16.75 percent trigger
point, the investor’s share of net income decreases due to the increase in host share of net income from 30
percent to 55 percent.  The following simplified example compares the results of investment versus non-
investment:   
Net Revenue ($ Millions)
Investor Share with and without Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Additional Investment* 
No Additional Investment Case 
(ROR < 16.75%) ($100 *[1 - 0.3]) = $70.00 $70.00 $70.00 $70.00 $70.00
Additional Investment Case 
(ROR > 16.75%) ($150 *[1-0.55]) = $67.50 $67.50 $67.50 $67.50 $67.50
* Simplified example.
11. Van Meurs, Suggestions for New Terms for the Alaska North Slope LNG Project: Background Report.
12.  “Appeal of the Institute of Sea Geology and Geophysics of the Far East Academy of Science to the President V.
Putin, Speaker G. Seleznyov, the Chief of Soviet Security S. Ivanov, the President of Academy of Science Y. Osipov,
the Chief of Presidium of Far East Academy of Science G. Elyakov, the Chief of Auditing Chamber of Russia S.
Stepashin,” declaration by Pacific Environment, February 4, 2001.  
13. Prudhoe Bay was discovered in 1967 and entered production in 1977 to become the largest oil field ever
developed in North America. Alaska North Slope (ANS) production peaked at 2.0 million barrels per day (bpd) in
1988 and was approximately 1.0 million bpd in 2002. Output from the complex is expected to remain at current
levels through 2010, dropping to approximately half that level by 2034.  In terms of total production, the Prudhoe
Bay reservoir is expected to produce approximately 14 billion barrels of oil, with the outlying reservoirs
contributing an additional six billion barrels of oil.  See Alaska Department of Revenue, Revenue Sources: Forecast
and Historical Data (spring 2002): 29; L.D. Maxim, “Appendix A: Trans Alaska Pipeline System Throughput
Analysis,” in Draft Environmental Report for the Trans Alaska Pipeline System Right-of-Way Renewal (Trans Alaska
Pipeline System Owners; February 15, 2001): A-2.  
1 9 8 E N D N O T E S
14. Mergers and acquisitions have changed the corporate names of the three dominant companies on Alaska’s
North Slope.  BP’s U.S. subsidiary merged with the Standard Oil Company of Ohio (Sohio) in 1970 and formally
took over management of its Alaska partner in 1987; ExxonMobil represents the combined interests of the former
Exxon and Mobil Corporations; ConocoPhillips is the third major North Slope player by virtue of Phillips
Petroleum’s acquisition of ARCO’s Alaska properties in 2000.  (BP was required to divest those properties as a
condition of its global merger with ARCO; Phillips subsequently merged with Conoco, which had previously held
smaller interests on the North Slope before trading them to BP and leaving Alaska in 1993.)
15. From Alaska Department of Revenue, Revenue Sources: Forecast and Historical Data (spring 2002): 165, and
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation data.  
16. The Alaska agency analysis used production and lifting cost estimates from the author’s 1998 report, How
Much Is Enough? Estimated Industry Profits from Alaska North Slope Production and Associated Pipeline Operations,
1993–1998 (Oilwatch Alaska, 1998), available at: http://www.alaskaforum.org 
17. Gordon S. Harrison, “RE: Overview of Oil and Gas Disputes: Update, August 1994,” Alaska State Legislature,
Legislative Research Agency, Research Request 94.207, August 12, 1994.
18. Ibid.
19. Letter to Representative Ron Larson, co-chair, House Finance Committee, Alaska State House of
Representatives, from Bruce M. Botelho, Alaska attorney general, February 17, 1994. The $217 million estimate
did not include the staff time, expenses, and administrative overhead of the auditors, other agency personnel and
the time and costs of the administrative overhead for approximately five staff attorneys within the Attorney
General’s Office. At that time, the Alaska Department of Law estimated that approximately $8.0 billion in claims
against the industry were still outstanding. 
20. From “Oil and Gas Settlements,” attachment to letter from Bruce M. Botelho, Alaska Attorney General, to
Representative Eric Croft, Alaska State House of Representatives, February 7, 2001.  
21. State of Alaska et al. vs. Amerada Hess Corporation, et al., Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment
and Damages, State of Alaska, Civil Action No. 77-847, January 10, 1989, p. 25-29 (henceforth: Third Amended
Complaint).  
22. “Standard” refers to the former Standard Oil Company of Ohio (Sohio), which merged with BP in 1970.     
23. Different crude oils have different physical characteristics that affect their market value. For example, ANS
trades at a discount to the benchmark West Texas Intermediate (WTI) because ANS is heavier and contains more
sulfur.
24. State of Alaska, Third Amended Complaint, 30.
25.“Oil and Gas Settlements.”
26. See  “ANS Royalty Litigation Settlement Agreement (between BP Exploration [Alaska] Inc. and State of
Alaska),” December 31, 1991, Exhibit A to Joint Motion and Memorandum Supporting Entry of Final Judgment
Resolving All Claims between the State and BP Exploration [Alaska] Inc. in the matter of: ANS Royalty Litigation,
January 23, 1992.  
27. See ExxonMobil Corporation v. State of Alaska, Memorandum in Support of Emergency Motion for Stay, Civil
Action no. 3AN95-1168CI, February 8,1995, p. 1.
28. Office of the Governor of Alaska, “ExxonMobil Pays State $254 Million to Resolve Tax Dispute,” E-News
Release 98049, March 10, 1998;  “ExxonMobil, State Settle Tax Fight,” Anchorage Daily News, March 11, 1998, F-1.  
29. For summary discussion of competition issues on TAPS, see Anthony Scott, The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System:
The Causes and Consequences of Regulatory Failure, Master of Science thesis in resource economics, (University of
Wisconsin, 1996); and Richard A. Fineberg, The Big Squeeze: TAPS and the Departure of Major Oil Companies Who
Found Oil on Alaska’s North Slope (Oilwatch Alaska, 1997), available at www.alaskaforum.org.
30. Personal communication with Charles Logsdon, senior economist, Division of Oil and Gas Audit, Alaska
Department of Revenue, December 2002. For a simplified example of the state-industry fiscal relationship, see The
Big Squeeze, Tables 1.1 and 1.2. In a 1978 decision affirming the interest of the State of Alaska in TAPS tariffs, the
United States Supreme Court noted that the State of Alaska loses $0.23 for every dollar of excessive TAPS tariffs.
See Mobil Alaska Pipeline Company, et al. v. United States et al., Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 US 631 (1978).
31. The Alaska Department of Law described the case as “the largest” in budget and other presentations to the
Alaska State Legislature, October 20, 1983, February 6, 1984 and January 24, 1985. 
32. The complexity of the TAPS tariff formula is compounded by the fact that each of the TAPS carriers files a
separate tariff. Moreover, individual company tariff data are shrouded in confidentiality.  
E N D N O T E S    1 9 9
33. Settlement Agreement between The State of Alaska and ARCO Pipe Line Co., BP Pipelines Inc., Exxon Pipeline Co.,
Mobil Alaska Pipeline Co., Union Alaska Pipeline Co. with Respect to the Trans Alaska Pipeline System, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission Docket OR 78-1, June 28, 1985.  Through most of its life, the TAPS carriers without
exception filed the maximum allowable tariff.  Although some carriers have filed reduced tariffs in recent years,
published settlement data indicates that these reductions constitute less than one percent of total tariff revenues.
34. “Oil and Gas Settlements.”
35. For a summary of TAPS litigation issues subsequent to the 1985 settlement, see The Big Squeeze, 5.1 - 5.23.
36. Regulatory Commission of Alaska, Order Rejecting 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 Filed TAPS Rates; Setting Just and
Reasonable Rates; Requiring Refunds and Filings; And Outlining Phase II Issues, Order no. 151 in Docket no. P-97-4,
November 27, 2002, 1-9.   As noted above, for every $1.00 of excessive TAPS tariffs, the State of Alaska loses
approximately $0.21 in reduced royalty and severance tax payments. Therefore, overcharges of $10 billion,
although largely transfer payments among shipper-owners, reduced Alaska’s royalty and production tax receipts
by approximately $2.1 billion. 
37. Allen Baker, “State Weighs Pipeline Fees — $110 Million: If Rates are Cut, Alaskans, Small Producers Benefit,”
Anchorage Daily News, December 31, 2002, A-1. 
38. Regulatory Commission of Alaska,  “The Regulatory Commission of Alaska Rejects Rates for the 1997-2000
Intrastate Trans-Alaska Pipeline System, Sets Just and Reasonable Rates, and Requires Refunds and Filings by the
Carriers,” press release accompanying Order no. 151 in Docket no. P-97-4, November 27, 2002.
39. Amerada Hess Pipeline Corporation, BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc., ExxonMobil Pipeline Company, Mobil Alaska
Pipeline Company, Phillips Transportation Alaska, Inc. and Unocal Pipeline Co. v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska,
Indicated TAPS Carriers’ Statement of Points on Appeal, Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial
District, Case no. 3AN-02-___ CIV, December 6, 2002. 
40. State of Alaska and U.S. Department of Justice, Explanatory Statement of the State of Alaska and the United
States Department of Justice in Support of Settlement Offer, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Docket no. OR
78-1, June 28, 1985, App. 6-7. 
41. “Oil and Gas Settlements.”
42. Although the U.S. Internal Revenue Service has received significant settlement payments from the major
North Slope producers, comprehensive figures on its legal battles to are not available to the public.   
43. As part of the California settlement, the companies also agreed to open previously closed West Coast
pipelines to competitors. See: “Unocal to Settle Price-Fixing Suit for $78 Million: The Firms Admit no
Wrongdoing in the Proposal, One of the Largest Settlements Reached in a State Antitrust Action Against the Oil
Industry,” Los Angeles Times, February 7, 1991, p. D-1; “Oil Giants Settle Suit With State: Chevron, Others to Pay
Nearly $220 million,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 17, 1991.
44. See testimony of Harry R. Anderson in Long Beach Antitrust Case, July 6-7, 1999, quoted in Eric Umansky,
“Shooting the Whistleblower: How Congress is Sabotaging an Effort to Stop Oil Companies from Cheating
Taxpayers,” The Washington Monthly, vol. 31, Issue 8; and Morton Mintz, Tompaine.com, December 29, 1999,
available at www.tompaine.com
45. Scattered news reports only hint at the magnitude of the amounts at issue in litigation by the U.S. Internal
Revenue Service (IRS). The value of ANS crude was not the only issue in the federal challenges.  For example, in
May 2000 the Houston Chronicle reported that the U.S. Tax Court denied ExxonMobil $228 million in tax
deductions ExxonMobil had sought future Prudhoe Bay dismantling expenses for the years 1979 through 1982
under a tax loophole closed in 1984. Since ExxonMobil holds a 20 percent interest in Prudhoe Bay, the total
deduction at issue for that field was approximately $1.0 billion.  According to the article, the Prudhoe Bay case
was one part of a larger, global claim against ExxonMobil in which the IRS was seeking a total of $6.8 billion in
alleged tax underpayments from ExxonMobil; on many of the major issues, the tax collectors did not prevail.  See
“Tax Court Denies Exxon Mobil Case,” Houston Chronicle, May 5, 2000.
46. The data released by the State of Alaska to the State Legislature in 1994 indicated that the net financial
benefit of protracted litigation far outweighs the cost (see “Oil and Gas Settlements”). Therefore, it is reasonable
to assume that industry will prefer continued litigation to settlement unless the settlement preserves a significant
portion of potential gains or prevents potential losses. In contrast to industry’s primary focus on retaining its
gains, host government decisions are made in a broader context by public officials (for example, to raise revenue
to provide public services, or to induce further development).   
47. Under Alaska’s Constitution, the legislature functions as the overseer of public policy; the execution of the
tasks established by the legislature is the domain of the agencies of the executive branch.
2 0 0 E N D N O T E S
48. Edward L. Morse and James Richard, “The Battle for Energy Dominance,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2002): 23.
49. The prospects for oil development in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan will be discussed in Chapters five and six.
50. See Johnston and Johnston, “Kashagan and Tengiz—Castor and Pollux.”  
51. The EDPSA and AIOC agreements are shown in Daniel Johnston’s unnumbered figure, “Government Take (for
Oil),” in International Petroleum Fiscal Systems Workbook. 
52. Ibid., 19.
53. The disparity between the results reported by the State of Alaska for 1988-2000 and the estimates for the
Caspian Basin developments is even wider than these numbers indicate for the following reasons:  
(1) Oil prices were relatively low during the period covered by the Alaska estimates, but the Alaska industry
percentage take increases as oil prices rise and average oil prices were significantly higher during the first
decade of North Slope production than during the 1988-2000 period;   
(2) The Alaska producer take in earlier years would be higher than the 1988-2000 period because smaller (and
hence less profitable) fields were not in production during the earlier years of North Slope operation; and  
(3) The Alaska estimates overstate the federal take by using the nominal federal income tax rate, which the
industry seldom pays.  
An accountancy analysis of Alaska operations between 1977 and 1987 reported industry take of 48.1 percent, with
51.9 percent going to the state and federal governments.  (Edward B. Deakin, Oil Industry Profitability in Alaska,
1969 through 1987, Alaska Department of Revenue (1989): Appendix E.
54. U.S. Energy Information Agency, “Kazakhstan: Oil and Natural Gas Projects” (January 2002): Table 2.
55. Johnston and Johnston, figures 2 and 4.  The environmental and technical challenges associated with
Kashagan development will be discussed in Chapter six.
56. For discussion of the relationship between North Slope and pipeline profits, see Fineberg, How Much Is
Enough? Estimated Industry Profits from Alaska North Slope Production and Associated Pipeline Operations,
1993–1998. 
57. See Orhan Degermenci, “EU Study of Caspian Area Oil, Gas Pipelines Compares Routes, Costs,” Oil & Gas
Journal (November 2001): 68-79; U.S. Energy Information Agency, “Caspian Sea Region: Reserves and Pipeline
Tables” (July 2002) and  “Kazakhstan: Oil and Natural Gas Projects” (January 2002). 
58. U.S. Energy Information Agency, “Kazakhstan” (January 2002): 3.  
59. “Russian Regulator Delays Deeming Caspian Pipe a Monopoly,” Wall Street Journal, December 16, 2002.
60. “Caspian Sea Region: Reserves and Pipeline Tables,” Table 4.
61. Johnston and Johnston, Table 2. 
62. “Caspian Sea Region: Reserves and Pipeline Tables,” Table 4.
63. Information from personal communications with SOCAR and Turkish government officials, November 2002.
64. “Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Company Formed,” press release, August 1, 2002, available online at
http://www.unocal.com
65. Johnston and Johnston, Table 2. 
66. See “Caspian Sea Region: Reserves and Pipelines Tables.”
67. It has been suggested that Alaska, as host, gives up a premium for the risk of investing in Arctic and sub-
arctic Alaska. While a risk surcharge may have been warranted in early years, Alaska’s North Slope has operated
with few interruptions for more than two decades and by 2002 had produced approximately 1.5 times more oil
than originally anticipated. New developments now make up an increasing portion of Alaska’s production. For
these reasons, the original risk premium cannot explain the disparity between the public share from Alaska
petroleum development and Caspian Basin target returns.  
68. As noted previously, these figures underestimate the total share of public revenue secured through litigation
because they do not include amounts secured by the federal government through similar efforts, for which no
public totals are available (see Section 2, above).
69. Conoco, later acquired by Phillips Petroleum, is now a part of ConocoPhillips (see endnote 14, above).
70. For the effect of pipeline costs on Conoco’s profitability during its final year of operation in Alaska, see How
Much Is Enough? 27-35.
71. For Dunham’s statements see “Getting to the Future First,” Hart’s Oil and Gas Investor (August 1996): 41. 
E N D N O T E S    2 0 1
Chapter 4
1. Terence H. Qualter, Opinion Control in the Democracies (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1985).
2. Bruce M. Owen and Ronald Braeutigam, The Regulation Game—Strategic Use of the Regulatory Process
(Ballinger, Cambridge, MA. 1978).
3. Prince William Sound RCAC, Annual Reports, publications, and newsletter available at: www.pwsrcac.org
4. Cook Inlet RCAC, Annual Reports, publications, and newsletter available at: www.circac.org
5. “Pipeline Safety Panel a Wise Idea,” Bellingham Herald, January 26, 2003.
6. The Cook Inlet RCAC has a staff of six.
7. The Cook Inlet RCAC has three committees: Environmental Monitoring; Prevention, Response, Operations,
and Safety; and Educational Outreach.
8. U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congress on the Alaska Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils (GAO,
Washington, D.C. 1993): 33
9. PWS RCAC, RCAC Retrospective: The Successes and Lessons of a Citizens’ Advisory Group, PWS RCAC document
file code: #5006.645 (1996).
10. P. Ginsberg, S. Sterling, S. Gotteherer, “The Citizens’ Advisory Council as a Means of Mitigating Environmen-
tal Impacts of Terminal and Tanker Operations,”  Marine Policy (September 1993): 404-411.
11. Ibid.
12. G.J. Busenberg, Citizen Advisory Councils and Environmental Management in the Marine Oil Trade, technical
report based on doctoral dissertation (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1997): 78.
13. Transparency International, Improving Public Sector Procurement in Latin America: A Synthesis Report on Eight
Case Studies of Three Methods in Three Countries (September 2002).
14. Ibid.
15. U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to Congress on the Alaska Regional Citizens’ Advisory Councils.
Chapter 5
1. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, & Power (New York: Touchstone Books, 1992)
2. Bulletin of Turan News Agency, “Key Macroeconomic Indicators, 2001.”
3. Energy Information Administration website, available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspgrph.html
4. International Development Association, February 13, 2002.
5. Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan (2001): 36-37.
6. TACIS, Economic Trends-Azerbaijan (April-June 2001).
7. Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan (2001): 135, 321.
8. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report (2001).
9. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile- Azerbaijan 2002. 
10. TACIS, Economic Trends–Azerbaijan (July–September 2001): 150.
11. John A. Holsen, “Macroeconomic Developments and Poverty,” a background paper prepared for Azerbaijan
Republic Poverty Assessment, forthcoming, World Bank (2003).
12. Bulletin of Turan News Agency, “Key Macroeconomic Indicators of Azerbaijan.”
13. TACIS, Economic Trends–Azerbaijan (January–March 2001); Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan (2001): 136.
14. Communication with U.S. Department of Treasury representative, March 4, 2003.
15. Communication with John A. Holsen, March 2, 2003, former regional chief economist, former director of
country economics department, World Bank; contributor to World Bank’s Azerbaijan Republic Poverty Assessment
(2003).
16.  Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan (2002).
17. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile–Azerbaijan 2002.
2 0 2 E N D N O T E S
18. Economic Trends–Azerbaijan (January–March 2002).
19. Economic Trends–Azerbaijan (January–March 2001); Also, calculations of Trend Information Agency.
20. Presentation by Samir Sharifov, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 8, 2002.
21. Economic Trends–Azerbaijan (January–March 2001): 9.
22. N. Quilyeva, “U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce Hints at Azeri Corruption,” Ekho (translated in BBC
Monitoring Service), October 9, 2002.
23. Office of Research, Department of State, “Azerbaijanis Voice Confidence in Aliyev,” Washington, D.C., May 21,
2001.
24. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1305 (2002)[1], Honouring of obligations and
commitments by Azerbaijan.
25. Foreign Investment Advisory Service, “Azerbaijan: Joining the Race for Non-Oil Investment. A Diagnostic
Review of the Environment for FDI” (May 2002).
26. Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan (2002): 76.
27. John A. Holsen, “Macroeconomic Developments and Poverty.”
28 Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan Republic State Programme on Poverty Reduction and
Economic Development, 2003–2005. See also, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Azerbaijan
Human Development Report–2002. In 2001, only 5.2 percent (2,500 people) of those that approached relevant
state bodies to be registered as unemployed were approved, Azerbaijan Human Development Report–2002.
29. Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan Republic State Programme on Poverty Reduction and
Economic Development, 2003–2005.
30. UNDP, Human Development Report–2002.
31. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/html/prdph/lsms/country/azer95/docs/ppabse.pdf
32. Available at: http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewCountries/
AD9E5A867E8406C8C1256BDD0031B18D?OpenDocument
33. United Nations Environment Program, State of the Environment Report–Azerbaijan, 2002, available at:
http://www.grida.no/enrin/htmls/azer/soe/ecology/index.html
34. Holsen, “Macroeconomic Developments and Poverty.”
35. The section on budget accountability is based on an assessment prepared by the International Budget Project
for the Open Society Institute about the readiness of civil society and the media to monitor natural resource
revenues and the public budget in Azerbaijan, October 2002.
36. RFE/RL Newsline, October 14, 1998. See also the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 1999
Annual Report, available at: http://www.ihf-hr.org/reports/ar99/ar99aze.htm
37. OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Republic of Azerbaijan, Parliamentary Elections, 5
November 2000 and 7 January 2001, Final Report.
38. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1305 (2002)[1].
39 Stephanie Rust, “NGO Registration in Azerbaijan: A Cast Study,” Give & Take (winter 2003): 11-13. See also,
“Overview of NGO Registration Procedure: Legislation Provisions and their Implementation,” International Center
for Not-for-Profit Law, January 4, 2002.
40. Trend News Agency, “Azeri Budget Trying to Reduce Reliance on Oil,” translated in BBC Monitoring, October
16, 2002.
41. Report and recommendation of the president of the International Development Association to the executive
directors on a proposed second structural adjustment credit in the amount of SDR 48.4 million to the Republic of
Azerbaijan, February 13, 2002.
42. Statistical Yearbook of Azerbaijan (2001). 
43. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile–Azerbaijan 2002.
44. TACIS, Economic Trends–Azerbaijan (July–September 2001): 72; and calculation of Trend Information Agency.
45. TACIS, Economic Trends–Azerbaijan (July–September 2001): 166, and calculation of Trend Information Agency.
46. Decree of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Changes to Several Legal Acts Regulating the
Activities of the State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, February 7, 2003.
E N D N O T E S    2 0 3
47. All Azerbaijani PSAs have been signed on behalf of the Azerbaijani government by the State Oil Company,
SOCAR, because a Ministry of Energy did not yet exist. As a result, there is a built in conflict of interest in that
SOCAR is both a contractor and the representative of the government’s interests.  Appendix Two contains a
summary of the twenty-one PSAs that have been signed.
48. Key documents for the development of this field, such as the production-sharing agreement, environmental
and social impact assessments, and oil spill response plan can be found on the Caspian Development and Export
webpage available at: http://www.caspiandevelopmentandexport.com/ACG/eng/acg.asp
49. Energy Information Administration, Azerbaijan Country Report.
50. Turan News Agency “High Cost Delays Development of Azeri Gas Field,” translated in BBC Monitoring
Service, October 15, 2002.
51. Report and recommendation of the president of the International Development Association to the executive
directors on a proposed second structural adjustment credit in the amount of SDR 48.4 million to the Republic of
Azerbaijan. February 13, 2002.
52. Holsen.
53. The terms of this index apply if transport costs are less than or equal to $3/barrel.
54. Presentation of Samir Sharifov, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
55. Except for the Atasgah-Yanan Tava-Mugan-Daniz field being explored by a consortium of Japanese companies.
56. Holsen.
57. TACIS, Economic Tendencies in Azerbaijan (January–March 2001); 87. Khalg 7, July 2002, page 2; Analysis from
Trend Information Agency. 
58. In real terms, the maximum is $270 million because SOCAR holds a 10 percent share of the project.
59. International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Azerbaijan Republic: Recent Economic Developments,” IMF Staff
Country Report no. 95/119 (1995): 32.
60. State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2001 Annual Report.
61. These estimates are nominal in that they are not discounted for inflation.
62. National & Regional Review, forthcoming report of the AIOC project partners, 2003.
63. Ibid.
64. Turan News Agency, January 7, 2002.
65. “IMF Wants Azerbaijan to Set Up an Oil Fund,” Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, News and Trends Central
Asia, February 21, 2000.
66. State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2001 Annual Report.
67. Regulations of the State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic, sec. 2.
68. Regulations of the State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic, sec. 3.
69. Available at http://www.oilfund.az/html/reports.html
70. Regulations of the State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic.
71. Regulations of the State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic, sec. 3.
72. The first decree (no. 562, August 22, 2001) authorized the spending of $17.8 million on construction of
housing for refugees displaced by the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. A second decree (no. 577, September 7, 2001)
authorized another $18 million to help settle IDPs ousted from the districts of Agdam and Fuzuli. A third decree,
issued in 2002, allocates about $40 million to improve living standards for IDPs in five tent camps in the
Bilasuvar district. The implementation of these decrees is being handled by the Agency for Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction of the Occupied Territories (responsible for about 25 percent of the spending) and the Fund for
Social Development of Internally Displaced Persons (responsible for about 75 percent of spending). The State
Committee for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons is overseeing the Agency and the Fund. 
73. Regulations of the State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic, sec. 1.6,a.
74. Turan News Agency, translated on BBC Monitoring Service, July 24, 2002.
75. Azerbaijan Republic: 2001 Article IV Consultation, p.18.
76. State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2001 Annual Report, 22.
77. Regulations of the State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic, sec. 3.1.3.
78. Regulations of the State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic, sec. 1.2.
2 0 4 E N D N O T E S
79. Regulations of the State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic, sec. 2.
80. International Monetary Fund (IMF), “International Monetary Fund’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
Arrangement with the Azerbaijan Republic,” Press Release, December 14, 2002.
81. State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2001 Annual Report, 45.
82. Regulations of the State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan Republic, sec. 5.1.3.
83. Available at: http://www.bankwatch.org/issues/moilclima.html
84. Foreign Investment Advisory Service, Azerbaijan: Joining the Race for Non-Oil Investment. A Diagnostic Review
of the Environment for FDI.
85. Azerbaijan Republic: Article IV Consultation, March 2002.
86. Jeffrey Davis, Rolando Ossowski, James Daniel, and Steven Barnett, “Stabilization and Savings Funds for
Nonrenewable Resources,” IMF Occasional Paper 205, Washington, D.C., 2001.
87. For more information on the EITI, see http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/News/files/eiti_guide.htm
88. “Journalists Clash with Government Over New State Secrets Decree,” Eurasianet, September 15, 2002.
Chapter 6
1. “Kazakhstan’s Citizenship Will Be Worth More than that of the USA,” Argumenty i Fakti Kazakhstan, March 27,
2002.
2. “Seventy-five Percent of Kazakhstan National Economy Privatized,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, November 3, 1999.
3. Tengiz is being developed by a joint venture led by ChevronTexaco (50 percent), KazMunaiGaz (20 percent),
ExxonMobil (25 percent) and Lukarco (5 percent).  Kashagan is being developed by the Offshore Kazakhstan
International Operating Company (OKIOC).  Italy’s ENI is the operator.  OKIOC subsequently has been renamed
AGIP Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company (AGIP KCO).  ENI is the parent of AGIP. Karachaganak is
being developed by a joint venture whose members include BT Group (32.5 percent), ENI (32.5 percent),
ChevronTexaco (20 percent) and Lukoil (15 percent).   
4. “Oil-rich Kazakhstan Growing Fast, Must Diversify,” Reuters, Astana, January 28, 2003.
5.  “Kazakhstan Reaches Oil Accord,” New York Times, January 23, 2003; “Oil Companies Settle Flap with
Kazakhstan,” Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2003.
6. Interfax, Astana, January 29, 2003.
7. “Kazakhstan Gas Trade: APS Review,” Oil Market Trends, August 26, 2002.
8. “Plan for Development of Kazakh Natural Gas Reserves to be Worked Out,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty,
February 7, 2003.
9. “Kazakh-Russian Joint Venture to Export 35-40 Billion Cubic Meters of Gas by 2015,” Alexander’s Oil and Gas
Connection, December 18,  2002.
10. “KazRosGaz to Export 35-40 Billion Cubic Meters of Gas per Year,” Moscow(Bluebull), December 19,  2002.
11. “Kazakhstan Projects Crude Output at 3-mil b/d by 2015,” Platts Oilgram News, December 10, 2002
12. “Russia Venture Breathes New Life into Kazakh Gas,” Platts Oilgram News, October 4, 2002.
13. “Gazprom to Boost Kazakh Gas Transit to Europe,” Reuters, Astana, December 5, 2002.
14. “Kazakhstan to Refine 9 Percent More Crude in 2003,” Interfax, Astana, January 31, 2003.
15. Russia has a 24 percent participation in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium; Kazakhstan: 19 percent, Oman: 7
percent, and the remaining 50 percent is divided between the Chevron Caspian Pipeline Company, which holds 15
percent, Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company: 7.5 percent, and six other equity holders. See “CPC Activity Should be
Regulated in Line with Shareholder Agreement–Kazakh PM,” Interfax, Astana, November 20, 2002.
16. KazMunaiGaz transport manager Kabyldin said that an agreement is being considered under which Kazakh
firms would participate in the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Kabyldin thought Kazakhstan could commit up to 400,000
bpd.
17. “CPC Chief Announces Difficulties with Implementation of Project in Russia,” Interfax, Moscow, November
20, 2002.
E N D N O T E S    2 0 5
18. “Kazakhstan to Export 16 Million Tons of Oil Through CPC in 2003,” Interfax, Astana, January 29, 2003.
19. “Kazakh Oil Transit through Russia to Top 19 Million Tons in 2003,” Interfax, Moscow, December 18, 2002.
20. “Kazakhstan Sees 24 Percent Output Gain in 2003,” Platts Oilgram News, February 5, 2003.
21. Without access to Kazakhstan’s production-sharing agreements, it is difficult to know the government’s take.
However, if, as is expected, production will be about 1.25 million bpd in 2005, at $23 per barrel, total earnings will
be $10.5 billion. Even after transportation costs and cost recovery are taken into account, the likely earnings for
the government in 2005 will be far greater than $1.5 billion. 
22. “Republic of Kazakhstan: Staff Report for the 2001 Article IV Consultation,” IMF Country Report, no. 02/63,
January 3, 2002.
23. World Bank, “Kazakhstan: Accelerating Growth in the Non-Oil Sectors of the Economy,” report of the World
Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Division, Europe and Central Asia Region, December 21,
2001.
24. Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan,“Republic of Kazakhstan: Staff Report for the 2001 Article IV
Consultation,” p. 17.
25. Memorandum of the IBRD and the IFC to the Executive Directors on a Country Assistance Strategy for the
Republic of Kazakhstan, January 16, 2001. (henceforth: Country Assistance Strategy).
26.  “On Forecast Targets for the State Budget of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2002-2004,” Government
Resolution no. 1197, September 13, 2001. “Kazakh Oil Revenue to Grow on Average 11 Percent a Year by 2005,”
Kazakhstan Today News Agency, March 11, 2003.
27. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, EBRD Transition Report (1996).
28. “IMF Forecasts Easy 7-8 Percent Growth of Kazakh Economy in 2003,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty, March 3,
2003.
29. For a more extensive discussion of Kazakhstan’s macroeconomic achievements, see Government of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, “Republic of Kazakhstan: Staff Report for the 2001 Article IV Consultation.”
30. “Country Report: Kazakhstan,” Economist Intelligence Unit (September 2002).
31. United Nations, United Nations Human Development Report (2002).
32. United Nations, Millenium Development Goals in Kazakhstan, (2002).
33. Memorandum of the IBRD and the IFC to the Executive Directors on a Country Assistance Strategy for the
Republic of Kazakhstan.
34. Human Development Report, Kazakhstan, (2002).
35. Ibid,  27.
36. Ibid. See also the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Statistics available at: www.kazstat.asdc.kz
37. Ibid.
38. K. Mukhtarova, The Distribution of Income and Poverty in the Transition Economy (Almaty, 2000).
39. Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997).
40. Report of International Budget Project to the Open Society Institute on opportunities for participatory
budgeting in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, November 27, 2002.
41. World Bank, “Kazakhstan Public Expenditure Review,” World Bank Summary Report, vol. 1, no. 20489-KZ,
2000.
42. Author’s interview with Sofia Issenova, November 2002. 
43. International Monetary Fund, Republic of Kazakhstan, Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes—Fiscal
Transparency Module, April 2003.
44. Ibid.
45. S.N. Bobylev, “Interview with Green Salvation,” Green Salvation Herald, 2002, available at: www.greensalva-
tion.org/English/index.htm
46. For more information on deforestation in Kazakhstan, visit the website of the Ecological Association, Green
Salvation at: www.greensalvation.org
47. United Nations, State of Environment of the Republic of Kazakhstan, (1998).
48. Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, Republic of Kazakhstan, A National Plan of Action for Protecting
the Environment for the Stable Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Almaty, 1998). 
2 0 6 E N D N O T E S
49. Galina Godunova, “Massive Die-Off of Caspian Seals-A Warning Sign for Human Beings,” Give & Take (winter
2001): 12-14.
50. “Kazakh Oil Industry Poses Threat to Caspian Sea Fauna,” Novoye Pokoleniye, Almaty, January 31, 2003.
51. “Who is Investing in Whom? Foreign Oil Companies in Kazakhstan,” Green Salvation Herald, 2001. Available
at: www.greensalvation.com
52. “Oil Money Threatens to Make Killing Fields of Kazakhstan,” The Guardian, December 4, 2002.
53. See website at: www.economist.com/agenda.
54. “New Frontiers,” Platts Oilgram News, January 21, 2003.
55. “Kazakh Oil Consortium Divided on Kashagan Future,” Reuters, Almaty, October 3, 2002.
56. See www.greensalvation.org
57. Marjukka Hiltunen, Economic Mechanisms for Nature Protection, January 2001. Available at: www.greensalva-
tion.org.
58. Ibid.
59. See “Battle for the Mountain Giant,” Available at: www.greensalvation.org
60. PriceWaterhouseCoopers, The Removal of Constraints to Investment in Kazakhstan Project, report submitted by
PriceWaterhouseCoopers to USAID, February 2, 2001.
61. On the tendency for natural resource wealth to undermine the incentive for structural reform, see C. Leite and
J. Weidmann, “Does Mother Nature Corrupt-Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth,” IMF
Working Paper99/85 (Washington DC: IMF).
62. Article IV Consultation, Kazakhstan.
63. Tax revenues in Kazakhstan fell from 22 percent of GDP in 1993 to 17.4 percent in 1999. Country Assistance
Strategy.
64. Country Assistance Strategy.
65. “Risks for Foreign Investors,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 29, 2002.
66. Sergei Gavrichev, “Private Oil Companies in Kazakhstan Will Have to Choose Contractors with Government
Consent,” RusEnergy Weekly, no. 30 (2002).
67. See http://riskwire.eiu.com
68. Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., Kim R. Holmes, and Mary Anastasia O’Grady, The 2002 Index of Economic Freedom,
(The Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, 2002).
69. The IMF has struggled for several years with the government of Kazakhstan over disclosure. According to the
Economist, the Fund was unable to complete a review of its Extended Fund Facility to Kazakhstan partly due to the
government’s refusal to disclose information about the budgetary results of its oil operations. For other calls for
transparency, see, U.S. Department of Commerce Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States
“Kazakhstan Fact Sheet,” June 2002; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2001-2002 Kazakhstan
Strategy Overview, available at: http://www.ebrd.org/country/index.htm; “World Bank Chief Calls for Transparency
in Kazakhstan,’ World Markets Analysis, April 9, 2002. 
70. Country Assistance Strategy.
71. Ibid. For a thorough analysis of the constraints to business in three Kazakh oblasts, see the report of
PriceWaterhouseCoopers report to USAID on The Removal of Constraints to Investment in Kazakhstan Project,
February 2, 2001.
72. World Bank, “Kazakhstan: Accelerating Growth in the Non-Oil Sectors of the Economy,” Poverty Reduction and
Economic Management, Europe and Central Asia Region (December 21, 2001): 25.
73. Country Assistance Strategy. For anecdotes illustrating some of the arbitrary and vague requirements, and the
room they leave for interpretation by local inspectors, see “Kazakhstan: Accelerating Growth in the Non-Oil
Sectors of the Economy.”
74. 2002 Index of Economic Freedom.
75. For a detailed reporting on the constraints of doing business in Kazakhstan, see “Kazakhstan: Accelerating
Growth in the Non-Oil Sectors of the Economy.”
76. “Kazakhstan Aims to Increase GDP by About 300 Percent by 2015,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty, March 11,
2003.
E N D N O T E S    2 0 7
77. “IMF Warns Against Protectionism in Kazakh Industrial Development Policy,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty,
March 4, 2003.
78. Investigations of money-laundering by Nazarbayev by the Swiss and U.S. departments of justice are still
underway.
79. “Kazakhstan: Premier Admits to Secret Fund, Bank Accounts,” RFE/RL, April 4, 2002.
80. Interview with Oraz Jandosov, May 17, 2002.
81. “On the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” Presidential Decree no. 402, August 23, 2000.
82. Republic of Kazakhstan, Article IV Consultation (March 2002):19
83. Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (2003).
84. Communication with IMF staff of the European II Department, May 1, 2002.
85. “Kazakhstan to Accumulate 4 Billion Dollars in Stabilizing Fund by 2005,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty, March
11, 2003.
86.  Information of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Formation and Use of the
National Fund in 2001 available at: http://www.nationalfund.kz/. Corporate income taxes equaled 71.34 percent,
with 23.3 percent from royalties, and the remainder from bonuses and VAT.
87. Includes managerial services, commissions, and legal fees. All figures reported at September 2002 exchange
rates.
88. Website of the National Fund available at: http://www.nationalfund.kz/
89. Report of the Ministry of Finance to the parliament on 2001 Budget Fulfillment, May 14, 2002.
90. “The State Budget Has Received 148168.3 Million Tenge from the Raw Materials Sector as of January 1, 2003,”
Kazakhstan Today, January 28, 2003.
91. The IMF has, however, provided National Fund projections based on a $19/bl estimate. However, given the
high oil prices of recent years, it is important to provide projections based on these various scenarios. For the
IMF’s projections, see Staff Report for 2001 Article IV Consultation and also Republic of Kazakhstan: Selected
Issues and Statistical Appendix.
92. Study trips to Norway were funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Author’s interview with
David Hoffman, USAID, Kazakhstan.
93. Press Conference at the National Bank, May 8, 2002.
94. Author’s communication with IMF staff of the European II Department, May 1, 2002. Interview with Iskander
Beysembetov, Chairman, Agency for Strategic Planning, Kazakhstan.
95. K. Shaymerdenov, “Vice-premier Utembayev Has Portrayed to Deputies the Outlook for Creating a So-called
Oil Fund,” Panorama, June 30, 2000.
96. “Parliamentarians Want Explanations on Establishment of National Fund,” Panorama, June 23, 2000.
97. Christian E. Petersen and Nina Budina, “Governance Framework of Oil Funds: The Case of Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan,” presented at The World Bank Workshop on Petroleum Revenue Management, Washington, D.C.,
October 23-24, 2002.
98. Khabar Television, December 13, 2000.
99. Republic of Kazakhstan, “Rules for the Establishment and Use of the National Fund,” Decree no. 543, January
29, 2001.
100. “Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World,” Human Development Report 2002. See also Robert G.
Kaiser, “Kazakhs’ Season of Repression: President of Key U.S. Ally Puts Critics on Trial, in Jail,” Washington Post,
July 22, 2002; “A Wide Crackdown in Kazakhstan,” International Herald Tribune, June 11, 2002; “The Rot in
Kazakhstan,” the Economist, July 27, 2002.
101. See Constitution of Kazakhstan, art. 6, pt. 3 and art. 3, pt. 1.
102. Research commissioned by Caspian Revenue Watch from Transparency Kazakhstan.
103. Megapolis, September 26, 2001.
104. Izvestia, September 26, 2001.
105. For example, Majlis deputy Tatiana Kviatkovskaya explains, “It’s not that I am against the NF, but rather that
transfers to it should pass through the budget. No harm can come from passing through an additional filter of
control....According to what rules should we, the legislative branch, be crimping on our own powers?” 
2 0 8 E N D N O T E S
106. Delovoye Obozrenie Respublika, November 1, 2001.
107. See for example, A. Mazhilisman and V. Makalkin, interview in Toward A Society Without Corruption, no. 1
(July/August 2001). Also, interview with Bulat Abilov, Delovoye Obozreniye Respublika, November 1, 2001.
108. See for example, Amirzhan Kosanov, “The Oil Fund or the Government’s Purse?” The Twenty First Century,
January 22, 2001. This view was also expressed in interviews with Ivan Fedorovich Cherkalin, chairman of the
legislative committee on economic reform and regional development; Victor Nikolayevich Vensin, secretary of the
legislative committee on finance and budget; and Valentin Ivanovich Makalkin, member of the Majlis, May 20-21,
2002.
109. See for example Altynai Mukhamedyarova, “Kazakhstan Has Determined its Position on the National Fund,”
Central Asian Agency for Political Research available at http://www.caapr.kz/show.php?kza0502-06.htm
110. Letter to the editor, Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2002.
111. Interview with founders of People’s Oil Fund.
112. “The Transparency and Accountability of Natural Resource Revenues,” Eurasia Economic Summit, Almaty,
April 9, 2002.
113. Alaska Statute Section 37.13.170 supra n.4.
Chapter 7
1. National Energy Policy, Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, May 2001. Available at
http://www.fe.doe.gov/general/energypolicy/nationalenergypolicy.pdf
2. European Commission, Energy: Let Us Overcome Our Dependence: Green Paper–Towards a European Strategy for
the Security of Energy Supply, (2002). Available at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy_transport/livrevert/brochure/dep_en.pdf
3. For more information on the campaign, see the Publish What You Pay website available at: 
www.publishwhatyoupay.org
4. The Global Reporting Initiative is a Collaborating Center of the United Nations Environment Program.
5. Philip Swanson, Reporting of Resource Revenues, research report commissioned for World Bank (December
2002).
6. For examples of how advocacy campaigns influenced policy changes at the World Bank, see the Bank
Information Center’s summary available at: www.bicusa.org/policy/projectcampaigns.htm 
7. Daphne Eviatar, “Wildcat Lawyering,” The American Lawyer, November 4, 2002. See also “Oil Companies
Colonise Turkey: MAI by the Back Door?” August 30, 2002 press release by Cornerhouse, Friends of the Earth
International, Kurdish Human Rights Project, Platform, CEE Bankwatch Network, and the Ilisu Dam Campaign.
8. IFC Press Release No. 02/129, September 30, 2002.
9. William Ascher, Why Governments Waste Natural Resources (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1999).
2 0 9
About the Contributors
Author
Svetlana Tsalik is the director of the Caspian Revenue Watch, a program of the Open Society
Institute’s Central Eurasia Project. As such, she conducts research, works with local activists,
and conducts advocacy in support of improved transparency and accountability in the man-
agement of petroleum revenues in developing countries. Prior to this she worked as a man-
agement consultant for A.T. Kearney in New York. In 2000, she graduated with a Ph.D. from
the Department of Political Science at Stanford University, with a focus on center-regional rela-
tions in post-Soviet Russia.
Editor
Robert Ebel is director of the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strate-
gic and International Studies. Formerly vice president for international affairs at Enserch Cor-
poration, he advised the corporation on global issues. Ebel traveled to the Soviet Union in 1960
2 1 0 C O N T R I B U T O R S
as a member of the first U.S. petroleum industry delegation, and in 1971 with the first group
of Americans to visit the oil fields in Western Siberia. He is co-editor of Energy and Conflict
in Central Asia and the Caucasus (2000) and author of Energy Choices in the Near Abroad: The
Haves and Have-nots Face the Future (1997) and Energy Choices in Russia (1994).
Contributors
Ingilab Akhmedov is the founder and director of the analytic information agency Trend in
Azerbaijan. He also heads the Public Finance Monitoring Center in Azerbaijan. Akhmedov
served as an advisor to the Ministry of Economy of Azerbaijan from 1998 to 1999. Prior to
that, he taught at the Azerbaijan Institute of Oil and Chemistry from 1991 to 1992. He holds
a Ph.D. from the St. Petersburg State University of Economy and Finance.
Sabit Bagirov is the chairman of the board of Transparency International in Azerbaijan and
president of the Entrepreneurship Development Foundation and the Center for Economic and
Political Research in Baku, Azerbaijan. From 1992–1993, he served as the state advisor on
strategic programs to the president of Azerbaijan, helping establish state committees on anti-
monopoly policy and support for entrepreneurship, privatization of state property, land reform,
and foreign investment. During that time, he was also president of the State Oil Company of
Azerbaijan (SOCAR), during which he restructured the company for greater efficiency and
was  responsible for contracts with foreign investors for the development of oil and gas. 
Richard A. Fineberg brings experience from academia, newspaper reporting, and government
service to his independent analysis of economic and environmental issues related to Alaska
and global petroleum development. His research reports on Alaska cover topics such as: the
profitability and long-term production prospects of Alaska’s North Slope oil complex; state and
federal petroleum receipts; operational and safety issues on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Sys-
tem (TAPS); the economics of that system; and the causes and effects of the 1989 Exxon Valdez
oil spill. His newspaper coverage of the construction of TAPS and a proposed natural gas line
earned both state and national awards. Between 1986 and 1989, Fineberg served as a senior
advisor to the governor of Alaska on oil and gas policy issues. Since that time he has consulted
and prepared reports for nonprofit organizations, government agencies, independent devel-
opers, and private investors.
Rick Steiner is a professor, conservation specialist, and associate director of the University of
Alaska Marine Advisory Program in Anchorage, Alaska. As the University of Alaska’s marine
advisor for the Prince William Sound region of Coastal Alaska from 1983–1997, he was inti-
C O N T R I B U T O R S    2 1 1
mately involved in oil issues, and became a local leader in the response to the Exxon Valdez
oil spill in 1989. His work after the oil spill—proposing the establishment of the Regional Cit-
izens Advisory Councils, helping to craft the U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, and proposing
that the governments and Exxon settle their damage claims, which led to the historic $1 bil-
lion settlement—received several awards and international recognition. He has also been pro-
ducer and host of the Alaska Resource Issues Forum public television show since 1986.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize winner in economics, is professor of economics and finance
at Columbia University in New York City. He has taught at Princeton, Stanford, and MIT, and
was the Drummond Professor and a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. He was a member
of the Council of Economic Advisors from 1993–95 and CEA chairman from 1995–97. Stiglitz
served as chief economist and senior vice president of the World Bank from 1997–2000. His
work has helped explain the circumstances in which markets do not work well, and how gov-
ernment intervention can improve their performance. He helped create a new branch of eco-
nomics, “The Economics of Information.” His most recent book is Globalization and Its
Discontents.

2 1 3
Contact Information
The Central Eurasia Project
Open Society Institute
400 West 59th Street
New York, NY 10019 USA
Tel:   1 212 548 0600
Fax:  1 212 548 4607
dsershen@sorosny.org
efinnerty@sorosny.org
http://www.eurasianet.org
http://www.soros.org
2 1 4 C O N T A C T  I N F O R M A T I O N
STAFF
Anthony Richter, Director
Deborah Koeppel, Regional Director
Susan Lazorchick, Assistant Regional Director
Erika Dailey, Director, Turkmenistan Project
Svetlana Tsalik, Director, Caspian Revenue Watch
Erin Finnerty, Program Coordinator
Daniel Sershen, Program Coordinator
Justin Burke, Editor, EurasiaNet
Abraham Rein, Website Data Manager, EurasiaNet
ADVISORY BOARD
Patricia Carley, US Commission on International Religious Freedom
Fiona Hill, The Brookings Institution
Scott Horton, Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler
Nancy Lubin, JNA Associates
Michael Ochs, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
David Rieff, Writer
Barnett Rubin, Center on International Cooperation
C O N T A C T  I N F O R M A T I O N 2 1 5
OSI Assistance Foundation–Armenia
1 Pushkin St., Apt. 2, 
Yerevan 375010, Armenia
Tel/Fax: (3741) 541719
E-mail: office@osi.am
OSI Assistance Foundation–Azerbaijan
117A Academik Hasan Aliyev Street
Baku 370110, Azerbaijan
Tel: (99412) 41 27 22 or 98 69 33
Fax: (99412) 98 69 34
E-mail: fasadov@osi-az.org
Open Society Georgia Foundation
10 a Chovelidze Str, 
380008 Tbilisi, Georgia 
Tel: (99532) 938999
Fax: (99532) 291052
E-mail: kartuli@osgf.ge 
Soros Foundation–Kazakhstan
Ul. Furmanova, 117-20
Almaty, Kazakhstan 480091
Tel: (73272) 503811
Fax: (73272) 503814
E-mail: aartemyev@soros.kz
Soros Foundation–Kyrgyzstan
55A Logvinenko St.
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan 720040
Tel: (996312) 663475
Fax: (996312) 663448
E-mail: office@soros.kg 
Mongolian Foundation for Open Society
XacBank Building
Prime Minister Amar Street
Sukhbaatar District
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia - 210646 
Tel: (976 11) 313 207
Fax: (976 11) 324 857
E-mail: osi@soros.org.mn
OSI Assistance Foundation–Tajikistan
59 Tolstoy Street
734003 Dushanbe, Tajikistan
Tel/Fax: (992372) 211958
E-mail: zhalimov@osi.tajik.net
OSI Assistance Foundation–Turkey
Cevdet Pasa Caddesi
Mercan Apt, No. 164, D.11
Bebek, Istanbul 80811, Turkey
Tel: (90212) 2879986
Fax: (90212) 2879967
E-mail: sbezmez@osiaf.org.tr
OSI Assistance Foundation–Uzbekistan
31 Zarbog Street 
700031, Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Tel: (99871) 1205408 or 1205410
Fax: (99871) 1206854
E-mail: osi@osi.uz
SOROS FOUNDATIONS 


C
asp
ian
 O
il W
in
d
falls: W
h
o
 W
ill B
en
efit?
OSI
Svetlana Tsalik
Foreword  | Joseph E. Stiglitz
C A S P I A N  R E V E N U E  W A T C H
Caspian Oil Windfalls:
Who Will Benefit?
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan urgently
need measures that guarantee
accountability, transparency, and
public oversight in their oil industries.
Only then will the two countries 
stand a chance of using oil and
natural gas revenues to raise living
standards for their people and lay 
the basis for healthy, long-term
economic growth.
OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE
Central Eurasia Project
